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The backing-of-warrants is a fast-track procedure for extradition regulated under 
Part 4 of the Extradition Act 1999.  This thesis critically scrutinises a recent review 
of the legislation by the Law Commission as it relates to the impact of its proposed 
new Act on the current backed-warrant procedure, particularly as it relates to 
Australia.1 The Commission’s proposal that its new Act will achieve the 
Commission’s objective to “strike the necessary and appropriate balance between 
protecting the rights of those whose extradition is sought and providing an efficient 
mechanism for extradition” will be analysed and critiqued.2   It will be shown that, 
the Commission has tipped the balance towards the liberty interests of the requested 
person, when it proposed to increase the breadth of grounds by which the courts 
may refuse surrender under a new “unjust or oppressive” provision. As a 
consequence, the proposed legislative provisions may risk breaching the doctrine 
of comity and frustrating the backed-warrant procedure. This thesis further posits 
that comity should not be over-emphasised, particularly as the Commission has not 
at all or has inadequately considered the disparity that exists between the way 
comity is applied in practise by the Australian and New Zealand courts. As a 
consequence, the proposed less onerous test for Australia, is unjustified. While the 
Commission’s proposal gives weight to the growing importance of human rights as 
a determining factor in surrender nevertheless, the Commission’s proposals lack 
coherency and fail to delineate between the standard procedure and the backed-
warrant procedure. In absence of any evidence that the efficacy of the backed-
warrant procedure is wanting, the impact of the Commission’s proposals, are 
unlikely therefore to achieve the balance it strives to achieve.   The argument put 
here is that there is a strong principled case for strengthening human rights 
protections in the current backed-warrant procedure. In that regard, this thesis 
advances the proposition that in combination, the Commission’s New Zealand Bill 
of Rights proposal and a role for a proposed central authority - subject to 
reconceptualising comity in this context to one that includes a human rights 
component.  To that end, this thesis advocates replacing the balancing act paradigm 
                                                          
1 Law Commission Modernising New Zealand’s Extradition and Mutual Assistance Laws (NZLC 
R137, 2016) [Report]; and Law Commission Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
Matters (NZLC IP37, 2014) [Issues Paper]. 
2 Law Commission Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (NZLC IP37, 2014) 
[Issues Paper] at [1.8]-[1.9].  See also Report, above n 1, at 5. See Extradition Bill, cl 7(1)(a). 
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that purports to reconcile the competing interests underpinning extradition with an 
assessment of human rights as a primary determining factor in surrender at both the 
initial stages and latter stages of the backed-warrant procedure. This model, as 
proposed, will maintain the fast-track nature of the backed-warrant procedure as it 
would allow the judiciary to differentiate risk between low-level and gross forms 
of human rights violations or abuse.  Finally, this thesis posits that the 
jurisprudential acceptance in the courts of the extraterritorial effect of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 in relation to Australian Police conduct in New 
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1.   Introduction 
 
1.1 Background to the Law Commission’s proposed reform  
On 1 November 2013, the Government referred to the Law Commission a review 
of the Extradition Act 1999 and the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 
1992 (MACMA).3 The purpose of the review was to ensure that these Acts are 
efficacious and provide safeguards for essential human rights.4 In 2014 the 
Commission released an Issues Paper making a preliminary conclusion that the Acts 
required reform and calling for submissions.5 This was followed by a final report 
tabled by the Minister of Justice in February 2016.6 
 
1.2 Summary of the Law Commission’s findings 
The Law Commission President, Sir Grant Hammond concluded that both Acts 
are complex and convoluted and fail to come to grips with the realities of New 
Zealand’s place within a globalised environment.  The Commission said:7  
 Both statutes fail to provide a framework through which to balance New 
 Zealand's role within the international community and the values important 
 to New  Zealanders in this context, which include protecting the rights of 
 those accused of crimes overseas and protecting those here from 
 unwarranted investigations from abroad.  
1.3 Proposed new Act 
In attempt to modernise New Zealand’s extradition law, the Commission 
proposed a new Act that is designed to “strike the necessary and appropriate 
balance between protecting the rights of those whose extradition is sought and 




                                                          
3 Issues Paper, above n 1, at iv. 
4 Issues Paper, above n 1, at [1.7]. 
5 Issues Paper, above n 1. 
6 Report, above n 1. 
7 Report, above n 1, at iv. 
8 Issues Paper, above n 1, at [1.8]-[1.9]. Report, above n 1, at 5. 
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1.4  Research question 
Given, that approximately half of all extradition requests to New Zealand fall under 
a backed-warrant procedure, 9 it is appropriate to ask, how the proposed new Act 
will impact on this procedure and whether in developing its proposals, the 
Commission has appropriately delineated the standard extradition procedure from 
surrender under the backed-warrant procedure.10  This “simplified procedure” has 
received little, if any, academic attention and hence the need to research the Part 4 
backed-warrant procedure. It is Part 4 of the Extradition Act 1999 (“the 1999 Act”) 
in relation to Australia, that is the focus of this paper.  
 
1.5 The history of the backing-of warrants 
The term backed-warrant procedure, or backing-of-arrest warrants, is the name 
given to the procedure in which a state is asked to “back” or endorse the overseas 
warrant for arrest.11 It differs from standard extradition, in that it is less formal and 
more simplified in nature, without the requirement to establish a prima facie case 
against the defendant.12 The backed-warrant procedure has its origins in the long-
established imperial-based procedure which existed prior to the 1991 Act.13 Tracing 
the development of the backed-warrant procedure through its imperial origins will 
assist in evaluating how the Commission’s proposals will impact on key aspects to 
the procedure.   
 
1.6 Surrender 
This thesis uses the term “surrender” in referring to the backed-warrant procedure 
and the term “standard extradition” in referring to the non-simplified procedure of 
extradition.  For the purposes of this thesis, the terms “endorsement” will be 
adopted and the person whose surrender is being sought, will be referred to as the 
                                                          
9 Issues Paper, above n 1, at [2.27]. 
10 The Law Commission’s recommendations for further simplification of the backed-warrant 
procedure was not mentioned in a recent article by Paul Comrie-Thomson and Kate Salmond 
“Modernising New Zealand's extradition and mutual assistance laws” [2016] NZLJ 81. 
11 Issues Paper, above n 1, at [2.15]. It has been suggested that the term “backing-of-warrants” was 
first used in the Indictable Offences Act 1848 (UK). See E P Aughterson Extradition Australian 
Law and Procedure (Law Book Company Limited, Sydney, 1995) at 236. The term “endorsed 
warrants” regime is used in the Explanatory Note of the Extradition Bill 1998. 
12  Margaret Soper “Extradition” (2004) 1 Laws of New Zealand at 5; and M Cherif Bassiouni 
International Extradition: United States Law and Practice (5th ed, Oxford University Press, New 
York, 2014) at 21; and Clive Nicholls and others The Law of Extradition and Mutual Assistance 
(3rd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013). 
13  Fugitive Offenders Act 1881 (UK). 
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“requested person”.  In addition, the term “requested country” will refer to the 
country where requests for surrender are received and the term “requesting country” 
will refer to the country from where requests originate.14 
 
1.7 The role of comity  
A key aspect to the backed-warrant procedure is the concept of comity but, despite 
its importance the term “comity” is not explicitly mentioned in the 1999 Act or its 
predecessors.15 Nor is there any judicial discussion or jurisprudence elucidating 
how such loose usage of the term comity evolved and is applied to the Part 4, 
backed-warrant procedure when determining surrender.16   
 
Comity, is broadly defined in the non-legal sense as “courtesy and considerate 
behaviour towards others”.17  Its legal roots have been traced to private international 
law where it acted as a balancing principle that assisted the judiciary and executive 
to accommodate the doctrine of sovereignty with serving justice to private 
litigants.18  In the context of extradition, the purpose of comity was to allow states 
to deviate from the principle of sovereignty in order to fulfil the goal of international 
cooperation in transnational crime.19  Comity in the extradition context is often 
referred to as “comity of nations”  which is defined in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary 
                                                          
14 The backed-warrant procedure and other such simplified systems are variously referred to in the 
literature and in legislative provisions as “deportation”, “surrender”, “rendition” or “extradition”. 
See Solicitor-General “New Zealand Foreign Offenders Apprehension Act, 1863. (Papers relating 
to the case of Frederick Gleich)” Untitled, [1880] AJHR A6 available at 
<www.atojs.natlib.govt.nz/cgi-bin/atojs>; Limor Klimek European Arrest Warrant (Springer 
International Publishing, Switzerland, 2015) at 52; Extradition Act 1999, Part 4 and the Fugitive 
Offenders Act 1881 (UK). Historically, the subject of this procedure has been referred to as the 
“prisoner” or “fugitive” and under more recent legislation, the “person” or “requested person”. 
While the term “endorsement” is used under Part 4 of the 1999 Act, Australia refers to the backing 
of the original warrant as “indorsement” under Part 3 of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth).  
15 See Civil Aviation Act 1990, s 88 (5). In that Act, comity is referred to but not defined. 
16 More modern usage of the term comity, includes “judicial comity” and “legal comity” with 
connotations of deference and respect for the courts in another jurisdiction. It is also said to 
complement the principles of stare decisis.  See for example Hilton v Guyot 159 US 113 (1895) at 
163–64; and CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 345 at 396.  Applied in 
Minister of Home Affairs and Others v Tsebe and Others 2012 (5) SA 467 (CC) [Tsebe] at [126]. 
17 See Shorter Oxford Dictionary <www.dictionaries.com>; and H W Fowler and F G Fowler The 
Concise Oxford Dictionary (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1929) at 224. 
18 Thomas Shultz and Jason Mitchenson “Navigating sovereignty and transnational commercial 
law: the use of comity by Australian courts” (2016) 12 Journal of Private International Law 344 at 
348.  
19 Alexander James Johnston The New Zealand Justice of the Peace: A Treatise on the Powers, 
Duties and Liabilities of Magistrates, Coroners & Peace Officers in the Colony: With a Digest of 
the Law of Evidence and an Appendix of Acts and Forms (M'Kenzie & Muir, Wellington, 1864) at 
288-292. See further Alpheus Todd Parliamentary Government in the British Colonies (2nd ed, 
Longmans, Green, London, 1894). 
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as being “the courteous and friendly understanding by which each nation respects 
the laws and usages of every other, so far as may be without prejudice to its own 
rights and interests.”20  In Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye, the following 
definition of comity of nations was approved by La Forest J at the Supreme Court 
of Canada:21  
 
"Comity" in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on 
the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is 
the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the 
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard 
both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own 
citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws …” 
 
 
In order to evaluate the impact of the Commission’s proposals on the backed-
warrant procedure it is necessary to consider whether comity needs to be 
reconceptualised in a way that would contribute towards how comity should be 
currently understood.  This question requires an examination of the competing 
interests that the judiciary or executive face in determining whether surrender of 
the requested person should be refused.  These competing interests include the 
principle of sovereignty, the doctrine of comity or international cooperation and the 
recent concept of the fundamental rights of the requested person.  In context of the 
backed-warrant procedure, comity may be differentiated from the standard 
procedure in terms of the level of comity involved. The Part 4 backed-warrant 
procedure attracts a higher level of comity as a result of close geographical and 
historical links and the presumption of similarity (such as legal and procedural 
similarity), which excuses the requirement to establish a prima facie case. By 
distinguishing the features of comity as it relates to the backed-warrant procedure, 
namely Australia, comity will pose different questions as to the balancing of such 
competing interests. To this end it is helpful to trace the concept of comity from its 
                                                          
20 Shorter Oxford Dictionary, above n 17.  Compare H W Fowler, above n 17, at 224. “Comity of 
nations” is defined as “friendly recognition as far as possible of each other’s laws and usages.” The 
usage of “comity of nations” was referred to in context of determining extradition under simplified 
schemes in Tsebe, above n 16 at [126]. See for example Hilton v Guyot, above n 16, at 163–64; 
and CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd, above n 16, at 396.  
21 Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye [1990] 3 SCR 1077 at 256. 
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earliest position under the imperial-based simplified procedure to its current 
position under the Part 4 backed-warrant procedure.   
 
1.8 Law Commission’s proposed reforms   
This thesis has particular regard for the Commission’s proposal to: establish a 
central authority (nominally, the Attorney-General);22 further simplify the Part 4, 
backed-warrant procedure as it relates to Australia; shift the emphasis away from 
the executive role in the extradition process and increase the role of the judiciary; 
and implement extradition-appropriate provisions under the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990.23  
 
These proposals and their underpinning human rights rationale will be examined 
for their impact on the backed-warrant procedure and their coherency with both the 
Commission’s other relevant proposals and the emphasis that the Commission 
places on “comity” with Australia.  
 
 1.9 The case for an increased role of a central authority 
This thesis begins by examining the Commission’s proposal to establish a central 
authority with authority to oversee the entire extradition process.  In terms of the 
Part 4, backed-warrant procedure the Commission shifted its position from one 
that was concerned to limit the role of a central authority to an administrative role 
and leave the role of the New Zealand Police intact. This measure will effectively 
replace the role of the New Zealand Police in the initial stages of the Part 4, 
backed-warrant procedure. There are a number of rationales underlying this 
proposal, including the proposition that human rights will be better served by 
creating some degree of independence from the executive.  In light of this 
rationale, this thesis will analyse whether in changing its position the Commission 
is retreating from its emphasis on comity with Australia.  Next, I examine the 
impact on the backed-warrant procedure arising from three further key proposals.  
 
 
                                                          
22 See further Report, above n 1, at [2.12]-[2.17] and [5.5]; and Issues Paper, above n 1, at [4.18]-
[4.19].  
23 Issues Paper, above n 1, at [1.28]–[1.29]; and Report, above n 1, at 6. 
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1.10 The case for judicialisation 
Firstly, the Commission proposes a shift towards extradition being a judicial rather 
than an executive process.  Increasing the role of the judiciary, is consistent with a 
more modern and global trend away from treating extradition as a predominantly 
executive function.24 It is the Commission’s view that the judiciary can provide 
better human rights protection to the requested person. The backed-warrant 
procedure rarely involves the executive, which provides an opportunity to evaluate 
this proposal against relevant case law.  
  
1.11  The case for broader grounds in refusing surrender  
Closely linked to this proposal, the Commission proposes a new unjust or 
oppressive provision that allows the judiciary to exercise a broader discretion in 
refusing surrender of the requested person.25  The proposed new unjust or 
oppressive provision encapsulates the all-encompassing provision that the Minister 
exercises in the discretionary grounds “compelling or extraordinary personal 
circumstances and “any other reason”.26 Consistent with overseas trends, if satisfied 
the judiciary must rather than may refuse surrender.27 The critical provision under 
New Zealand’s current extradition law is narrow in scope and if satisfied, the 
judiciary may rather than must refuse surrender.28  
 
This modification is also directed at improving human rights protections because 
the injustice limb is directed primarily at the risk of prejudice to the requested 
person in the conduct of the trial itself and oppression is directed to the hardship 
imposed upon the requested person resulting from their personal circumstances.29 
The effect of this provision, is that if established to the requisite high standard, such 
that the injustice or oppression must shock the conscience of the court, the court 
must rather than may refuse to surrender the requested person.30 Moreover, this 
                                                          
24 Kemp in Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act (Juta Cape Town, 2011) 
App B2 in Murdoch Watney “A South African Perspective on Mutual Legal Assistance and 
Extradition in a Globalized World” (2012) 15 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 292 at 297. 
25 Report, above n 1, at [5.11]-[5.17] and [13](b)(i)-(ii). See draft Bill, cl 20(e) in Report, above 1. 
26 Extradition Act 1999, s 48(4)(a)(ii). 
27 Extradition Act 1988 (Cth), s 34(2) provides that if the relevant statutory ground is established 
the judiciary “must” refuse surrender.  See also Extradition Act 2003 (UK). 
28 Extradition Act 1999, s 8 (1).   
29 Report, above n 1, at [5.6(e)].  In the course of its work, the Commission was influenced by the 
jurisprudence in several Commonwealth jurisdictions, particularly Canada’s Extradition Act SC 
1999.   
30 Report, above n 1, at [5.6(e)]. This is the requisite standard in Canada. 
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provision applies to both standard extradition and surrender under the backed-
warrant procedure.  It would certainly not appear to facilitate a fast-track procedure 
of surrender to Australia or reinforce the doctrine of trustworthiness and comity.31 
In order to determine whether this proposal will contribute positively to the backed-
warrant procedure a careful analysis of the relevant case law will be undertaken. 
 
1.12 The case for further simplification 
Secondly, I examine the Commission’s recommendation to further simplify the 
backed-warrant procedure, with Australia nominated as a special case.32  Of 
particular interest, is a less onerous test proposed for Australia in meeting the 
criteria for an extradition offence. The Commission’s intention is to remove the 
requirement for double criminality, based upon the importance of comity and what 
purportedly acknowledges more relaxed provisions under Australia’s extradition 
law in regard to New Zealand.33  
 
1.13 The case for increasing human rights protection 
Thirdly, this thesis will examine the Commission’s recommendation to implement 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (“the NZBORA”) rights that are 
appropriate to the extradition process (into the new Act) and how this will impact 
on the backed-warrant procedure. It is suggested that in the shadow of the Dotcom 
litigation, the Commission’s consideration for the NZBORA became skewed 
towards standard extradition.  That being said, this thesis contests that the majority 
ruling by the Supreme Court in the Kim Dotcom extradition case has limited 
applicability to the backed-warrant procedure.34   
 
 1.14 Critique of Reform 
This thesis argues that the Commission has struggled to delineate between the 
standard extradition and backed-warrant procedure in developing its proposals. 
                                                          
31 See Report, above n 1, at 53. The view of the Commission, is that an Issues Conference will 
help to circumvent any delays in surrendering the requested person. 
32 Issues Paper, above n 1, at [6.21]; and Report, above n 1, at [7.17]. 
33 Issues Paper, above n 1, at [6.22]. Part 3 of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth). 
34 Dotcom v The United States of America [2014] NZSC 24, [2014] 1 NZLR 355 (and earlier 
judgments). In the course of its review, the Commission became aware of the Kim Dotcom 
extradition case and judgments which could conceivably influence the Commission’s approach to 
reform, especially in regard to reducing cost and time. See Phil Pennington “Law Commission 




These proposals are the product of weak research based on assumptions about our 
affinity with Australia.  In some instances the Commission appears to suggest that 
Australia is not to be trusted in human rights matters while in others the 
Commission is zealous and emphatic towards the trustworthiness of Australia.  In 
particular, the Commission has not considered how divergent the practise of comity 
is between New Zealand and Australia. Nor has the Commission, considered how 
usage of the term comity differs between standard extradition and the backed-
warrant procedure.  
 
How best to reconcile the backed-warrant procedure and the elusive concept of 
comity to make the surrender process align with today’s human rights norms? What 
this thesis argues, is that comity needs to allow for the underpinning principle of 
mutual respect and recognition of similarity of legal systems, provided that the 
principle of comity does not unduly infringe the human rights of the person sought 
for surrender.  Consequently, comity in regard to the backed-warrant procedure 
raises important questions. How similar are New Zealand and Australia’s in their 
attitudes towards human rights? Should the underpinning principles of comity with 
Australia be adapted and applied in a manner that allows for more protection of the 
human rights of the requested person? There is also the fundamental question of 
whether clarifying the meaning and role of comity through a functional definition 
of comity would assist in unleashing comity’s legal potential?35 Would it better 
facilitate surrender under the backed-warrant procedure?  Arising from such 
questions, this thesis seeks to highlight the need to review comity and its unique 
position in the backed-warrant procedure with Australia.   
 
Moreover, it is the need for a functional definition of comity that is tailored to the 
New Zealand-Australian nexus.  One possible solution is proposed which involves 
reconsideration of the balancing act paradigm. It is argued that in light of surrender 
cases being highly fact-specific, a hierarchy of human rights (from minor human 
rights infringements to gross forms of human rights violations) may act as a better 
guide in determining how comity is applied.36  In such circumstances, human rights, 
                                                          
35 A similar question concerning comity has been raised in context of private international law. See 
Shultz and Mitchenson, above n 18. 
36 For instance, due process rights are especially at risk in the early stages of the procedure, before 
the requested person has appeared before the court. Conversely, more gross human rights 
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will act as a restraining mechanism on the application of comity, to the extent that 
the backed-warrant procedure will constitute an infringement of human rights.  For 
this reason, the adequacy of human rights protections as a qualifying factor for 
determining surrender needs to be assessed along the entire spectrum of the backed-
warrant procedure.37  
 
To this end, it is recommended that reconceptualising comity with Australia to 
include a human rights component and replacing a balancing act paradigm with a 
hierarchy of human rights will more likely accommodate the human rights 
protections of the person without compromising the efficacy of the simplified 
nature of Part 4.  Complementing this strategy is the combined effect of the 
Commission’s proposals in regard to: the role of a central authority as opposed to 
the Police; the more prominent role of the courts throughout the backed-warrant 
process, and implementation of extradition-appropriate provisions of the NZBORA 
are largely consistent with the weight that must be given to the human rights 
protections of the person.  To bring these provisions within the backed-warrant 
procedure, I suggest will allow the much needed scrutiny by the Central Authority 
and the courts to consider matters of due process and the potential for adverse 
treatment of the requested person at the earliest phase of the backed-warrant 
procedure.  Finally, it is argued that, based upon a liberal interpretation, there is a 
strong principled case for giving the NZBORA extra-territorial effect insofar as 
Australian Police conduct in New Zealand is concerned.  
 
1.15 Objective of thesis 
To summarise, the main objective of this thesis is to provide a critique of the Law 
Commission’s proposals, to determine the impact of these proposals on the backed-
warrant procedure and evaluate these proposals for their coherency. In particular, it 
will examine how likely the draft Bill, contained in the Commissions’ Report, will 
achieve efficacy and the desired balance between comity or international 
cooperation and the human rights interests of the requested person.38  This research 
is important to the backed-warrant procedure of both Australia and New Zealand as 
it provides a perspective on the procedure that has not been researched previously. 
                                                          
violations may apply to the latter phase of the procedure, when the defendant is at risk of torture or 
other mistreatment while in prison.  See EP Aughterson, above n 11.  
37 See Soering v United Kingdom [1989] 11 EHHR 439 (ECHR). 
38 Report, above n 1. 
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While this paper focuses primarily on Australian and New Zealand case law, its 
finding should be of interest to scholars and practitioners in other Commonwealth 
jurisdictions. 
 
To that end, the second objective is to provide an assessment of the Part 4, backing 
of arrest warrant procedure, by firstly tracing its imperial origins and development 
when New Zealand became an independent Commonwealth country.  An overview 
of procedural safeguards and the role of comity in the court’s approach to 
restrictions on surrendering the requested person under imperial-based simplified 
procedures, namely the Fugitive Offenders Act 1881 (UK) will be provided. The 
second objective is to outline the backed-warrant procedure under Part 4 of the 1991 
Act, in a similar fashion, giving cognisance to the role of comity in the court’s 
assessment of the judicial and ministerial discretion to refuse surrender.  The third 
objective is to briefly examine simplified systems of extradition in other 
Commonwealth countries to illustrate how conceptually similar they are at a global 
level. Areas of commonality and difference in restrictions and conditions on 
surrender will be highlighted, commencing with a brief overview of the backed-
warrant procedure in each country.  The fourth objective is to examine the 
Commission’s key proposals affecting the backed-warrant procedure.  This 
includes examination of case law relevant to the role of the proposed Central 
Authority and how the principle of comity/trustworthiness is applied by the 
Australian judiciary in context of determining grounds for refusing surrender.  It 
also includes examination of whether in relation to the Part 4, backed-warrant 
procedure, there is a strong principled case for its further simplification and the 
implementation of BORA rights as well as extra-territorial application of the 
NZBORA insofar as Australia is concerned.   
 
1.16 Method 
The main method of analysis comprises of a positivist analysis of relevant legal 
instruments and comparisons between New Zealand and Australia practise of the 
backed-warrant procedure. 
 
1.17 Chapter Outline 
The structure of this thesis is organised as follows:  The successive chapter provides 
an historical overview of the backing of arrest warrant procedure and the role of 
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comity in determining the grounds for refusing surrender under imperial-based 
simplified procedures, namely the Fugitive Offenders Act 1881 as well as its 
development under the London Scheme.  The third chapter contains an overview of 
the backed-warrant procedure under the 1991 Act. The fourth chapter examines 
restrictions to surrender and the role of comity in the ministerial and judicial 
discretion to refuse surrender. The fifth chapter compares the backed-warrant 
procedure under the 1991 Act with other simplified procedures in other 
Commonwealth countries, particularly in regard to any restrictions and conditions 
on surrender. The sixth chapter provides an overview of the Commission’s 
proposals against the background of relevant case law impacting on the backed-
warrant procedure, as well as an evaluation of the Commission’s position in regard 
to the relative importance of comity and human rights protections. Finally, some 




2.  Historical overview of New Zealand’s backing-of-warrant 
 procedure 
 
2.1  Origins of backing-of-warrants under imperial statutes 
There were two systems of extradition affecting the development of backing-of-
warrants in New Zealand and the rest of the Commonwealth.  The first one involved 
standard extradition under treaty that provided for extradition of persons between 
the British Empire and other countries.  The other concerned the surrender of 
persons within the British Empire under the backed-warrant procedure.39 The 
former was governed by the Extradition Act 1870 (UK) and its amending Acts in 
force in New Zealand.40  Early practice of the backing-of-warrants was provided 
for under An Act for the Better Apprehension of Certain Offenders, 1843 (“the 1843 
Act”) when a warrant was issued for certain offences (“felonies” and “treason”) 
allegedly committed by persons in one part of the British Empire for execution in 
the part where the requested person was located.41 These Acts operated at a time 
when all possessions of the British Empire owed allegiance to the British Crown, 
enabling the Imperial Parliament at Westminster to maintain supremacy over all 
parts of the Empire.42 Moreover, the Imperial Parliament enabled the Colonial 
Legislatures to affect the liberty of British subjects beyond their jurisdiction.43   
 
 
                                                          
39 See Explanatory Note of Extradition Bill 1998. M Cherif Bassiouni, above n 12, at 21; and Clive 
Nicholls and others, above n 12, at 6. 
40 Margaret Soper, above n 12, at 4.  
41 An Act for the Better Apprehension of Certain Offenders, 1843, 6 & 7 Vict Chp 34 
<www.nzlii.org/nz>. See further Kimberly Prost “Cooperation in Penal Matters in the 
Commonwealth” in M Cherif Bassouini International Criminal Law, Vol 2: Multilateral Bilateral 
Enforcement Mechanisms (3rd ed, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Netherlands, 2008) at 413-414. See 
Re Ashman [1985] 2 NZLR 224 at 226. See also Margaret Soper, above n 12, at 5; and Robert E 
Clute “Law and Practice in Commonwealth Extradition” (1959) 8 American Journal of 
Comparative Law at 20. See further Scott Baker, David Perry and Anand Doobay A Review of the 
United Kingdom’s Extradition Arrangements (Home Office, 30 September 2011) [Baker report] at 
[3.15]. The practice of backing-of-warrants between English countries operated under English 
statute 28 Geo 2, C 26 (1750) and between Scotland and England and Wales from 1773 (13 Geo  
3, C 31) and between Great Britain and Ireland under the Indictable Offences Act 1848 in Baker 
report, above n 41.  
42 Paul O’Higgins “Extradition within the Commonwealth” (1960) 9 The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 486 at 486.  
43 Justice Johnston referred to by Chief Justice Prendergast in Solicitor-General, above n 14, at 2. 
See further Alpheus Todd, above n 19, at 302. 
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2.2 Commonwealth cooperation under The Foreign Offenders 
 Apprehension Act, 1863 (NZ) 
In respect of New Zealand, “The Foreign Offenders Apprehension Act, 1863 
(NZ)”44(“the 1863 Act”) was enacted for the sole purpose of providing for surrender 
(referred to as “deportation”) of the requested person facing alleged felonies as well 
as indictable misdemeanours45 in the “Australasian Colonies” (New Zealand, NSW, 
Tasmania, Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia and Queensland and their 
respective Dependencies).46  It was designed to build on the 1843 Act in order to 
deal with an influx of criminals escaping from Australia, particularly to the Otago 
goldfields.47 
  
Although assented to by the Crown, the 1863 Act was not free of controversy.   In 
1879, in the case of Regina v Gleich the majority of the New Zealand Supreme 
Court (Prendergast CJ, Johnston, Richmond and Williams JJ, with Gillies J 
dissenting), ruled that the legislation was ultra vires and that any persons alleged to 
have committed misdemeanours in any of the Australian colonies will not be liable 
for arrest in New Zealand, should they escape to this colony.48 In that case a warrant 
issued in Australia for Gleich an absconding bankrupt, was endorsed by a 
magistrate in Wellington. The 1863 Act was held to be ultra vires and repugnant to 
imperial legislation because it contained no provision that expressly allowed for the 
Governor General to keep lawful detention of the surrendered person in the high 
seas, a passage that was unavoidable in surrendering persons between the 
Australasian colonies.49   Accordingly the Supreme Court granted Gleich a writ of 
habeas corpus and ordered his discharge. The dissenting opinion of Justice Gillies 
considered that the warrant was validly endorsed by the magistrate and that the 
matter of lawful detention on the high seas was not one that should be determined.  
                                                          
44 Foreign Offenders Apprehension Act 1863 (27 Victoriae 1863 No 22) <www.nzlii.org.nz>. See 
further Solicitor-General, above n 14.  
45 New Zealand Foreign Offenders Apprehension Act, 1863, Part III. 
46 New Zealand Foreign Offenders Apprehension Act, 1863, Part II. This Act was intended to 
broaden the scope of offences provided for in An Act for the Better Apprehension of Certain 
Offenders, 1843. 
47 John E Martin “Refusal of assent – a hidden element of constitutional history in New Zealand” 
(2010) 41 Victoria University Law Review at 68.    
48 In re Gleich (1879) OB&F (SC) 39 at 41 (SC). See also Ex parte Thomas Rendell (1879) 
OB&F, 72 (SC). The 1863 Act was repealed in 1891. See further John E Martin, above n 47, at  
68.    
49 Justice Johnstone had previously highlighted the issue in Alexander James Johnston, above n 19, 
at 288-292.  See also John E Martin, above n 47, at 68. 
14 
 
As a result of the decision in Gleich, the New Zealand Government sought a remedy 
for the defect from Britain in 1880.50 The remedy was achieved through enactment 
of the Fugitives Offender Act (UK) 1881 in force in New Zealand.  
 
2.3 Commonwealth cooperation under the Fugitive Offenders Act 1881 
 (Imp) 
2.3.1 Structure  
The 1881 Act was divided into two parts, reflecting two different situations. Part I 
provided for the surrender of fugitives from one part of Her Majesty’s dominion to 
another simply by sending the original warrant issued by the requesting country for 
endorsement and execution in the requested country. Part II provided a separate and 
even more simplified procedure of backed-warrants applying specifically to groups 
of “British possessions” based upon their contiguity by Order in Council made in 
the UK.51 An Order in Council made in 1925 applied Part II to a group comprising 
New Zealand, Australia, and certain Pacific territories.52   
 
2.3.2 Function 
The Fugitive Offenders Act 1881 (UK) (“the 1881 Act”) was enacted by the 
Imperial Parliament for the primary purpose of improving the efficacy of 
surrendering fugitives within the British Empire.53 The Preamble read: 
Whereas it is expedient to make more effectual provisions for the 
apprehension and trial of offenders against the laws who may be in other 
parts of Her Majesty’s Dominion than those in which their offences were 
committed. 
                                                          
50 Following an intercolonial conference in Melbourne in 1867, the New Zealand and Australian 
Government had previously requested to Britain without success, that it extend the existing 
extradition legislation. See John E Martin, above n 47, at 68-69. 
51 For example In re Tressider (1905) 25 NZLR 289 at 290, involving a request for surrender of 
the accused from Australia to New Zealand which required no prima facie evidence. See Fugitive 
Offenders Act 1881(UK), s 12. See also Clute, above n 41, at 21; Fugitive Offenders Amendment 
Act 1976, Explanatory Note; and O’Higgins, above n 42 at 487 citing H C Biron and K E 
Chalmers The Law and Practice of Extradition (London, 1903) at 95-96. See also how it applied 
between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland in Paul O'Higgins, "Irish Extradition 
Law and Practice" (1958) 34 British Yearbook of International Law at 274-311, especially 284-
291. 
52 Fugitive Offenders Amendment Act 1976 (NZ), Explanatory Note. 
53 1881 Act, s 2.  See D S Bedi “Law and Practice of Extradition within the Commonwealth 
Countries” (1977) 19 Journal of the Indian Law Institute at 421. 
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Relevant to the special problem experienced by New Zealand and Australia, the 
1881 Act replaced the 1843 Act and the limited offences for which the removal of 
fugitives could be achieved.54 
 
2.3.3 Extraterritorial jurisdiction 
This Act was not free from controversy.  Differing views arose in New Zealand in 
relation to whether the Magistrate had jurisdiction to endorse the original warrant 
for an offence alleged to have occurred in any part of the Commonwealth of 
Australia.55  The issue was settled in the Court of Appeal in the case of Godwin v 
Walker (Godwin) which held that under Part II, the surrender of a person may be 
obtained from New Zealand to the Commonwealth of Australia, for an offence in 
any part of the Commonwealth of Australia where such an offence is alleged to 
have been committed.56 In reaching its decision, the Court overruled the Full Court 
in Re Munro and Re Campbell and its conclusion that Part II did not apply to any 
individual state of the Commonwealth of Australia.57 The Court of Appeal in 
Godwin determined that by virtue of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution 
Act, 1900 (Imp) the whole area constitutes a “British possession” within the 
meaning of the 1881 Act. The Court also considered the wording of s 13 of the Act 
“punishable by law in that possession” in determining that under Part II, backed-
warrant procedure of the 1881 Act, surrender of a person requested may be sought 
in relation to an offence against the laws in any part of the Commonwealth of 
Australia where the offence is alleged to have its origin.58    
 
2.3.4 Conditions 
2.3.4.1  Extraditability 
2.3.4.1.1 Extraditable person 
Liability for surrender under the Part II, backed-warrant procedure of the 1881 Act 
applied to any person (referred to as “fugitive”) that had been accused of 
committing an offence in a British possession to which that part of the Act applied.59 
 
                                                          
54 Clute, above n at 41. See Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (1880) Third Series, vol 261, clmns 
1032-1033. 
55 Re Munro and Campbell [1935] NZLR 159. 
56 Godwin v Walker [1938] NZLR 712 at 5. 
57 Re Munro and Campbell, above n 55.  
58 Godwin, above n 56, at 712. 
59 1881 Act, s 13. 
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2.3.4.1.2 Extraditable country 
Under the Part II, backed-warrant procedure of the 1881 Act applied to any British 
possession of a group by reason of their contiguity or by Order in Council.60 
 
2.3.4.1.3 Extradition offence 
Part I applied to all offences (“misdemeanours”) along with piracy, treason and 
felonies whereas Part II contained no restrictions on the type of offence to achieve 
surrender. This remedied the difficulties New Zealand experienced with the 1863 
Act that provided for a broader scope of offences than those contained in the 1843 
Act.  
 
2.3.4.1.3.1 Double criminality 
There was no requirement to establish double criminality under Part II of the 1881 
Act. Double criminality requires that an alleged crime for which extradition is 
sought be punishable in both the requested and requesting states.61 Its rationale is 
to safeguard the liberty interests of the person by ensuring their surrender will not 
result in prosecution by another country for conduct which the requested country 
did not itself consider criminal.62  Its removal under Part II of the 1881 Act appears 
to be based upon the assumption that Australia and New Zealand share broadly the 
same scope of criminalisation as British possessions. It followed from the removal 
of double criminality that no evidence would be required. 
 
2.3.4.1.3.2         Penalty threshold 
Part I of the 1881 Act required offences to be subject to a minimum twelve months 
imprisonment with hard labour, whereas Part II contained no minimum penalty 
threshold.  
 
2.3.4.2  Speciality 
There was no requirement to establish speciality under Part II of the 1881 Act. 
Speciality requires that a person surrendered to a requesting state not be detained, 
                                                          
60 Section 13.  
61 EP Aughertson, above n 11, at 59-60. I A Shearer Extradition in International Law (Manchester 
University Press, Manchester, 1971) at 137-138; M Cherif Bassiouni International Extradition: 
United States Law and Practice, above n 12, at 494; and Anne Warner La Forest Extradition to 
and from Canada (3rd ed, Canada Law Book, Ontario, 1991) at 52-53. 
62 EP Aughertson, above n 11, at 59-60. 
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prosecuted or punished for any offence, committed prior to surrender, other than 
that for which extradition was granted.63  
 
2.3.4.3  Standard of evidence 
Part II of the 1881 Act contained no requirement to establish a prima facie case 
before the court.  The regime relied on there being a warrant validly issued, 
evidence for which sufficed if it was deposed on oath by the police officer of the 
requesting state.64 In respect of surrender from New Zealand to Australia, the 
Supreme Court in Kurtz v Aicken explained that it was for the trial court to 
determine whether the charge was bona fide.65  
Part I contained more stringent criteria than Part II and was similar to standard 
extradition under treaty.66 For example, s 5 of the 1881 Act, required there to be 
evidence of a strong or probable presumption that the requested person had 
committed the offence.67 
 
2.3.5  Procedure  
2.3.5.1  Endorsement of original warrant 
The procedure differed from standard extradition in that it was less formal and more 
simplified by nature.68  Under s 13, the Magistrate could simply endorse the 
requesting country’s original arrest warrant provided the Magistrate was satisfied 
that the procedural requirements of the 1881 Act were established.   
. 
2.3.5.2  Surrender order 
In order to enable the offender to be surrendered, s 14 required the Magistrate to be 
satisfied: (i) that the warrant for arrest of the fugitive had been duly authenticated; 
(ii) that it had been issued by a person having authority in that regard; and (iii) that 
the identity of the fugitive to whom the warrant related was duly authenticated as 
                                                          
63 EP Aughertson, above n 11, at 83-84; and Issues Paper, above n 1, at [2.12]. 
64 Tressider, above n 51 at 290; and Kurtz v Aicken (1891) 9 NZLR 673 at 678. 
65 Kurtz v Aicken, above n 64, at 678. But see Johnstone v Commonwealth of Australia HC 
Christchurch A 266-98, 9 March 1999 [Johnstone] at 2. Reference is made by Chisholm J at the 
High Court to there being a prima facie case established in the District Court for the return of the 
requested person.  
66 See further Clute, above n 41, at 23.  
67 For example Flickinger v Crown Colony of Hong Kong [1990] 3 NZLR 372 at 372. However, 
Clute observes that the courts tended to be less stringent in regard to the standard of evidence 
required under Part I at 22. See Clute, above n 41. 
68 Soper, above n 12, at 5. 
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required by the Act (s 29 of the 1881 Act).69  A police officer of the requesting state 
deposing on oath that the conditions were met in accord with s 29 was sufficient 
evidence to satisfy a magistrate that the procedural requirements under s 13 were 
met.70  
 
2.3.5.3  Provisional warrant 
Usually a provisional warrant was issued pursuant to s 16, in the requested country 
which served as a warrant sufficient to detain the person until the original warrant 
was brought before the Magistrate for its endorsement.71  
 
2.3.5.4  Appeal 
There was no appeal provision in the 1881 Act itself.72  Appeals were brought under 
the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 although whether and if so how it applied to 
the 1881 Act was subject to some judicial discussion.73 Under Part 1, s 5, the 
committing magistrate was expressly required to inform the requested person that 
they will not be surrendered until after the expiration of 15 days and that they have 
a right to apply for a “writ of habeas corpus, or other like process”.74  
 
2.3.6  The role of comity 
Although comity was not made explicit in the 1881 Act, it was expressly mentioned 
in a number of cases.75 The role comity played as a determining factor in surrender 
was unquantifiable and because it presupposed similarity between the legal and 
procedural systems of those countries applicable to Part II, it had the potential to be 
used as a convenient excuse to leave it for the trial court to consider the fundamental 
rights of the requested person.76  
In 1880, New Zealand’s Supreme Court Justice Johnston described the role of 
comity (referred to as “comity of nations”) in creating extradition treaties as “a give-
                                                          
69 See Tressider, above n 51, at 290; Re Murray Ross [1921] NZLR 292 at 292; Cook v 
Superintendent of Mount Eden Prison & Ors HC Auckland CP 184-87, AP 82-87, CP 182-87, 23 
September 1987 [Cook]; and Franic v Wilson [1993] 1 NZLR 318.    
70 Tressider, above n 51, at 290; and Kurtz v Aicken, above n 64.  
71 R v Howard [1985] 2 NZLR 216 at 220; and Kurtz v Aicken, above n 64, at 674. 
72 Cook, above n 69, at 9.  
73 See R v Howard, above n 71, at 222-223. 
74 At 9.  
75 See Police v Thomas (1989) 4 CRNZ 454 (HC) at 458 and Bieleski v Police HC Auckland 
AP286/86, 28 November 1986. 
76 Kurtz v Aicken, above n 64, at 678. 
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and-take arrangement to enable the social intercourse of civilized nations to be 
carried on”.77 It is relevant that in referring to comity Justice Johnston made no 
mention of the liberty interests of persons as a qualifying factor in determining 
surrender. In an indication of the progress in how comity is understood today 
somewhat differently today, Justice Arnold in United States of America v Dotcom 
qualified the importance of comity (referred to as “comity of nations”) when he 
said:78  
Equally, however, states committed to the rule of law have an interest in 
ensuring that persons they surrender will not face injustice or oppression 
in the requesting state.5 Extradition processes must take proper account 
of both of these important values. 
 
2.3.7  Human rights   
Part II of the 1881 Act reflects a practise of backing-of-warrants that was tailored 
to the unique needs of older Commonwealth countries (Australia, New Zealand, 
Canada and various countries in Africa) well before the concept of human rights 
standards arrived on the scene. Unsurprisingly, decisions under the 1881 Act 
proceeded without the necessity to give consideration to whether comity and the 
presumption of similarity with Australia should include similarity in human rights 
standards.  Further, as discussed above, the backed-warrant procedure under Part 
II, lacked well-known safeguards in standard extradition law which functioned in 
part to protect the liberty interests of the requested person such as double 
criminality, speciality and a minimum prima facie standard of evidence.79  There 
were however, procedural safeguards designed to protect the person against 
unlawful arrest, detention and surrender.  
                                                          
77 In re Gleich, above n 48, at 48.  See also Alexander James Johnston, above n 19, at 288-292.  
See also United States of America v Dotcom [2013] 2 NZLR 139 at [12]. In a similar vein, the 
term comity of nations was used by the Court of Appeal to describe its important role in the 
extradition processes. 
78 United States of America v Dotcom, above n 77, at [12] per Arnold J. 
79 See R v Connell [1985] [Connell] 2 NZLR 233 at 238 line 50. See also Clute, above n 41, at 21 
and 23.  Section 9 of the 1881 contains the double criminality requirement. The loose criteria for 
surrender under Part II contrasts with the repealed 1863 Act that contained a prima facie standard 
of evidence. See further Alexander James Johnston, above n 19, at 439. In his 1870 publication 
Justice Johnston cautions: “Justices must not assume that the same acts amount to felony 
misdemeanour in other colonies which do so in New Zealand. There are many new 
felonies and misdemeanours created by the New Zealand Legislature, and there may be 
such in other colonies also.”  
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2.3.8  Procedural safeguards 
The 1881 Act required the sanction of an endorsed or provisional warrant including 
authority of processes recognised by the Courts. Despite those protections, in the 
case of R v Hartley (Bennett) the Court of Appeal, determined that “all the essential 
statutory precautions were blithely disregarded by the police in both countries.”80  
 
The Court of Appeal was referring to the essential statutory precautions against 
unlawful arrest, detention or surrender.81 Instead, the return of Bennett was 
accomplished by improper and unlawful means, beginning with a telephone 
communication from New Zealand police to Australian police and ending with 
Bennett “bustled” from his bed to a plane in Australia and met by New Zealand 
police upon his arrival in New Zealand.82   Having considered the factual 
background, and the provisions of the 1881 Act, the Court of Appeal held that, 
although Bennett was brought to New Zealand unlawfully, he was eventually 
lawfully arrested within New Zealand and by due process of law he was brought to 
the Court. Accordingly, the Court was in a position to exercise jurisdiction in 
respect of the indictment.83  However, the Court determined that it had a wide 
discretion to discharge Bennett under either s 347(3) of the Crimes Act 1961 or by 
virtue of its inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of its own process. The Court 
viewed that based on the case before it, the trial Judge would probably have been 
justified in exercising its discretion on that ground.84   
 
The Court of Appeal accepted the second ground of appeal, determining that the 
New Zealand police had obtained statements from B by means in breach of the 
Judges’ Rules and they should not have been used against him. The Court of Appeal 
held:85  
 
There was clearly a serious breach of the spirit and purpose of the Judges' 
Rules, and for this reason alone we think the evidence should have been 
excluded as a matter of discretion. …. It follows that on this second ground 
                                                          
80 R v Hartley [1978] 2 NZLR 199 [Bennett] at 214 per Woodhouse J.  
81 Bennett, above n 80.  
82 At 214. 
83 At 215. 
84 At 215-217. 
85 At 219 per Cooke J. 
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his appeal must be allowed and his conviction quashed, irrespective of the 
matters we have discussed under the first ground.  
 
In conclusion, the Court of Appeal granted B his appeal and his conviction was 
quashed.   What the case of Bennett suggests is that police are not familiar with the 
need to adhere to standard procedural protections when using this process. 
 
2.3.9  Restrictions 
In addition to procedural safeguards there were restrictions to surrender designed 
to protect the requested person’s liberty interests. These restrictions allowed a 
magistrate the power to exercise a discretion to refuse surrender, subject to comity. 
They did not however, make human rights protections visible. Instead, 
consideration for the liberty interests of the requested person, such as the right to a 
fair trial, were found at common law in the obscure phrase “oppressive or unjust”.  
 
2.3.9.1  Mandatory restrictions 
Until the enactment of the Fugitive Amendment Act 1976 which allowed an 
exemption from extradition where the offence in question was based on political 
offences, race and religion, there were no mandatory restrictions on surrendering a 
person.86 Nor was there any discretion given to the executive to withhold surrender 
under Part II of the 1881 Act.87  
 
2.3.9.2  Judicial restrictions 
Section 19 of the 1881 Act listed three grounds by reason of which injustice or 
oppression might arise should surrender proceed: (i) the trivial nature of the 
offence; (ii) where the accusation is not made in good faith in the interests of justice; 
(iii) or  otherwise, it would having regard to the distance, to the facilities of 
communication, and to all the circumstances of the case, be unjust or oppressive, or 
                                                          
86 O’Higgins, above n 42, at 488.  The rationale for making a political offence no impediment to 
extradition, has been attributed to the historical unity of sovereignty or common political ideals. 
87 At 488. 
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too severe a punishment, to return the prisoner either at all or until the expiration of 
a certain period.88  
 
2.3.9.2.1 “unjust or oppressive” 
In context of s 8(3) of the Fugitive Offenders Act 1967 (UK), the words “unjust” 
and “oppressive” were defined by Lord Diplock in Kakis v Government of 
Cyprus:89   
 
Unjust I regard as directed primarily to the risk of prejudice to the accused 
in the conduct of the trial itself, ‘oppressive’ as directed to hardship to the 
accused resulting from changes in his circumstances that have occurred 
during the period to be taken into consideration; that there is no room for 
overlapping, and between them they would cover all cases where to return 
him would be fair.  
 
The passage has been cited with approval in both Australian90 and New Zealand91 
courts.  In the influential case, Police v Thomas,92 Fisher J, having analysed a string 
of authorities, established that it will only be in exceptional cases that the Court 
should exercise a discretion to discharge a defendant.93 From those authorities, 
Fisher J summarised a number of relevant principles, of which one included  
 
                                                          
88 Re H (A Prisoner) [1971] NZLR 982; endorsed by Fisher J in Police v Thomas, above n 75. See 
also Coronno v Police HC Wellington 130/86, 4 February 1987; and R v Governor of Brixton 
Prison ex parte Singh [1962] 1 QB 211. Section 10 is the applicable provision under Part 1 of the 
1881 Act, however the wording is almost identical to section 19. See Flickinger, above n 67; and 
Re Gorman [1963] NZLR 17.  The main differences are that in seeking a discharge under s 10, 
jurisdiction was confined solely to a “superior court” and there was no reference to appeal, 
whereas in s 19, jurisdiction may be exercised by either a Magistrate or a superior court, as well as 
a right of appeal from a Magistrate to the superior court.  See Franic v Wilson, above n 69; 
Bieleski, above n 75; and Loh v Commissioner of Police for Victoria HC Auckland M1379/89, 
M1380/89, 11 October 1989 [Loh].  
89 Kakis v Government of Cyprus [1978] 1 WLR 779 at 782-783 per Diplock J. See EP 
Aughertson, above n 11, at 159. 
90 For example, Perry v Lean (1985) 39 SASR 515 at 520; Ingram v Attorney-General (Cth) 
[1980] 1 NSLWR 1990 at 206; in New Zealand v Moloney [2006] FCAFC 143 [Moloney – Full 
Court].  See also EP Aughertson, above n 11, at 159. 
91 As articulated in Perry v McLean & Another (1986) 63 ALR 407, the passage was relied upon in 
Bieleski, above n 75.  See R v Governor of Brixton Prison ex p Naranjan Singh, above n 88;  
Coronno, above n 88; Re Gorman, above n 88; and Bieleski, above n 75. 
92 Police v Thomas above n 71. 
93 See Johnstone, above n 65, at 9; and Police v Thomas, above n 75. However, in Loh, above n 88, 
Gault J sitting at the High Court, expressed the view that a broader inquiry into whether the 
surrender of the person would be unjust or oppressive was warranted, so that each case was judged 
on its own merits rather than limited to establishing an exceptional case.  
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mention of comity and mutual respect, albeit empty of explanation as to its 
meaning:94  
 
(a) The general assumption is that the established legal processes for 
returning prisoners under the Act should take their course. The fact 
that proceedings have been commenced in another Commonwealth 
country is not itself a reason for impeding those legal processes. It 
is necessary to preserve the comity and mutual respect for law among 
Commonwealth countries. 
 
An issue relevant to oppression, was whether the requested person had settled in 
the requested state.95 In instances where there were financial, family, business or 
employment interests at stake, the courts adopted the perspective that accused 
persons within the same jurisdiction face similar disruptions combined with delays 
in their prosecution. The mere inconvenience or hardship associated with being 
surrendered to Australia, away from home, did not in itself suffice in cases 
determined under the 1881 Act.96  
 
2.3.9.2.2 “circumstances of the case” 
Section 19 of the 1881 Act referred also to “circumstances of the case”. 
Accordingly, a broad discretion involving a non-exhaustive list of factors was 
viewed as falling within the s 19 exception,  some of which included: the 
seriousness of the crime alleged; the circumstances in which the accused left the 
country where the crime was alleged to have occurred; the extent to which there has 
been delay particularly where the accused has been lulled into a false sense of 
security97  and established himself in a new and meritorious life or if the delay might 
prejudice an effective defence; and the impact upon innocent third parties such as a 
new wife and children and hardship to the accused himself in being surrendered.98  
 
Section 19 of the 1881 Act also allowed the Magistrate to merely defer surrender 
“until after the expiration of the period named in the order” because “it would 
                                                          
94 Police v Thomas above n 75, at 458. Referred to in Loh, above n 88, at 10. 
95 Bieleski, above n 75, at 11. 
96 Coronno, above n 88. In the case of Police v Thomas, above n 75, delay combined with hardship 
was not considered as extraordinary. 
97  Considered in Coronno, above n 88.   
98 Police v Thomas, above n 75, at 458. 
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having regard to the distance, to the facilities of communication, and to all the 
circumstances of the case, be unjust or oppressive, or too severe a punishment.”  
 
2.3.9.2.3 “trivial nature of the offence and bad faith and in the interests of 
justice” 
The first and second ground concerning the trivial nature of the offence and bad 
faith were seldom invoked. In Re Murray Ross the Supreme Court determined that 
the offence of wife-desertion which carried a sentence of three-years imprisonment 
was not trivial, nor was there evidence that the request had been made in bad faith 
in the interests of justice. In conclusion, the appeal (“motion”) was dismissed and 
the order made by the Magistrate under s 14 of the Act for the accused’s return to 
Sydney to face trial was upheld.99 In Re H (A Prisoner), (Re H), seven years hard 
labour for an alleged offence was viewed as not trivial and the Magistrate was 
satisfied that the request was made in good faith and in the interests of justice.100  
Comity was seldom referred to in the case law in the determination of these grounds 
for surrender. In determining the same grounds for refusing surrender, Gault J in 
Loh v Commissioner of Police for Victoria (Loh) only made indirect reference to 
the importance of comity in examining earlier authorities.101 In addition, Gault J 
appeared to place less emphasis on the importance of comity than Fisher J in Police 
v Thomas. This is because rather than follow the “exceptional case” standard 
required by Fisher J (and one that is equated with the importance of comity and 
mutual respect), Justice Gault preferred a broader inquiry into whether the grounds 
were made out in favour of the defendant. This suggests that under s 19 of the 1881 
Act, the degree of importance that comity played in determining grounds for 
surrender, was subject to judicial variation.    
 
2.3.9.2.4 “otherwise” 
The third ground, widened the court’s discretion for refusing to surrender the 
person, by reason of it being considered "otherwise" unjust or oppressive, or too 
severe a punishment to return the prisoner, "having regard to the distance, to the 
facilities of communication, and to all the circumstances of the case." Under the 
                                                          
99 Re Murray Ross, above n 69, at 296. 
100 Re H, above n 88, at 982.  See also Coronno, above n 88; and Loh, above n 88.   
101 Police v Thomas, above n 75.  
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third ground, the poor health of the accused did give rise to a finding in favour of 
the accused.102  In Re H the Supreme Court determined that based on the accused’s 
mental health and poor likelihood of being found fit to stand trial or eligible for bail 
and to the detriment of his mental health remain on remand with no prospect of 
cure, it would make it oppressive or too severe a punishment to surrender the 
accused. Accordingly, the Supreme Court discharged him absolutely.103 Not only 
was any reference to comity omitted from the reasoning of Wilson J, the view that 
the accused was likely to suffer under the conditions described, did not bode well 
for the doctrine of trustworthiness.  Instead, the decision may be interpreted as 
indifference towards the comity principle adding to the confusion as to its proper 
meaning.  It may also reflect comity adapting to a new balancing function, from  
accommodating concerns for the principle of sovereignty and the need for 
extradition law, to accommodating that need with the growing importance of human 
rights.   
 
In contrast, Justice Eichelbaum in Coronno v Police (Coronno) agreed with the DCJ 
in emphasising the importance of comity and mutual respect in dismissing an appeal 
against the decision of the DCJ to refuse to make a discharge under s 19 on a number 
of grounds advanced by the defence.104  Compared to an hysterical condition 
working in favour of the requested person, in Re H, Justice Eichelbaum considered 
that the importance of comity and the intention of the statute did not yield to 
compassion or emotional influences.105  
 
In the words of Justice Chisholm in Johnstone: “Any prejudice can be properly 
considered by the trial Court in Australia.”106  Had the grounds advanced in Re H 
been framed in terms of the “unjust” rather than the “oppressive or severe a 
punishment” limb of the grounds advanced in Re H, the outcome could have been 
different, however. That being said, it is disputed that the perceived comity between 
New Zealand and Australia predisposed the judiciary to a laissez faire attitude in 
determining the potential risks for the liberty interests of the requested person post-
surrender. 
                                                          
102 See Re H, above n 88, at 984, line 13. 
103 At 986-987. 
104 Coronno, above n 88, at 7. 
105 At 7; and Re Gorman, above n 88.  
106 Johnstone, above n 65, at 16. 
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2.3.9.2.5  “passage of time” 
The question of passage of time received considerable judicial attention, it being a 
matter expressly incorporated into subsequent legislation as one factor giving rise 
to injustice or oppression.107 There has been some debate over the extent to which 
the injustice or oppression had to flow from or be a product of the passage of time. 
In Bieleski v Police (Bieleski) the Court determined that a delay of 20 years from 
the time the offence was allegedly committed was no bar to prosecution under the 
statute of limitations in New Zealand.108  Moreover, in considering delay in a 
general sense, Henry J found that there was no evidence brought before him to 
suggest that the police had caused undue delay109 or that the actual delay would 
create any injustice or overall unfairness to the accused110 such as the effects of 
delay on recall. His Honour’s approach was based upon the view that both the cause 
and effects of the delay were relevant to a section 19 determination.111 In context 
of a submission relating to the death of a witness or ability to compel witnesses, the 
central question as to whether injustice arises, was whether the delay has some 
causative effect on the alleged injustice.112 In that case, Henry J determined that it 
was a matter that would be given due weight when it was before the New South 
Wales Courts.113 His Honour’s reasoning is consistent with the theme identified by 
this thesis, that human rights concerns are cold-shouldered at the pre-surrender 
phase of the process.    
 
In this context it was significant that Henry J, perceived a strong similarity in the  
judicial systems of Australia and New Zealand and in particular that they had  
similar procedural safeguards.  In that regard, Henry J was persuaded that any 
natural justice issues would be obviated.114 This observation was referred to in 
another case dealing with delay under s 19, twelve years later, in Johnstone v 
Commonwealth of Australia (Johnstone).115  Henry J did not expressly use the term 
                                                          
107 See 1999 Act, s 8(1)(c). 
108 Bieleski, above n 75, at 4. Followed in Johnstone, above n 65, at 9-10. 
109 Bieleski, above n 75 at 6. 
110 At 8. 
111 At 7. See also Loh, above n 88.  
112 Bieleski, above n 75, at 9. 
113 At 10-11. In his reasons, Henry J distinguished the case of Kakis, above n 89.  His Honour said 
that Kakis provided “no explanation as to the authorities’ failure to prosecute the existing charge 
made against the accused during the time of his presence in Cyprus and in particular when one 
witness vital to his defence was also present and able to give evidence.”  
114 At 7. 
115 Johnstone, above n 65. 
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comity.  In this sense, how comity is weighed, relates to the court being confident 
that the accused will receive a fair trial according to “New Zealand standards.”116  
 
2.3.10  Summary 
The authorities discussed above make clear that s 19 placed a heavy onus on the 
accused to be able to satisfy the Court that exceptional circumstances warranted the 
exercise of a s 19 discretion in their favour.117 In determining whether that standard 
was satisfied, the courts considered a non-exhaustive list of relevant factors, 
including those classified by Fisher J in Police v Thomas. It would appear to have 
been fundamental to assessing whether to intervene, that the judiciary paid regard 
to comity and mutual respect for law among Commonwealth countries.118  
However, the analysis of these decisions reveals inconsistencies in the way comity 
was applied, if at all. Further, judicial insights into what the concept of comity 
means did not give a clear picture of the concept, except that in context of the 
backed-warrant procedure, comity is obviously bound up with the perceived 
similarity of the legal system and procedural safeguards between New Zealand and 
the requesting country, especially in regard to Australia and New Zealand.  
Consequently, the rights of the person sought are governed by the procedural 
safeguards and the principles of comity. However, the case of Bennett shows that 
in the initial stages of the process, a person sought has a well-founded fear of having 
their fundamental rights violated. In particular, it illustrates how comity can be 
perceived by officials (and judges) as a reason to run roughshod over standard 
procedural protections. Given the dominant role of the Police in the initial stages of 
the procedure this is a recipe for abuse.  While the courts have adopted a more active 
human rights role since the implementation of the NZBORA in 1990, the critical 
criminal process rights (namely ss 21-23 of the NZBORA), are only applicable 
when violations of these rights happen on New Zealand soil.  Although Bennett 
happened a considerable time ago, the practise it exposes serves as a powerful 
illustration of the need to incorporate fundamental human rights into the concept of 
comity under Part 4.   This matter is discussed in more depth, under the head of the 
proposed role of the Central Authority and the head of the proposed implementation 
of NZBORA in Chapter 5. With this background, it is appropriate to turn to the 
                                                          
116 At 4 per Henry J. 
117 Police v Thomas, above n 75, at 456; and confirmed in Johnstone, above n 65, at 9. 
118 Police v Thomas, above n 75, at 458; and Coronno, above n 88, at 7. 
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development of New Zealand’s backed-warrant procedure in context of 
Commonwealth countries becoming independent states. 
 
2.4  The London Scheme  
 
2.4.1 Background to the London Scheme 
Provision was made after many former British colonies attained independence for 
these newly independent states to remain aligned inter alia in regard to 
extradition.119 To this end, the London Scheme, formerly known as, “A Scheme 
Relating to the Rendition of Fugitive Offenders within the Commonwealth" (Cmnd 
3008) (“the Scheme”), was adopted by the Commonwealth in 1966 at a Meeting of 
Commonwealth Law Ministers in London.120  
 
The Scheme was first conceptualised at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' 
Conference in 1961.  The objective was to establish an independent organisation 
for the provision of Commonwealth legal material and legal information sharing on 
“new ideas on legal matters, particularly with regard to law reform, between the 
governments of Commonwealth countries and for the mutual assistance by 
Commonwealth countries of one another in the legal field.”121 The document "Plan 
of Mutual Assistance between Commonwealth Countries on Law Reform," sets out 
the purposes of the Scheme:122 
 
to disseminate information on new developments of special interest in law, 
and particularly in law reform, in countries of the Commonwealth and to 
arrange for assistance to any Commonwealth Governments which desire 
this in the preparation of particular pieces of legislation, the codification 
of particular parts of the law, or the study of other legal problems. 
 
The Scheme is operated by the British Institute of International and Comparative 
Law (entrusted in 1962) and has numerous procedural advantages (simplicity, 
                                                          
119 Clive Nicholls and others, above n 12, at 6. 
120 Anthony Aust “The Theory of Practice of Informal International Instruments” 35 (4) (1986) 
The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 787. See also M Cherif Bassiouni, above n 12,  
at 21. 
121 H H Marshall “The Commonwealth Legal Advisory Service: A Successful Experiment in 
Commonwealth Legal Co-operation” (1972) 21 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
at 435-451.    
122 At 436. 
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expediency and confidentiality, flexibility) to using informal instruments over 
treaty arrangements.123 One advantage is the ease with which it can be amended.124   
 
2.4.2 London Scheme and Extradition within the Commonwealth 
The informal nature of the Scheme, described as similar in character to a 
multilateral convention125  creates the basis for Commonwealth countries to put into 
effect reciprocating and substantially uniform legislation enacted in each member 
of the Commonwealth.126  
 
In regard to extradition, the Scheme provides for guidelines to the construction of 
Commonwealth statutes regulating extradition between Commonwealth countries 
and dependencies.127  Nevertheless, the meeting in 1966 concluded that it was 
appropriate to incorporate some of the usual safeguards featured in extradition 
treaties.128 For example, enumeration of extraditable offences; the requirement of 
establishing a prima facie case; and political offence exceptions.129 It is relevant 
that the Scheme has not precluded special arrangements between Commonwealth 
countries, enabling Australia and New Zealand to preserve simplified procedures 
such as the 1881 backed-warrant procedure.130  
 
2.4.3 Amending legislation to implement the London Scheme 
2.4.3.1  Australia 
Australia was the first Commonwealth country to implement the Scheme to replace 
the 1881 Act by enacting the Extradition (Commonwealth Countries) Act 1966 
(Cth) extending to the countries of the British Commonwealth. The backed- warrant 
                                                          
123 Aust, above n 120, at 789. See further Dale "Is the Commonwealth an International 
Organisation?" (1982) 31 ICLQ 451.  
124 Aust, above n 120, at 790. 
125 Geoff Gilbert Transnational Fugitive Offenders in International Law Extradition and Other 
Mechanisms (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, The Netherlands (1998) at 42.  
126 I A Shearer, above n 61, at 55.  
127 Alun Jones; QC, Jones on Extradition and Mutual Assistance (Sweet & Maxwell, London 
(2001) at 50. 
128 Julian B Knowles Blackstone’s Guide to The Extradition Act 2003 (Oxford University Press, 
New York (2004) at 6. 
129 At 6.  
130 R Burnett The Australia & New Zealand Nexus Annotated Documents (Australian National 
University, Australia, 1980) at 701.1 and 703.1. See Gilbert, above n 125, at 45.  
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system was preserved in Part III of the former Australian legislation, with New 
Zealand as the only designated country to which the system applied.  
 
2.4.3.2  UK 
In the UK the Scheme was embodied in the Fugitive Offenders Act of 1967 (UK)131 
which repealed the 1881 Act, “creating a stricter and more demanding scheme than 
its predecessor”.132 Its repeal did not affect its validity in New Zealand however.133 
The 1967 Act, was primarily designed to implement the agreement reached at the 
Commonwealth Law Ministers Meeting 1966, concerning the problem of political 
offenders and the absence of safeguards in governing the surrender of offenders 
whose crime is of a political character under the 1881 Act.134  
 
2.4.3.3  New Zealand 
New Zealand on the other hand, lagged behind Australia and the UK in choosing 
not to replace the 1881 Act by passing legislation to implement the London Scheme. 
On the contrary, ten years following the adoption of the1966 Scheme, New Zealand 
passed the Fugitive Offenders Amendment Act 1976 Act (“the Amendment Act”) 
to overrule the decision in R v Superintendant Mt Eden Prison; ex parte Best and 
Ashman, which held that in view of the constitutional changes in the status of 
countries of the Commonwealth the 1881 Act applied only to “British possessions” 
and did not apply to New Zealand because New Zealand was no longer a Dominion 
in terms of the definition adopted by the Court.135 That decision was given on 31 
May 1976, and its effect was reversed, just six weeks later, by the Amendment 
Act.136  
 
A second purpose of the Amendment Act was to make provision for prohibiting the 
return of a person likely to face persecution on the grounds of his race, religion, 
                                                          
131 See Ivan A Shearer “The Current Framework of International Extradition: A Brief Study of 
Regional Arrangements and Multilateral Treaties” in M Cherif Bassiouni & Ved P Nanda A 
Treatise on International Criminal Law (Thomas, 1973). 
132 Canada v Aronson [1990] 1 AC 579 (HL) per Lord Elwyn-Jones. 
133 See Re Ashman, above n 41 at 226. 
134 M Cherif Bassiouni, above n 12, at 21.  The passing of the Extradition Act 1989 (UK) repealed 
the Extradition Acts 1870-1932 (1870-1932 Acts) essentially consolidating the Extradition Act 
(UK) and the 1870-1932 as well as the Criminal Justice Act 1988. See Knowles, above n 126, at 7. 
135 See R v Howard, above n 71, at 217; Soper, above n 12; and Explanatory Note in 1976 
Amendment. See also Re H, above n 88. 
136 Burnett, above n 130, at 50. 
31 
 
nationality or political opinion.  Australia had similar legislation relating to every 
Commonwealth country, except New Zealand.137  In New Zealand’s case the 
provision was inserted as a result of pressure from the opposition Labour  Party 
based on its study of the British Fugitive Offenders Act and concern about return 
to repressive regimes in Africa such as Rhodesia and South Africa.138   
 
2.4.4 Summary 
It has been described as striking that although New Zealand had attained full 
international personality, the 1881 Act remained part of the law of New Zealand 
preserving the old ‘backed-warrant’ system by continuing the operation of the 1925 
Order in Council139 until it was repealed by the Extradition Act 1999.140  Until the 
1999 Act, Australia was not subject to any special status (as a designated country) 
but continued on the basis of the simplified scheme under the 1881 Act. Although 
as members of the Scheme, both New Zealand and Australia could rely upon the 
Scheme, today Australia and New Zealand conduct their extradition relations on 








                                                          
137 At 51. 
138 At 51. 
139 O’Higgins, above n 42, at 486; and Alan and Robin Burnett The Australia and New Zealand 
Nexus (The Australian Institute of Internal Affairs, Australia (1978) at 49.  
140 Extradition Act 1999, s 112(2).  The New Zealand Parliament enacted its first Extradition Act 
in 1965, forming the sole basis for extradition between New Zealand and foreign states.140 Section 
s 20(2) of the Extradition Act 1965 repealed the UK Parliamentary enactments set out under 
Schedule 2 of the Act. Under the Imperial Laws Application Act 1988, s 4(1), these repealed Acts 
(Extradition Acts 1870-1932) were no longer part of New Zealand law. Issues Paper, above n 1, at 
[2.9]. 
141 Gilbert, above n 125, at 45. See Extradition Act 1999, Part 4 and Australia’s Extradition Act 
1988 (Cth), Part III.  A complete listing of Commonwealth countries’ agreements, orders and the 
Act relating to extradition and rendition of fugitive offenders can be found on the Commonwealth 
Website available at <www.thecommonwealth.org>. The latest relevant development is the 
London Scheme for Extradition within the Commonwealth (amended in November 2002). Its most 
recent review and amendment took place in the 1990’s (LMM(90)32).  
32 
 
3. Backing-of-warrants in New Zealand under Part 4 of the 
Extradition Act 1999  
 
3.1 Structure  
The backed-warrant procedure is currently governed by the Extradition Act 1999 
 (“the 1999 Act) which replaced the Extradition Act 1965 and the 1881 Act. Before 
proceeding to examine the operation of the backed-warrant procedure in detail, it is 
important to distinguish between the backed-warrant procedure and standard 
extradition procedure. For that purpose it is important to understand the structure 
of the present Act.142 
 
Part 3 of the 1999 Act applies to extradition requests from a Commonwealth 
country; a country that New Zealand has an extradition treaty with; a country 
designated by Order in Council to have Part 3 of the 1999 Act apply; and for the 
purposes of a specific individual extradition request, a country designated under 




Part 4 specifically applies to surrender requests from Australia; and “other 
designated countries”144  for “extraditable persons”145 who are charged with or have 
been convicted of an “extradition offence”.146   Designation as a Part 4 Country, is 
made by the Governor-General by Order in Council on the recommendation of the 
Minister of Justice (currently only the UK and Pitcairn Islands).147 The Minister 
must be satisfied as to the circumstances in which a person may be arrested in the 
other country and similarities to the process in New Zealand, the other country’s 
                                                          
142 For a summary of the statutory scheme, see Mailley v Police [2011] 3 NZLR 223 at [21]-[38] 
per Ellis J.  
143 Issues Paper, above n 1, at [2.15]. 
144 Extradition Act 1999, s 2(1). 
145 Section 3. 
146 Section 4. 
147 Extradition Act 1999, ss 39 and 40. See Issues Paper, above n 1, at [2.15]. For example Brown 
v Territory of Pitcairn, Henderson, Ducie and Oeno Islands [2006] 2 NZLR 281; and Tranter v 
Chief Executive of the Dept of Corrections [2012] NZCA 407 at [11]. 
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ability to extradite to New Zealand (reciprocity), the other country’s speciality rules 
and the other country’s rules about surrendering a person to a third country.148  
 
3.3 Function 
The function of the backed-warrant procedure is to provide a “simplified 
procedure” for New Zealand to give effect to requests for surrender from Australia 
and any country designated under s 40149 (currently only the UK and Pitcarin 
Islands), in recognition of what is presupposed to be New Zealand’s close ties, 
procedural similarities and justice system with these countries. It is for this reason 
that the backed-warrant procedure differs from standard extradition in terms of both 
the evidence required and the degree of involvement by the courts and the 
Minister.150 
  




3.4.1.1  “Extraditable person” 
Under s 3 of the 1999 Act, a person is an “extraditable person” in relation to an 
extradition country if: 
   
(a)  the person is accused of having committed an extradition offence 
against the law of that country; or 
(b)  the person has been convicted of an extradition offence against the 
law of that country and— 
(i)  there is an intention to impose a sentence on the person as a 
consequence of the conviction; or 
                                                          
148 Extradition Act 1999, s 40(3)(c)-(d). See Issues Paper, above n 1, at [6.10]. For comment on the 
difficulty in determining how a decision is made to designate a country, see Report, above n 1, at 
[7.15].  See also Mailley v District Court at North Shore [2013] NZCA 266 [Mailley – Court of 
Appeal 2013] at [7]-[8].     
149 Extradition Act, s 12. Issues Paper, above n 1, at [6.6]. 
150 Explanatory Note of the Extradition Act 1998. See Soper, above n 12, at 5. See Kurtz v Aicken, 
above n 64. That case involved a charge of larceny arising from an alleged bet at race-course – in 
reply to submissions for counsel of accused, evidence as to the charge being bona fide is not a 
matter that falls to be considered under s 19 of the Fugitive Offenders Act 1881 (UK), rather, the 
Court held that it was a matter to be determined on trial – for the purposes of Part II, the evidence 
was sufficient to bring the offence under the reach of the 1881 Act. See further, M Cherif 
Bassiouni, above n 12, at 21; and Clive Nicholls and others, above n 12. 
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(ii) the whole or a part of a sentence imposed on the person as a 
consequence of the conviction remains to be served. 
 
3.4.1.2  “Extradition country” 
Australia and all designated countries are defined as "extradition countries" for the 
purposes of the relevant part of the Act. 151  
 
3.4.1.3   “Extradition offence” 
Under s 4 of the 1999 Act, an “extradition offence” is defined in s 4 of the 1999 
Act. 
 
3.4.1.3.1 Double criminality 
Under s 4(2) of the 1999 Act, the principle of double criminality is preserved.  
 
3.4.1.3.2 Conduct rule   
In determining whether the statutory definition of an “extradition offence” is met, 
the expression “conduct constituting an offence” under s 5 means that the focus is 
on the conduct of the requested person rather than the crime alleged to have been 
committed.152  
 
3.4.1.3.3 Penalty threshold 
In relation to a request from Australia or a designated country to New Zealand, an 
offence must be punishable under the law of that country for which the maximum 
penalty is imprisonment for not less than 12 months or any more severe penalty.  
The same seriousness threshold applies in relation to requests from New Zealand 
to Australia or a designated country.153  
 
This threshold accords with thresholds set in Australia and under the European 
Arrest Warrant and is within the parameters set by article 2(2) of the United Nations 
Model Treaty. However, it is half the level used by Canada154 and the London 
Scheme.155 Technically, it means that a requested person may be subject to the 
                                                          
151 Extradition Act, s 2(1).  
152 Plakas v Police HC Auckland, CIV-2008-404-2412, 11 June 2008 at [23] per Randerson J. 
153 Extradition Act 1999, s 4(1)(a)-(b). 
154 Extradition Act SC 1999, c 18, s 3. 




backed-warrant procedure on the basis of a relatively minor offence.156   This 
problem is said to be obviated through the high level of trust that is accorded 
Australia and other designated countries.157 Further, the trivial nature of the offence 
is currently one of the grounds on which the court may refuse surrender.158 This 
ground appears to compensate for the low penalty threshold. 
 
3.4.2 Speciality 
The principle of speciality (as discussed in paragraph 2.3.4.4), is also preserved 
under the backed-warrant procedure by virtue of the Minister’s selection process.159 
 
3.4.3 Standard of evidence 
The usual requirement to show a prima facie standard of guilt has been removed 
under the Part 4 procedure and replaced with a requirement that the requesting state 
produce an arrest warrant rather than on the basis of evidence.160 Removal of the 
prima facie case standard is a result of comity.  It flows from the perceived 
similarity in the judicial system and safeguards between Australia and New Zealand 
and a high level of trust in their respective legal systems.161 It is what differentiates 
the backed-warrant procedure from the standard procedure of extradition under Part 
2 of the 1991 Act.  
 
3.5 Procedure 
Part 4 of the 1999 Act prescribes a procedure to be followed when considering 
requests for surrender. It differs from standard extradition by narrowing the 
procedural requirements on the basis of comity and the presumption of similarity 
of legal and procedural systems with Australia and other designated countries. 
Consequently, there are fewer procedural safeguards and formalities in place than 
are found in standard extradition.  
                                                          
156 For example, unlawful assembly, attracts a maximum 12 months’ imprisonment, under the 
Crimes Act 1961, s 86. 
157 Issues Paper, above n 1, at [5.29]-[5.32]. 
158 At [5.24]. See Extradition Act 1999, s 8(1). 
159 Section 40(3)(d). 
160 Section 45(5). 
161 Issues Paper, above n 1, at [6.8]-[6.10]. 
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3.5.1  Pre-Arrest 
In essence, the initial process of securing surrender under Part 4 involves police-to-
police cooperation, although the 1999 Act is silent on who is responsible for the 
receipt and vetting of backed-warrant requests as well as the decision to initiate 
proceedings.162 In practice, preparation of documents, affidavits, and the 
application for surrender to a District Court Judge (DCJ) is made by the New 
Zealand Police, on behalf of the requesting state.163 This exemplifies the 
simplification of the process compared to the standard procedure which involves 
the Minister of Justice in the initial stages.164   
 
3.5.2 Endorsement of the warrant  
The DCJ may endorse a warrant for arrest under s 41 if, based on affidavit evidence 
(authenticated in compliance with s 78 of the 1991 Act), it is satisfied as to:  
• the identity of the requested person; 
• the person is, or is suspected of being in New Zealand or on his or 
her way here (s 41(1)(a)); and  
• a warrant for arrest has been issued (s 41(1)); and the warrant was 
issued by a lawful authority (s 41(1)).165  
 
Under section 41(1)(b), there must also be reasonable grounds to believe that the 
person is an “extraditable person”166 in relation to an “extradition country”167 and 
“extradition offence”.168  Where a warrant has been endorsed “in the prescribed 
form”, the warrant may be executed by any constable (s 41(2)). The “prescribed 
form” of endorsement is Form EA6 which is found in the Extradition Regulations. 
 
 
                                                          
162 Mailley – 2013 appeal, above n 148, at [8]; and Issues Paper, above n 1, at [4.18]-[4.19].  
163 1999 Act, s 41. See Mailley v Police, above n 142, at [21]-[38]; and Issues Paper, above n 1, at 
[4.18]-[4.19]. In Mailley - 2013 Appeal, above n 148, at [43] per French J. The Court of Appeal 
held that the appropriate applicant is the requesting country rather than the NZP but error in the 
naming of the applicant was a technicality which could be overcome and did not lead to prejudice. 
New Zealand Police “Extradition to Part 4 Countries” (Obtained under Official Information Act 
1982 Request to the New Zealand Police).  
164 See Extradition Act 1999, s 18. See also Issues Paper, above n 1, at [2.24].   
165 See Keenan v United Kingdom [2016] NZHC 2446. 
166 Extradition Act 1999, s 3. 
167 Section 2(c). 
168 Section 4(1). 
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3.5.3 Provisional Arrest  
Assuming endorsement of the overseas warrant, Interpol is notified so an ‘arrest 
border alert’ can be entered to prevent the requested person from fleeing.169 
Section 42 sets out provisional arrest powers, permitting arrest without an 
endorsed warrant, subject to meeting certain criteria (s 41(1)(a)-(c)), if it is 
necessary or desirable for an arrest warrant to be issued urgently (s 42(1)(d)). 
 
3.5.4 Powers of the Court  
In contrast to the standard procedure, the backed-warrant procedure is aligned to 
the Criminal Procedure Act 2011. The Criminal Procedure Act includes a form of 
summary proceeding for what it terms Category 2 offences, which is applied to the 
backed-warrant process.170Category 2 offences involve District Court Judge alone 
proceedings unless an order is made on application by either side to the High 
Court.171 Category 2 offences are those which carry a penalty of less than two years, 
or by a community-based sentence. A District Court has all the usual powers such 
as issuing of summons to witnesses, remand of the defendant, adjournment and stay 
of proceedings.172  
 
3.5.5 Procedure following arrest  
Whether the person is arrested on a warrant endorsed under s 41 or a provisional 
warrant under s 42, the person must “unless sooner discharged, be brought before 
a court as soon as possible” (s 44(1)).  
 
Section 44(2) sets out terms by which bail may be granted following arrest under 
the Bail Act 2000 (s 44(3). Section 44(4) deals with time-frames when the person 
is under a provisional arrest warrant. If a reasonable time has elapsed for the 
endorsement of the warrant under s 41, “…the court may, and must if a reasonable 
time has elapsed for the endorsement of the warrant, order that the person be 
discharged.”173 Once a warrant has been endorsed and the Police have arrested the 
                                                          
169 New Zealand Police, above n 163.   
170 Extradition Act 1999, s 43(1)(a).  
171 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 70. 
172 District Court Rules 2014; and District Courts Act 1947. 
173 Section 44(4)(b). 
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person sought, usually the matter is transferred to the relevant Crown Solicitors who 
initiate and have carriage of the court proceedings.174 
 
3.5.6 Eligibility for surrender hearing  
Section 45 provides for the determination by the DCJ of the eligibility of the 
requested person for surrender in relation to the offences for which surrender is 
sought. Before ordering surrender of the requested person is possible, pursuant to s 
45(2) the court must be satisfied: 
 
(a) A warrant for the arrest of the defendant is produced to the court 
and has been endorsed under s 41(1); 
(b) That the defendant is an “extraditable person” (as defined in s 3), 
in relation to the extradition country; 
(c) There is an “extradition offence” (as defined in s 4) in relation to 
the “extradition country” (pursuant to s 39); and 
(d) There are no mandatory or discretionary restrictions under s 7 
and 8, respectively (s 45(3)(a)-(b)).  
 
In determining whether the requested person is an “extraditable person”, defects in 
the original warrant will not necessarily render the endorsed warrant invalid, 
particularly if the defect is without substance and can be overcome by the existence 
of supporting documentation.175  
 
3.5.7 Post eligibility hearing  
 
3.5.7.1  Detention  
Assuming that the eligibility criteria for surrender under s 45(2) are met and there 
are no applicable mandatory or discretionary restrictions, then the court must issue 
a warrant for the detention of the requested person pending their surrender176 and 
inform the requested person of matters relating to time frames for their surrender, 
during which time the person may exercise their right of appeal or apply for a writ 
of habeas corpus (s 46(1)(b)).  Section 46(1)(b)(i) provides that an order for 
                                                          
174 Mailley v Police, above n 142, at [34]. Extradition Act 1999, ss 44-45 stipulates the procedure 
following arrest. 
175 Smith v Police [2014] NZHC 2676 at [6]; and Smith v Police [2014] NZHC 1577. 
176 Extradition Act 1999, s 46(1)(a). 
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surrender may not be executed before the 15 day-period allowed for an appeal has 
expired.  
 
3.5.7.2  Bail  
The court may grant or refuse bail when making the order for detention.177 This 
involves the exercise of a judicial decision governed by a mixture of the provisions 
of both the Bail Act 2000 and the Extradition Act 1999 (s 46(3)).  Flight risk has 
been found to be highly relevant in the court’s assessment of there being a just cause 
to deny bail.178Although the requested person is not bailable as of right, the court 
must grant bail unless it is satisfied that there is just cause for the requested person’s 
continued detention.  
Assuming that the court grants bail to the requested person, pursuant to s 46(3) of 
the 1999 Act, the court may impose any conditions of bail that the court thinks fit 
in addition to any conditions that the court may impose under section 30(1), (2), 
and (4) of the Bail Act 2000 (s 46(3)) including conditions for estreatment of bail 
bond.179 In the event that the requested person is not found eligible for surrender, s 
46(4) provides for their discharge subject to s 70(1).  
 
3.5.8 Surrender Order  
Assuming a warrant for the detention of the requested person is issued under s 
46(1)(a), s 47 obliges the court to immediately after, make a surrender order, unless 
the court refers the person’s case to the Minister under s 48(1) or s 48(4). S 47(2) 
deals with time restrictions and the appellant’s right to appeal or apply for habeas 
corpus before a surrender order takes effect.  
 
3.5.9 Referral of case to Minister  
Assuming the criteria for eligibility for surrender are met, the court may 
nevertheless refer the case to the Minister. The role of the Minister of Justice is 
restricted to the final decision on surrender under s 48, reflecting the object of the 
Act set out in s 12(d) to provide a simplified procedure for requests for extradition 
                                                          
177 Section 46(2). 
178 Archer v Police HC Tauranga CRI-2007-463-143, 22 November 2007 at [4] and [10].    
179 R v Morgan HC Wellington, CRI-2004-485-110, 17 March 2009 at [13].  For example Fifta v 
New Zealand Police HC Auckland CRI-2006-404-145, 12 May 2006; and R v PGD HC 
Wellington CRI-2005-085-5692 24, 28 April 2006. Mailley – Court of Appeal 2013, above n 148, 
at [68]; and Radhi v District Court at Manukau [2015] NZHC 3347 [Radhi] at [29].   
40 
 
from Australia and other designated countries.  Importantly, the court is not 
required to refer the case to the Minister if the extradition country is Australia or a 
designated country.  In regard to these countries, the judiciary acts as gate-keeper 
to the Minister. In the rare case of a referral by the court to the Minister under s 
48(4), then the Minister must determine whether the person is to be surrendered, 
having regard to the matters contained in s 30(2)-(4).180  The Minister enjoys a wide 
discretionary power not available to the courts to refuse an extradition request, 
exemplified in their ability to refuse to do so “for any other reason” under s 
30(3)(e).181 Section 48(4)(a)(ii) also allows the Minister to merely defer surrender, 
where because of present circumstances, “it would be unjust or oppressive to 
surrender the person before the expiration of a particular period.”  
 
3.5.10  Appeal  
Section 68 of the Extradition Act applies to both the standard and backed-warrant 
procedure under sections 24 and 45 respectively.182 It confers on a party, a right of 
appeal in relation to decisions that a person is eligible or ineligible for surrender, 
but restricted to a question of law only.183 A person determined as eligible for 
surrender under s 46 may then file a notice of intention to appeal by way of case 
stated for the opinion of the High Court pursuant to s 68 of the 1999 Act.184  Another 
avenue to challenge an arrest warrant is through habeas corpus applications where 
the Crown is required to justify the detention of a prisoner. Assuming the Court or 
the Minister orders surrender, there is a 15-day window in which to apply for habeas 
corpus or lodge an appeal.185 
 
 
                                                          
180 Mailley – Court of Appeal 2013, above n 148, at [12]; McGrath v Minister of Justice [2015] 
NZAR 122, at [6]; and Radhi, above n 179.  
181 Extradition Act 1999, ss 30(3)(d)-(e). Radhi, above n 179, at [2]) See Wolf v Federal Republic 
of Germany (2001) 19 CRNZ 245 (CA) [Wolf] at [49]; Mailley v Police, above n 142, at [12]; and 
Radhi, above n 179, at [2]. 
182 Extradition Act 1999, s 68(1). 
183 Commonwealth of Australia v B [2016] NZHC 302 [Mercer – HC review decision] at [2]. 
Subpart 8 of pt 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 applies to such an appeal under s 69(2) of 
the 1991 Act. 
184 MKR v New Zealand Police [2013] 163 at [3].  
185 Extradition Act 1999, s 47(2) and 50(2). See Commonwealth of Australia v Mercer [2016] 
NZCA 503 [Mercer – Court of Appeal].  
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3.5.11  Other provisions 
Assuming that the case has been referred to the Minister, s 49 provides that the 
Minister must make a determination as to the surrender of the person and enables 
the Minister to seek any undertakings by the extradition country (s 49 (2)). Sections 
50 and 51 cover provisions for the making, varying or cancelling of a surrender 
order, time restrictions, right to appeal and application for a writ of habeas corpus. 
Section 52 provides for detention of the requested person in a place other than 
prison. Sections 53-59 deals with surrender by consent, temporary surrender (ss 54-
55); and ss 56-59 deals with discharge of the person.  
 
 3.5.12  Outgoing requests 
Surrender from Australia to New Zealand is determined by Part 3 (ss 28-39) of the 
Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) (“1988 (Cth) Act”), which is a backed-warrant 
procedure analogous to surrender within Australia that requires only an endorsed 
warrant.186 There is no requirement: (a) to make a formal request for surrender; (b) 
to produce supporting documents characteristic of the standard extradition process; 
(c) meet the double criminality requirement; or (d) meet a particular threshold of 
seriousness for any offence.187 Nor is there a requirement to provide prima facie 
evidence of guilt.188 The Part 3 backed-warrant procedure under the 1988 (Cth) Act 
is analogous to New Zealand, with exception to the removal of the double 
criminality requirement and the penalty threshold.  Removal of the penalty 
threshold may account for why there are grounds for refusing surrender based upon 
the trivial nature of the offence under s 34(2) of the Act.  
 
Unlike New Zealand’s backed-warrant procedure, there is no habeas corpus 
provision in Australia’s extradition legislation. Another difference is that s 34(5) 




                                                          
186 New Zealand v Moloney [2006] FCAFC 143 [Moloney – Full Court]; New Zealand v Johnston 
[2011] FCAFC 2 [Johnston – Full Court] at [10]. The current process of securing extradition 
within Australia is governed by Pt 5 of the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth).  
187 Moloney – Full Court, above n 186, at [28]. 
188 At [28].  
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3.6  The role of comity 
Assuming the function of comity is to balance the doctrine of sovereignty with the 
goals of extradition, it follows that “comity” allows for an even greater softening of 
sovereignty as a determinative factor in deciding surrender189  under the backed-
warrant procedure.190   This is because “comity”, as described by O’Higgins, 
involves shared political ideals and mutual respect for the quality and impartiality 
of the legal system administered in the independent members of the 
Commonwealth.191  These factors have given rise to reciprocal legislation and 
excused the standard of evidence required in standard extradition, which is 
traditionally based upon reciprocal treaties.192 That is not to say that comity per se 
is necessarily a determinative factor in deciding surrender. Rather, comity has to 
allow for the increasing importance of the basic human rights of the individual. This 
accords with the balancing function of the 1999 Act that the Commission has strived 
to improve through its proposed reform of the Act.193  
 
It follows that recent usage of the term “international comity” as described by the 
Law Commission194 or “comity of nations” as reflected in the Explanatory Note of 
the 1998 Bill, and as similarly described by Justice Johnston in 1880, fails to reflect 
this changing perspective of comity. None of these definitions, adequately reflect 
the type of comity that should be applied to New Zealand’s extradition law in a way 
that reflects modern conceptions of human rights.195 It is argued that a formulation 
of comity more closely approximating the type of comity operating under the 1999 
                                                          
189 See Elisa D’Alterio “From judicial comity to legal comity: A judicial solution to global 
disorder?” (2011) 9(2) Intl Jnl of Constitutional Law 394 at 394. See for example Hilton v Guyot, 
above n 16, at 163–64 (Justice Gray for the majority) approved by CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance 
Australia Ltd, above n 16, at 396. The explanatory note of the 1998 Draft Bill conveys the role of 
comity in softening the principle of sovereignty to yield international cooperation in extradition: 
“It is part of the comity of nations that one state should afford to another every assistance towards 
bringing persons guilty of such crimes to justice.” 
190 Issues Paper, above n 1, at [2.2]. 
191 Paul O’Higgins, above n 42, at 487. See also Bates v McDonald (1985) 2 NSWLR 89 (CA) 
[Bates] at 98. Referred to in Mailley v Police, above n 142, at [33]. 
192 For example, Part 3 of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) Act. Elisa D’Alterio, above n 189, at 399. 
For further discussion on the value of reciprocity see Adrian Briggs “The Principle of Comity in 
Private International Law” (2011) 354(65) Recueil des Cours: Collected Courses of the Hague 
Academy of International Law 140 in Timothy Endicott “Comity among Authorities” (2015) 68 
Current Legal Problems 1 at 7. 
193 Extradition Act 1999, s 12.    
194 Issues Paper, above n 1, at [2.2.]. The Law Commission refers to “international comity” as “the 
favour accorded by one state by to another”. The Commission observes that the importance 
reciprocity has to extradition is diminishing however.  
195 See Michael Plachta “European Arrest Warrant: Revolution in Extradition?” (2003) 11 
European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 178. 
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Act, is found in the leading authority on a definition of comity provided in the 
Canadian case, Morguard  Investments Ltd v De Savoye by Justice La Forest196: 
 
"Comity" in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute 
obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, 
upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows 
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of 
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and 
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons 
who are under the protection of its laws. 
 
This formulation is more progressive in developing a modern concept of comity as 
its wording is broad enough to accommodate the doctrine of sovereignty in a way 
that complements the trustworthiness doctrine that underpins comity with Australia 
and the increasing importance of human rights in qualifying comity.  However, 
there remains the difficulty in reconciling the importance of human rights as 
qualifying comity with the loose criteria required to achieve surrender under the 
Part 4 backed-warrant procedure.  This is because the emphasis on similarity and 
mutual respect tends to strengthen the case for ascribing a more absolute form of 
comity to the Part 4, backed-warrant procedure than under standard extradition.   
 
3.7 Human Rights 
The fast-track nature of the Part 4 backed-warrant procedure continues to place the 
human rights of the requested person at risk of being compromised because of the 
pressure comity places on the judiciary and minister to grant surrender. In 
particular, comity and the unchallenged assumption of similarity between New 
Zealand and Australia lends itself to being used as a scapegoat for non-inquiry into 
the treatment of the requested person further along the surrender process.197   In 
theory, the Court may refer the case to the Minister if there are grounds for believing 
the requested person might be subjected to an act of torture or imposition of the 
                                                          
196 Morguard  Investments Ltd v De Savoye [1990] 3 SCR 1077 at 1096. Referring to the 
formulation of comity adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States in the landmark decision 
of Hilton v Guyot, above n 16, at 163-64.  Followed in Brown v Miller [2008] BCJ No 1905; 2008 
BCSC 1351 at [63] per DJ Martinson J. 
197 See McGrath – High Court, above n 180, at [2]; Mailley – Court of Appeal 2013, above n 148, 




death penalty.198 However, in practise and as far as the author is aware, this 
provision has never been invoked.  Speaking in context of comity with Australia, 
the Court of Appeal in Commonwealth of Australia v Mercer (Mercer – Court of 
Appeal), said: “There is a justified expectation that the respondent’s human rights 
(including the right to a fair trial) will be met by Australia.”199  Even if this were a 
safe assumption, there is no evidence to indicate that New Zealand and Australia 
are on par with human rights standards.  In absence of a BORA or any provisions 
in the Australian Constitution that reflect the BORA rights of the defendant, it is 
questionable whether the presumption of similarity extends to the full range of 




                                                          
198 Extradition Act 1999, s 48. Mercer – Court of Appeal, above n 185, at [15]. 





Restrictions on surrender are essentially a safeguard to protect the interests of the 
requested person facing prosecution and punishment for crimes alleged to have 
occurred in the requesting country and ensure that the court’s process is not 
abused.200 Distinct from standard extradition under Part 3 however, comity plays a 
more definitive role in determining surrender under Part 4. Nevertheless, the 
question whether comity should be determinative, requires some balancing of the 
competing interests between the growing importance of human rights and an 
international obligation between New Zealand and Australia to make surrender as 
swift as possible. 
In order to establish a restriction on surrender, the burden of proof rests with the 
requested person on the balance of probabilities that to surrender the person would 
be unjust or oppressive according to whichever provision is relied upon under Part 
4.201 These provisions are discussed in more detail in the following paragraphs. 
 
4.1 Ministerial restrictions on surrender 
The basis on which the court may decide that a referral to the Minister is necessary, 
arises from any of the restrictions on the surrender of the requested person under s 
7 or 8 by virtue of s 48(4)(a)(i).  Section 7 provides for mandatory restrictions on 
surrender such as grounds of discrimination.  Section 8 provides for discretionary 
restrictions on surrender based upon a limited number of grounds. These include 
the trivial nature of the case, bad faith, interests of justice and the passage of time 
(“delay”) and are discussed in more detail under the head judicial restrictions.  
Alternatively, the court may decide that a referral to the Minister is necessary under 
s 48(4)(a)(ii) “because of compelling or extraordinary circumstances of the person, 
including, without limitation, those relating to the age or health of the person, it 
would be unjust or oppressive to surrender the person before the expiration of a 
particular period”.  
                                                          
200 See Report, above n 2, at [5.6(e)].   
201 Mercer – Court of Appeal, above n 185. 
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The word “or” creates two distinct statutory tests, either of which must be 
established before the DCJ may refer a case to the Minister.202  The distinction 
between the two statutory tests precludes the Court from considering the mandatory 
or discretionary ‘restrictions on surrender’ set out in ss 7 and 8 of the Act when 
considering any ‘compelling or extraordinary circumstances’ under s 48(4)(a)(ii) 
and vice versa.203 In that regard, the High Court in Radhi v The Manukau District 
Court & Anor (Radhi), determined that the DCJ had not made an error of law by 
failing to consider the impact of delay on Radhi under s 48(4)(a)(ii).204 Delay could 
only be a mandatory relevant factor under that provision if there was a nexus 
between the delay and personal impact on Radhi by reason of the phrase 
“circumstances of the person”.   
Another important aspect to a ministerial discretion is that unless the statutory tests 
are met, the DCJ is not required to consider the purpose of the Minister’s role, 
including the wider discretion available to the Minister and his power to seek 
undertakings from Australia.205  
4.1.1  “compelling or extraordinary” 
In order to qualify as extraordinary circumstances, the circumstances must be out 
of the ordinary, unusual, uncommon or striking, while "compelling" denotes "very 
persuasive" or "very strong".206 The Supreme Court’s decision  Ye v Minister of 
Immigration has been regarded as authority for the proposition that in determining 
the standard “compelling or extraordinary” all circumstances are to be assessed both 
discretely and cumulatively.207 In Radhi, it was recognised that Radhi’s refugee 
status was an “extraordinary circumstance of the person” for the purposes of 
assessing the s 48(4)(a)(ii) provision.208 In Brougham Judge Mathers rejected the 
proposition that a heightened risk of suicide “amounts to compelling or 
extraordinary circumstances …”209 This assessment was criticised by the Court of 
                                                          
202 Radhi, above n 179, at [31]. 
203 At [31],[32] and [46]).   
204 Radhi, above n 179. 
205 At [30]. 
206 Mailley – Court of Appeal 2013, above n 148, at [62]. Endorsed in Radhi, above n 179, at 43. 
207  Ye v Minister of Immigration [2009] NZSC 76, [2010] 1 NZLR 104 at [36] and [38]. Followed 
in Mailley v District Court at North Shore [2014] NZHC 2816 [Mailley – HC review decision]. 
208 Radhi, above n 179, at [21]. 
209 Brougham v Commonwealth HC Christchurch CRI-2009-409-191, 24 February 2010 at [8].  
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Appeal in Mailley – Court of Appeal 2013, as suggesting an unwarranted distinction 
between physical and mental health.210  
4.1.2  “circumstances of the person” 
Discretionary restrictions under s 8(1) read with s 48(4)(a)(i) relate to the 
circumstances of the case, while this relates to circumstances of the person.211 In a 
standard extradition case, the Court in Wolf v Federal Republic of Germany 
(Wolf) held that the phrase “all the circumstances of the case” in s 8(1) necessarily 
excluded the personal circumstances of the person sought for extradition.212  
Circumstances of the case may include consideration of such matters as delay,213 
issues with witnesses and the prospect of a fair trial.214 It is also likely that the 
required degree of proof depends on the nature of the alleged injustice or 
oppression. For example, where surrender to Australia is concerned, there has 
been a reluctance to determine the matter trivial, lacking good faith or in the 
interests of justice or at risk of unfair trial or presenting a risk to the requested 
person’s rights.215 Circumstances of the person on the other hand, can include 
matters such as the requested person’s age, health and family situation, or risk of 
refoulement.216 This “bright line” distinction between the circumstances of the 
person and the circumstances of the case has been the source of considerable 
confusion for counsel, however.217 
4.1.3 “without limitation, those relating to the age or health of the 
person” 
The passage “without limitation, those relating to the age or health of the person” 
has invoked a variety of matters for consideration under s 48(4)(a)(ii). Similar 
provision is contained in Australian extradition law under the Extradition 
(Commonwealth Countries) Regulations 1988, s Reg (1) as it applies to the 
Attorney-General.218 Although the matters considered by the Minister are broad in 
                                                          
210 Mailley v District Court at North Shore [2016] NZCA 83 [Mailley – Court of Appeal 2016] at 
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212 Wolf v Federal Republic of Germany [2001] NZAR 536 (HC) at [68].  Referred to in Mailley – 
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218 In EP Aughertson, above n 11, at 157 -158. 
48 
 
range, a clear nexus between the matter under consideration and the personal impact 
on the requested person is required.219  
Health, for the purposes of the section, is not limited to physical health, but may 
include suicide risk and mental health, determined as a matter of fact and degree.220 
In Brougham v Commonwealth  the requested person was sought for extradition to 
Australia in relation to charges that he allegedly falsely obtained goods and services 
tax (GST) refunds in 2004-2005.221 In the context of an application for extension of 
time to file a case stated appeal, the High Court determined that an appeal was 
unlikely to succeed on the grounds that the DCJ erred in determining that a referral 
to the Ministry of Justice for consideration under s 48(4)(a)(ii) was not necessary.222  
After examining the evidence brought before the DCJ, including regard to 
significant mental health problems suffered by Brougham, Panckhurst J found that 
the DCJ  did not err in principle because she recognised all relevant matters and did 
not consider irrelevant matters, nor draw a conclusion that was clearly wrong.223  
To exemplify the unchallenged assumption of comity with Australia, the words of 
Judge Mathers are of interest: 
 [14]  Australia obviously has proper medical care and psychiatric services. 
 I have no doubt that the Australian authorities can take note of Mr 
 Brougham’s circumstances … 
In context of the Part 4, backed-warrant procedure it shows that the New 
Zealand courts are unwilling to inquire downstream into the human rights 
interests of the person.   
4.1.4  “Unjust or oppressive” 
The meaning of unjust and oppressive has been discussed in a number of High Court 
and Court of Appeal cases.224 It is doubtful that the case of Kakis v Governor of the 
                                                          
219 Radhi, above n 179.  
220 Mailley – Court of Appeal 2013, above n 148, at [62]. 
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222 At [27]. 
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224 R v Franciscus Maria Schaapveld [2016] NZDC 15560 at [15].  See Wolf, above n 181; Police 
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Republic of Cyprus continues to be the current authority for the meaning of the term 
“unjust or oppressive”. As pointed out in New Zealand v Moloney (Moloney – Full 
Court) the statute under which it was interpreted, is different in form to s 34(2) of 
the 1988 (Cth) Act.225  
 
Likewise, the term unjust or oppressive under s 48(4)(a)(i) and s 48(4)(a)(ii) refers 
to either circumstances of the case or circumstances of the person as opposed to “all 
of the circumstances of the case” under s 19 of the 1881 Act.  In 2016, the Court of 
Appeal in Commonwealth of Australia v Mercer (Mercer – Court of Appeal) 
referred extensively to various passages in Kakis, despite agreeing in Mailley v 
District Court at North Shore (Mailley – Court of Appeal 2016) with Justice Keane 
at the High Court in Mailley v District Court at North Shore (Mailley – HC review 
decision) who was “unconvinced that the English cases are useful analogies”.226 
Rather than rely on Kakis for a meaning of unjust or oppressive, the Court in  
Mailley – Court of Appeal 2016 looked to its own analysis in Wolf.227  
 
Moreover, it is questionable whether decisions dating back to 1978 are applicable, 
especially in regard to the growing importance of human rights in both England and 
New Zealand. For example, the emphasis on “exceptional circumstances” as a 
qualifying factor in determining whether extradition would be oppressive or unjust 
has been criticised for its tendency to diminish the importance of human rights 
(discussed further below).228   
 
As noted in Radhi, “the phrase “unjust or oppressive” is used in both s 8(1)(c) and 
s 48(4)(a)(ii).229 The Court of Appeal in Mailley v District Court at North Shore 
(Mailley - Court of Appeal 2013) held that whether because of the person’s 
circumstances, surrender would be “unjust or oppressive”, is the ultimate litmus test 
upon which the court assesses whether a referral to the Minister is warranted.230  
                                                          
225 Moloney – Full Court, above n 90, at [67]. 
226 Mailley – HC review decision, above n 207, at [85]. See Mailley – Court of Appeal 2016, above 
n 211, at [39] and [52]. 
227 Wolf, above n 180. 
228 H(H) v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic (SC(E)) [2012] UKSC 25, [2013] 1 AC 338 
[H(H)].   
229 Radhi, above n 179, at [8]. 
230 See Mailley – Court of Appeal 2013, above n 148. 
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That being said, the case law shows that from a judicial perspective, comity with 
Australia is an influential part of the court’s assessment. 
 
On similar facts to Brougham, the case of New Zealand Police v Mailley concerned 
a request from Australia to New Zealand for the surrender of Mr Mailley (Mailley) 
in relation to charges in Queensland for allegedly committing fraud and attempting 
to commit fraud between 1999 and 2002, amounting to a total of A$2m by 
fraudulently obtaining credit cards while in receipt of welfare benefits.231   
 
In 2008 the DCJ determined, under Part 4, that Mailley was eligible for surrender 
and subsequently made an order for his surrender. Mailley then challenged that 
decision by way of appeal in point of law and by application for judicial review.232  
 
Mailley then appealed to the Court of Appeal.  The issue of interest was to 
determine whether the proceedings miscarried because of the failure of the District 
and High Courts to consider whether Mailley's health problems warranted referral 
to the Minister under s 48(4)(a)(ii).  Of significance was the oversight on part of 
counsel for Mailley and the District Court in their failure to consider evidence of 
his health condition.  
 
The Court of Appeal found in favour of Mailley, on this third ground of appeal and 
quashed the surrender order. Having considered all of the circumstantial facts 
relating to Mailley’s mental and physical health against an interpretation of s 
48(4)(a)(ii) "rendering it unjust or oppressive to surrender the person before the 
expiration of a particular period”, it was determined that it would be unjust to 
surrender him without s 48(4)(a)(ii) being addressed. Accordingly the case was 
remitted back to the District Court for determination concerning Mailley’s health 
issues.233  This suggests that the existence of comity in the backed-warrant 
procedure does little to protect the person sought but, rather it can be perceived by 
judges as a reason to run roughshod over humanitarian concerns.   
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In 2016, a second appeal to the Court of Appeal was made against the judicial 
review decision of the High Court.234 The main issues related to whether the High 
Court made the correct interpretation of s 48(4)(a)(ii) of the 1999 Act.  The Court 
of Appeal dismissed the appeal. In reaching its conclusion the Court agreed with 
the District Court and High Court that Mailley’s personal circumstances as set out 
failed to meet the high s 48(4)(a)(ii) threshold when viewed either separately or 
collectively.235 Mailley then appealed unsuccessfully to the Supreme Court.236  
 
The Court of Appeal decision, shows the high level of comity that is applied by the 
judiciary in determining whether there are grounds warranting a referral to the 
Minister. It also suggests that there is strength in the proposition that consideration 
for the importance of human rights under s 48(4)(a)(ii) may be inappropriately 
narrowed by the emphasis on “extraordinary circumstances”. The Court of Appeal 
said that to qualify as extraordinary circumstances “. . .the circumstances must be 
out of the ordinary, unusual, uncommon or striking, while compelling denoted 
"very persuasive" or "very strong”.237 
 
Some would argue that by its own standard, there is nothing run of the mill about a 
heart condition, bipolar affective disorder, personality disorder and risk of suicide 
if surrendered.238  Despite acknowledging that such matters can fall within the 
meaning of “compelling or extraordinary” the Court was satisfied that the High 
Court took the right approach in upholding the District Court’s conclusion that 
whether together, or even combined such circumstances were less than compelling 
or extraordinary.239 The main criticism of this approach is that the courts have 
shown an unwillingness to consider the person’s human rights once they are subject 
to the health and legal system of Australia. It illustrates how too much emphasis is 
placed on comity and trustworthiness, which in turn prevents an inquiry into 
whether the health and legal system of Australia meets the key standards of New 
Zealand. 
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4.2  Comity applied    
The case law discussed below exemplifies the restrictive function comity has on the 
judicial and ministerial discretion to refuse surrender. It illustrates how a rigid 
attitude towards the purpose of the backed-warrant procedure under Part 4 in 
relation to Australia and the importance of comity tends to subordinate the 
fundamental rights of the person sought.  
 
In Radhi the DCJ rejected the view that the “circumstances of the person”, for the 
purposes of s 48(4)(a)(ii), included hardship suffered by others, such as Mr Radhi’s 
family.240 Some would view it as repugnant to a modern conception of human rights 
that the best interests of the children who will or may be affected by surrender are 
not treated as a relevant consideration under the broad ambit of the phrase 
“circumstances of the person” in light of other factors applicable to the surrender 
process.i To some extent this approach was recognised as incorrect on appeal at the 
High Court where Woolford J preferred a broader interpretation of the phrase 
“circumstances of the person”. His Honour accepted the proposition that the 1999 
Act should be interpreted according to New Zealand’s obligations in complying 
with applicable international instruments, namely Article 3(1) of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.241 Woolford J, nevertheless, determined that 
the children’s rights were not directly engaged.242  
 
In determining how family circumstances should be weighed in the extradition 
context, Woolford J referred to the Supreme Court, UK decision of H(H) v Deputy 
Prosecutor of the Italian Republic (H(H)) and simply noted its emphasis on the 
‘imperative’ nature of extradition and the underlying principle of international 
cooperation in combatting transnational crime as distinguishable from the policies 
underlying deportation.243  That reasoning has been subsequently endorsed in the 
Court of Appeal.244  
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It is suggested that His Honour and consequently the Court of Appeal, have 
misunderstood the Supreme Court’s view of how the courts should approach 
convention rights in determining extradition as opposed to deportation cases. The 
convention rights under issue concerned article 8 rights of the European Convention 
of Human Rights (ECHR) and their applicability to determining extradition under 
the EAW as reflected in the Extradition Act 2003 (UK) (“the 2003 Act”).  
 
Article 8 of the ECHR provides:245 
 
 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
 home and his correspondence. 
 
In its extensive analysis of the criticisms levelled at how previous authorities have 
dealt with the matter, the UK Supreme Court did not accept that the article 8 rights 
had to be “radically different” between extradition and deportation.246 The Court 
reasoned that consideration of the Convention rights are an inherent part of the 
extradition process by virtue of s 21 of the 2003 Act.247  The Court emphasised that 
“the court has still to examine carefully the way in which it will interfere with 
family life.” 248 Its analysis was not limited to article 8 but also included 
consideration to the applicability of article 3.1 of the UN Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (CRC).249 Referring to the differences between deportation and 
extradition the Court said, that the only difference between these contexts is “the 
nature and weight of interests to be put into each side of the scale.”250   
 
These views are not reflected in Justice Woolford’s analysis of H(H) in Radhi, 
however. Despite the incorrect interpretation given to the phrase “personal 
circumstances of the person” by the DCJ, Woolford J was satisfied that the DCJ 
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arrived at the correct conclusion251 but, it is not obvious how, if at all, the DCJ 
weighed the relevant interests of the surrender context.  In fact, Woolford J 
recognised that Judge Moses “did consider the hardship on Mr Radhi’s family, 
albeit in an abbreviated fashion.”252  In doing so, it is likely that Judge Moses was 
focussing on “some exceptionally compelling feature” for the purposes of s 
48(4)(a)(ii). The UK Supreme Court in H(H) was critical of precisely this approach 
as it predisposes the court “to divert attention from consideration of the potential 
impact of extradition on the particular persons involved…towards a search for 
factors (particularly external factors) which can be regarded as out of the run of the 
mill”.253  
 
In considering the relevance of H(H), Woolford J disregarded the UK Supreme 
Court’s emphasis on the need for a careful examination of the nature and extent of 
the interference in family life.254  Instead, His Honour appears to have selected 
aspects of the Court’s judgment that are compatible with the importance of comity. 
Consequently, the human rights of the requested person were simply cold-
shouldered by an interpretation of New Zealand’s international obligations in 
respect of article 3 of the UNCRC to one that was fitting with comity.  
 
As an aside, it is unclear how New Zealand courts approach English cases in context 
of these cases. The applicability of English cases was discussed by the Court of 
Appeal in Mailley – Court of Appeal 2016.255  On the one hand the Court of Appeal 
distinguished English cases as guidance for an interpretation of s 48(4)(a)(ii) 
because: the legislation under which they are decided (Extradition Act 1989 (UK) 
and Extradition Act 2003 (UK)) is framed differently from the 1999 Act; the role 
of the court as opposed to the Minister in determining whether the person should 
be surrendered; the proportionality approach to human rights which is foreign to 
the statutory scheme under the 1999 Act, especially considering the words 
“…compelling or extraordinary circumstances of the person” and the restricted 
scope of the matters falling to be considered under s 48(4)(a)(ii).256On the other 
                                                          
251 Radhi, above n 179, at [35]-[36]. 
252 At [47]. 
253 H(H), above n 228, at 32 per Lady Hale referring to Lord Mance in Norris v Government of the 
United States of America (No 2) [2010] UKSC 9; [2010] 2 c 487 [2010] 2 WLR 572 at [109]. 
254 H(H), above n 228, at [32].  
255 Mailley – Court of Appeal 2016, above n 209. 
256 At [53]-[55]. 
55 
 
hand, the Court of Appeal endorsed the passage in Radhi citing the English case 
H(H). The contradiction lies in the fact that the analysis of the decision in H(H) was 
inextricably related to the same features upon which the Court of Appeal earlier 
distinguished the 1999 Act on the grounds of there being a weak analogy to cases 
under the Part 4, backed-warrant procedure.257 
 
It is even more puzzling that the same Court relied extensively on English cases in 
Mercer – Court of Appeal albeit dealing with a different provision of the Part 4 
procedure (s 45(4)). Irrespective of whether the Court was focussing on a judicial 
restriction to surrender under 8(1)(c) for the purposes of s 45(4)258 or a referral of 
the case to the minister under s 48(4)(a)(ii)259 both provisions contain the phrase 
“unjust or oppressive”. 
 
As to determining whether any restrictions under either s 7 or s 8 of the 1991 Act 
applied or required the matter to be referred to the Minister, Woolford J endorsed 
the view of the DCJ, that Australia could be trusted to safeguard Mr Radhi’s 
rights.260   Woolford J agreed with the DCJ that Radhi would have opportunity to 
raise delay as an issue in Australia, there being a “high level of commonality 
between New Zealand and Australia’s legal systems, and thus Australia could be 
trusted to safeguard Mr Radhi’s rights at trial.”261   Woolford J, was also satisfied 
that various provisions in the Australian Migration Act obviated any danger of 
refoulement to Iraq where he might face persecution.262  
  
As comity applies to the Minister’s role in restricting surrender, the litigation of 
McGrath v Ministry of Justice (McGrath) illustrates how the rationale of comity in 
that context has diverted attention from the individual rights of the requested 
person.263 
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The Minister’s role is to weigh all of the relevant circumstances and assess the 
potential consequences for the requested person in being subjected to the legal 
system of the requesting country.  The test is whether surrender would be unjust or 
oppressive. In this way, referral to the Minister is designed to provide for an extra-
layer of protection of the rights of the requested person.   
 
McGrath involved a request from Australia to New Zealand for surrender of Mr 
McGrath (McGrath) in relation to charges of sexual offending against 35 
complainants alleged to have occurred while employed in Australia between 1977 
and 1986.  Judge Farish at the District Court determined that McGrath was eligible 
for surrender.264  
 
McGrath appealed on the ground that Judge Farish was wrong not to exercise a 
judicial discretion under s 48(4) to refer the case to the Minister. On that ground, 
the High Court found in favour of McGrath and the matter was remitted back to the 
District Court.265 In arriving at his decision, Whata J sitting at the High Court, “was 
concerned that the DCJ may have unduly restricted her analysis of McGrath’s 
personal circumstances by reference to the Australian judicial system.”266  
Subsequently, Judge Farish at the District Court determined that there existed 
compelling or extraordinary circumstances making it unjust or oppressive to 
surrender McGrath. Accordingly, Judge Farish exercised her discretion to refer the 
case to the Minister.267  
 
The Minister, the Honourable Judith Collins, determined that none of the mandatory 
and discretionary restrictions on surrender in relation to the request from Australia 
to surrender McGrath applied in his case. McGrath appealed that decision on the 
grounds that the Minister erred in law in her assessment of his case not constituting 
extraordinary or compelling circumstances pursuant to s 30(3)(d). Specifically, 
McGrath alleged that the Minister was guilty of (a) apparent bias; (b) breaches of 
natural justice; (c) material errors of fact; (d) error of law; (e) unreasonableness; 
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and (f) abdication of responsibilities.268  Mander J sitting at the High Court, rejected 
every ground of appeal.269  
The Court’s response to the contention that the Minister made an error of fact in 
making no finding as to the submission that McGrath had “no guarantee of 
sufficient funding by way of legal aid in order to properly defend the charges”,270 
exemplifies the role of comity in the Minister’s decision-making process.271 In 
rejecting that ground of appeal, Mander J held that the issue of legal aid and its 
purported inadequacy was not a matter which imposed a duty of inquiry on the 
Minister.272  In that regard, Mander J accepted the submission by the Minister 
stressing the importance of having regard to comity and similarity in legal systems, 
especially between New Zealand and Australia under Part 4 of the 1999 Act.273 
Further, Mander J held that the Minister “was entitled to conclude that Australia 
would make adequate provision for state-funded legal assistance, and the 
recognition by its Courts of the centrality of the rights to counsel in criminal 
trials.”274  
 
In finding that the Minister’s assessment did not amount to “abdication of 
responsibility”, Mander J considered the weighting of the principle of comity versus 
the factors which may establish a basis for concluding there are compelling or 
extraordinary circumstances which could make it unjust or oppressive to surrender 
McGrath to Australia. Mander J recognised that the principle of comity cannot of 
itself divest the Minister of responsibility to examine the factors that might satisfy 
the statutory test, it being irrelevant that the extradition country is a Part 4 
jursidiction.275  At the same time, Mander J determined that in the course of 
assessing whether it would be unjust or oppressive to surrender McGrath, the 
Minister is legitimately entitled to take into account the ability of the Australian 
legal system to examine the issues raised by McGrath.   
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Overall, the approach in Radhi and McGrath borders on a pre-World War II 
approach to extradition that treats human rights considerations with indifference.276 
It allows comity to prevent judges from inquiring into the legal system of Australia. 
This is partly attributable to the fact that comity and its historical roots under the 
backed-warrant procedure is locked into a pre-human rights movement tradition.  
 
While the recognition of similarity in procedural safeguards suggests a degree of 
human rights protection, this is limited to low-level infringements of human rights 
such as due process. The reasoning of Mander J in McGrath reflects the degree of 
trust that both the judiciary and Minister are prepared to place in Australia’s ability 
to ensure the protection of the person’s human rights by a presumption of similarity 
in due process. It illustrates the restricting function of comity in determining 
whether there is a basis for refusing surrender making explicable why there is such 
a high-bar. In doing so, comity as it is conceptualised, restricts the judiciary from a 
more generous assessment of the rights of the requested person.  The McGrath 
litigation shows that even when the presumption of similarity is rebutted, such as 
inadequacies in legal aid, comity will still favour restriction of the judicial or 
ministerial power to refuse surrender.277    What would happen, for example, if a 
person identified as Maori, argued that they would likely to be racially 
discriminated against or subject to culturally inapt treatment in an Australian 
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4.3  Judicial restrictions on surrender 
 
4.3.1  Mandatory  
Under Part 4, s 45(3)(a) mandatory restrictions are set out under s 7, that relate 
primarily to cases in which extradition is sought for a military offence,  crimes of a 
political character or for which the penalty that the person may be subjected is due 
to that person’s race, ethnic origin, religion, nationality, sex or other status. There 
is also a mandatory restriction in cases which offend against the principle of double 
jeopardy (non bis in idem) and where the person is detained under the Mental Health 
(Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 or the Intellectual Disability 
(Compulsory Care and Rehabilitation) Act 2003 relating to mental health and 
disability. 
 
Additionally, s 45(3)(b) requires the defendant’s surrender to accord with 
provisions of the treaty (if any) between New Zealand and the extradition country. 
 
4.3.2  Discretionary   
A further safeguard is provided by the judicial discretionary restriction under s 8(1) 
that exists if, because of:  
 
(a)  the trivial nature of the case; or 
 
(b)  if the person is accused of an offence, the fact that the accusation 
against the person was not made in good faith in the interests of 
justice; or 
(c)  the amount of time that has passed since the offence is alleged to 
have been committed or was committed,  
 
and having regard to all the circumstances of the case, it would be unjust 
or oppressive to surrender the person.  
 
This discretion may be invoked by the requested person under the Part 4, backed-
warrant procedure by virtue of s 45(2).  Under s 45(4), there is a judicial discretion 
to determine that a person who might otherwise be eligible for surrender in terms 
of the criteria in s 2 is not eligible because discretionary restrictions as provided 
under s 8 are applicable. 
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Another discretionary restriction under s 8(2) concerns forum bar, where the 
requested person “has been accused of any offence within the jurisdiction of New 
Zealand (other than an offence for which his or her surrender is sought), and the 
proceedings against the person have not been disposed of.”  Plakas v Police is the 
only known case dealing with s 8(2).279 In that case, the accused was sought by 
Australia for extradition in relation to alleged fraud charges while facing pending 
proceedings in relation to similar charges in New Zealand.  In considering the 
appellant’s application for leave to the Court of Appeal, Randerson J sitting at the 
High Court, rejected the grounds of appeal in relation to it being contested that the 
DCJ was wrong in determining there was no s 8(2) discretion applicable to the case.  
 
In her reasons, Judge Aitken found:280 
 
…that the New Zealand charge was aimed at the “very same conduct” 
covered by the criminal charges laid in Victoria alleging a loss to Mr 
Morgan. While she found that the ingredients of the offending may be 
different, she was not persuaded that this made the offences different to 
the point where a discretionary restriction on surrender existed. 
 
In Plakas v Police, Randerson J agreed with Judge Aitken’s approach in considering 
the rule of conduct in ss 4 and 5 in assisting in a proper interpretation of whether s 
8(2) may be triggered.281 He observed as follows: 
 
[23]…Sections 4 and 5 make it clear that it is unnecessary for there to be 
any precise correspondence between the offence alleged in the 
extradition country and the comparable offence pending in New Zealand. 
The focus is not on the precise terms or ingredients of the offences in the 
extradition country and in New Zealand. Rather, the statutory focus is on 
the conduct of the person in question viewed in a broad way… 
[24] There are, as the Judge noted, some differences in the ingredients of 
 the offence alleged against Mr Plakas under s 240(1)(d) Crimes Act in 
New Zealand and the offences under s 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act. 
                                                          
279 Plakas v Police, above n 152. 
280 At [14] per Randerson J. 
281 Plakas v Police, above n 152, at [14]-[17], [23]. 
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However, the essential elements are deception or dishonesty resulting in 
 again to the perpetrator or a loss to the victims. In both cases, deliberate 
 or reckless conduct may be relied upon to constitute the offence. Like the 
Judge, I am satisfied that the conduct of Mr Plakas which is alleged to 
constitute an offence in Victoria would, if perpetrated in New Zealand, 
 have constituted an offence here. 
 
Under s 8 the onus is on the accused to prove to the court on the balance of 
probabilities that circumstances exist to warrant the exercise of a judicial discretion 
in favour of the accused.282 The following paragraphs illustrate the high bar required 
to establish grounds for refusing surrender under s 8(1), reinforcing the restrictive 
function that comity has in the power of the judiciary to refuse surrender. 283  
  
4.3.2.1       “time passed”  
In a similar fashion to cases determined under the 1881 Act, “the amount of time 
passed” (referred to herein as “delay”) under s 8(1)(c) has continued to be the 
category most often considered by the courts. While delay is relevant, in 
considering grounds for refusing surrender under s 8, it is not determinative. In 
order to make delay or whatever statutory ground is relied upon, oppressive or 
unjust, the courts require a clear nexus between the ground relied upon and the 
circumstances of the case.284    
 
4.3.2.2  “circumstances of the case”  
“All the circumstances of the case” include personal circumstances, such as health 
issues or having residence in New Zealand, because it is well established that 
personal circumstance can come within this statutory phrase and be relevant to a s 
8 inquiry.285   
 
In reference to the nexus required between the ground relied upon and the 
circumstances of the case, the Court of Appeal in Mailley – Court of Appeal 2013, 
determined that health issues alone would not have achieved an outcome in favour 
                                                          
282 Wolf, above n 181; and Mercer – Court of Appeal, above n 185, at [13].  
283 Police v Thomas, above n 75, at 457; and Mercer - Court of Appeal, above n 185, at [14]. 
284 Wolf, above n 181, at [48] per French J; and endorsed in Mercer – Court of Appeal above n 
185; Mailley – Court of Appeal 2013, above n 148, at [48]; Smith v Police [2014] NZHC 2676 at 
[9]; and Smith v Police [2014] 1577 at [39]-[45].  
285 Mailley – Court of Appeal 2013, above n 148, at [48].  
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of the appellant under s 8.286   In that case, Australian authorities sought surrender 
of the accused in relation to alleged fraud.  Two issues were raised in the District 
Court under s 8(1): lack of good faith on the part of the Queensland Police (s 8 
(1)(b); and delay (s 8 (1)(c))287  Upon review of the evidence, these issues were 
withdrawn by the appellant before the matter went to the Court of Appeal. In obiter, 
the Court of Appeal commented with reference to previous authorities approach to 
the nexus required, that in the appellant’s case, health issues alone would not have 
achieved an outcome in favour of the appellant under s 8.288    
 
4.3.2.3  “unjust or oppressive” 
As mentioned earlier, the meaning ascribed to the term “unjust or oppressive”  in 
Kakis continues to be reinforced in the Court of Appeal albeit somewhat 
inconsistently.289  The proposition that the delay has lulled the requested person into 
a false sense of security such as to make surrender oppressive is drawn from English 
cases, namely Kakis.290 Its significance has depended upon evidence adduced in 
support of the requested person having cause to believe that there is no prospect of 
being prosecuted or having to face trial.291 Where it has been invoked, other than 
Kakis, no decisions that have resulted in an outcome in favour of the requested 
person.292 
 
In Smith v Police (Smith), Smith was refused leave to seek appeal to the Court of 
Appeal, because the requisite nexus between the delay and the psychological stress, 
or accepting there was such a nexus, that the psychological stress was of sufficient 
degree to render the delay unjust or oppressive.293 In that case, Smith was sought 
for extradition in the UK for alleged sexual offending against children 294 and was 
subject to a significant and unexplained delay of four-years between the initial 
decision to prosecute the accused and the obtaining of a warrant and the request for 
                                                          
286 At [48].   
287 At [46]. 
288 At [48]. 
289 Mercer – Court of Appeal, above n 185, at [33]. See also Kim v Prison Manager, Mt Eden 
Corrections Facility [2015] NZCA 2. 
290 See Keenan v United Kingdom [2016] NZHC 2446. Kakis above n 89, at [790] per Lord 
Scarman. Considered in Mercer – Court of Appeal, above n 185, at [34]. 
291 Mercer – Court of Appeal, above n 185, at [48] and [55].  
292 Mercer – Court of Appeal, above n 185. 
293 At [8]–[9]. 
294 Smith v Police [2014] NZHC 2676. 
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surrender from New Zealand to the UK.295   However, identifying responsibility for 
the delay296 or whether delay is unexplained297  does not weigh in the balance. The 
relevant question concerns the consequences of that period of delay and whether it 
makes it unjust or oppressive to order surrender of the requested person.298   
 
In regard to the circumstances assessed, Smith raised the argument that the passage 
of time affected the ability and reliability of the complainants’ recall; affected the 
ability of the accused to obtain assistance in his defence through contacts with 
people in the UK; allowed him to settle into a new life in New Zealand; and caused 
significant psychological stress.  Having considered all of the relevant factors, the 
Court was not satisfied that Smith had met the test. In particular, Smith failed to 
satisfy the Court that there was the requisite nexus between the delay and the 
psychological stress or that accepting there was, the psychological stress was of 
sufficient degree to satisfy the test under s 8(1)(c).  
 
Of particular interest is the recent litigation surrounding the Commonwealth of 
Australia v Mercer (Mercer) which commenced four years ago.  That case involved 
a request for surrender from Australia to New Zealand Australia in relation to 
charges of indecent treatment of a boy under 17 years of age.299 The crime was 
alleged to have occurred between 1985 and 1986 in Queensland when the boy was 
13 years-old. The requested person (Mercer) was subject to an Australian arrest 
warrant issued on 31 October 2013.   The High Court dismissed an appeal against 
the decision of Judge Murfitt in the District Court in refusing to make an order to 
surrender Mercer to Australia.300 Having considered a number of factors relating to 
Mercer’s personal circumstances, Judge Murfitt concluded that based upon delay, 
it would be unjust or oppressive to surrender Mercer.  
 
Nation J was satisfied that in exercising his discretion against requiring surrender, 
the DCJ had recognised and correctly applied the factors he had to consider, arising 
                                                          
295At [9].   
296 At [31]. 
297 At [9]. Goddard J endorsing the passage of the DCJ at [39]. 
298 At [9].  
299 Mercer – HC review decision, above n 183.  See also The Commonwealth of Australia v Mercer 
[2015] NZDC 22153. 
300  The Commonwealth of Australia v Mercer [2015] NZDC 22153; and Mercer – HC review 
decision, above n 183, at [1]. 
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out of the particular circumstances of the case, and the requisite nexus to the 
delay.301 These matters included:  
 
(a) a lengthy delay of thirty years since the alleged offending, taking 
into consideration that such delays are not unheard of in cases 
involving historical sexual abuse;  
(b) the fact Mercer had already been subject to criminal sanctions for 
similar offending, involving the same peer group and in the same 
period as the current complainant for which he was sentenced to 
probation; 
(c) awareness of the Queensland police that at the time the 
complainant volunteered a complaint in 2002, Mercer had been 
sentenced, some months prior to imprisonment for offences 
against other victims; 
(d) lack of interest shown by the Queensland police in pursuing the 
enquiry once the complainant engaged in the prosecution process 
in 2002;  
(e) the fact that since the 2002 complaint, Mercer had been tried, 
sentenced and had served a term of imprisonment in Australia, and 
was deported to New Zealand despite the Australian prosecutorial 
forces being aware of the 2002 complaint and in a position to bring 
a prosecution; and  
(f) Mercer having established himself in New Zealand, living at his 
father’s home, apparently without any known offending. 
 
The Commonwealth of Australia then appealed successfully to the Court of Appeal, 
which held that a discretionary restriction under s 8(1)(c) was not made out for 
Mercer.302 After considering numerous authorities in relation to the unjust limb of 
s 8(1)(c) the Court extracted a number of principles relating to the conditions in 
which the defendant’s right to a fair trial may be in jeopardy.303  These included the 
importance of any relevant injustice linked to the act of surrender rather than the 
prospect of trial and the likelihood of there not being a fair trial based upon 
evidence, such as absence of an essential witness because of delay or unfitness to 
                                                          
301 Mercer – HC review decision, above n 183, at [23]. 
302 Mercer – Court of Appeal, above n 185.  
303 At [43]. 
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stand trial.304 In light of those principles the Court determined that on “the balance 
of possibilities” (equated with likelihood) Mercer failed to meet the unjust limb.305 
In reaching its conclusion, that surrender of Mercer would not be unjust, the Court 
emphasised what it perceived to be similarity in the legal and procedural system 
between New Zealand and Australia and the lack of evidence produced by Mercer 
that met the high threshold required to meet the s 8(1)(c) unjust limb.306  
 
As to the oppressive limb of s 8(1)(c) the Court stressed the importance of 
oppression linking to the prospect of surrender.307 While the Court accepted that 
delay may in some cases be relevant to whether there is oppression,308it was viewed 
as a matter best dealt with by the requesting state. 309It was only in borderline cases 
that the Court was prepared to consider that prosecutorial delay may tip the balance 
in favour of a finding of oppression.310 In terms of other factors being relevant to 
whether a case was made out, the Court considered a number of English cases311 
and New Zealand v Johnston involving surrender from Australia to New Zealand 
and McGrath v Commonwealth of Australia, involving surrender from New 
Zealand to Australia.312  Based upon limited evidence as to the cause of delay the 
Court rejected the matter of delay as a factor relevant to oppression. The Court 
rejected all other matters viewed by the High Court as relevant to oppression. The 
Court determined there was no evidence of a significant change in circumstances 
linked with the delay, previous convictions and deportation to justify a finding of 
oppression in surrendering Mercer to Australia.313 Accordingly, the Court allowed 
the appeal and on request of Mercer’s counsel remitted the case to the District Court 
to consider a possible referral to the Minister under s 48.  The Mercer litigation 
suggests that differences exist between the approaches of the lower court and that 
of the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal displays a more restrictive reading as 
opposed to a more liberal reading of what qualifies as “oppression”. In absence of 
                                                          
304 At [43]. 
305 At [44]. 
306 At [45]. 
307 At [52]. 
308 At [53]. Referring to Kakis where Lord Edmund-Davis used the term “inexcusably dilatory” in 
context of delay by the requesting state. See Kakis, above n 89. 
309 Mercer – Court of Appeal, above n 185, at [59]. 
310 At [53]. 
311 At [53]. 
312 Kakis, above n 89; New Zealand v Johnston [2011] FCAFC 2 (2011) 274 ALR 509 [Johnston – 
Full Court]; and McGrath v Commonwealth of Australia [2013] NZHC 2348 [Surrender appeal 
decision] respectively. 
313 Mercer – Court of Appeal, above n 185, at [2]-[16] and [65]. 
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any treaty between New Zealand and Australia, that would impose an obligation to 
read such provisions restrictively, it is reasonable to infer that comity is operating 
as a justification for a restrictive reading. Why else would the Court of Appeal not 
read liberally in favour of liberty? 
 
4.4  Comity applied 
In describing the Part 4 procedure, the Court of Appeal in Mailley simply added: 
“It reflects the high degree of comity between New Zealand and Australia.”314 In 
the second appeal, there was no mention of comity at all by the Court of Appeal.315   
Where comity is mentioned, it is given a vague meaning as illustrated by the 
ambiguous expression  in Mercer – High Court from Nation J who said:316  
 
The Judge did not expressly refer to the particular comity that existed as 
between Australia and New Zealand. He did not need to. The issue which 
he had to consider was the only issue because there was such comity.8  
 
All that links comity to a definition under a Part 4 procedure is that it exists because 
of the presumption that there is commonality of legal processes and safeguards, 
especially in regard to Australia and New Zealand. There is nothing to indicate 
commonality in fundamental rights of the requested person, such as the type of 
treatment the person will be subject to in the prisons of Australia.  It is also 
concerning that Australia does not have an enforceable bill of rights.    
 
4.5 Summary 
The authorities discussed above illustrate the continuity of the importance of comity 
between New Zealand and Australia and the role it plays in restricting both the 
judiciary and the minister in determining that circumstances exist to warrant the 
intervention of the surrender process under Part 4.317 This restrictive role appears 
to be based upon a presumption of similarity, it being core to the assumption that 
                                                          
314 Mailley – Court of Appeal 2013, above n 148, at [7] per French J. See also McGrath, above n 
263; and Mercer – HC review decision, above n 183, at [20] per Nation J. 
315 Mailley – Court of Appeal 2016, above n 210.  
316 Mercer – HC review decision, above n 183, at [20] per Nation J.  In Mercer – Court of Appeal, 
above n 185, the Court did not mention His Honour’s interpretation of comity. Instead the Court 
referred to its own undefined usage of the term in Mailley – Court of Appeal 2013, above n 148.  
317 Mercer – HC review decision, above n 183, at [14] and [21]. 
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the person will receive a fair trial.318 Importantly, the authorities inadequately 
address what should be the true scope of similarity as an underpinning principle of 
comity.  Despite what the New Zealand Court of Appeal considers to be “a justified 
expectation that the respondent’s human rights (including right to a fair trial) will 
be met by Australia”, comity does not extend the scope of similarity between New 
Zealand and Australia to the full gamut of human rights.319  This is because comity 
in this context is without a human rights tradition.  Because comity presumes 
similarity, it is used as an excuse for leaving the issue of human rights of the 
requested person for the trial court.  It allows the New Zealand courts to presume 
that fundamental human rights will be observed by Australia, preventing them from 
demanding a New Zealand Bill of Rights 1990 standard of protection of 
fundamental rights from Australia. Importantly, Australia does not have a Bill of 
Rights or any similar provisions reflected in the Australian Constitution. Other than 
what is provided by international human rights instruments and the few procedural 
safeguards in place to protect the rights of the person sought, the current Part 4, 
backed-warrant procedure may be rightly accused of imposing an obligation of 
‘blind trust’.  A similar proposition was made in relation to the principle of mutual 
recognition and problems identified with fundamental rights in context of EU 
law.320  
 
Cognisance needs to be given to the question of whether New Zealand can trust 
Australia in complying with fundamental human rights. Due to the lack of parity 
with New Zealand in legislating for the protection of human rights, it is argued that 
comity should not restrict the judiciary from inquiring into the fundamental rights 
of the requested person in being subject to the legal system of Australia. To this 
end, clarifying the meaning of comity in a way that takes into consideration a human 
rights component would transform comity from an amorphous concept into a more 
useful legal tool.321 If comity is to be understood as a judicial device for balancing 
and weighing competing interests (international cooperation, sovereignty and the 
                                                          
318 Police v Thomas, above n 75, at 457; and Mercer – HC review decision, above n 183, at [14]; 
and Mercer – Court of Appeal, above n 185, at [18]. 
319 Mercer – Court of Appeal, above n 185, at [18]. 
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interests of the person sought) one of the challenges this model faces concerns 
identifying the point along the spectrum of human rights interests at which the test 
of comity should allow the judiciary to permit surrender or intervene. This is likely 
to involve a sliding threshold in degree of judicial power to be exercised as a 
function of the level of human rights violation. For example, risk of gross forms of 
human rights violations such as torture, would favour comity allowing a less 
restrictive view of judicial power in determining surrender. On the other hand, risk 
of lower-level transgressions such as of due process, would favour comity allowing 












5. Comparative analysis with other simplified schemes  
 
 
New Zealand is not alone in providing for backing-of-arrest warrants. Conceptually 
similar schemes exist in other states.  These include the European Arrest Warrant 
(EAW), the Nordic Arrest Warrant (NAW), and the backing-of-warrants between 
the UK and the British territories, as well as between states of Africa and Australia.  
There is some dichotomy between these schemes in the sense of the mechanism that 
drives them. Most operate on the basis of the principle of reciprocity (New Zealand 
and designated countries under Part 4; the British Territories and the UK; and 
Africa) whereas the NAW and EAW operate on the basis of the mutual recognition 
principle. The following discussion illustrates how these schemes share in common 
an historical arrangement relating to extradition, it being simpler than usual 
extradition agreements because of the close links that exist between and within each 
set of states.322  
 
5.1 European Arrest Warrant (EAW) 
 
5.1.1 Nature of the EAW 
The European Arrest Warrant (EAW) represents a simplified system of interstate 
cooperation, reflected in there being a standardised form of arrest warrant issued in 
one state which may be executed in any other member state of the EU for the 
purposes of surrendering the person to the issuing member state.323 Its distinction 
from extradition is symbolised by the introduction of new terminology with the 
replacement of ‘requested State’ with ‘executing Member State’ and ‘requesting 
                                                          
322 Geoff Gilbert Transnational Fugitive Offenders in International Law Extradition and Other 
Mechanisms (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, The Netherlands, 1998) at 42. See also Per 
Ole Traskman “Mutual Trust and Political Intentions: The European Arrest Warrant and the 
Nordic Arrest Warrant” in Maria Bergstrom and Anna Jonsson Cornell (eds) Police and Criminal 
Law Co-operation: Swedish Studies in European Law (vol 5, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2014) 
at 143. 
323 Article 1.1 of the Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA [“the EU Framework Decision”](entered 
into force on 1 January 2004). See also Julian B Knowles Blackstone’s Guide to The Extradition 
Act 2003 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004); and Limor Klimek European Arrest Warrant 
(Springer International Publishing, Switzerland, 2015) at 58. 
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State’ now the ‘issuing Member State’.324 The term ‘extradition’ is now replaced 
with ‘surrender’ of the requested person.325  
The EAW326 abolished existing extradition arrangements between the EU Member 
States, replacing a time-consuming and complicated system based on treaty and 
national law, with a fast-track process of surrender.327 The legal basis of the EAW 
is the Council Framework Decision (“the EU Framework Decision”) of 13 June 
2002 adopted by the Council of the European Union.328  
Despite there being incompatibility between legal systems within the European 
Union (EU), the principle of mutual recognition is the cornerstone of the EAW.329 
Mutual recognition means that a judicial decision in one member state is 
automatically accepted in all other member states with similar effects.330 In theory, 
the principle of mutual recognition means that there are few or no grounds for 
refusal to surrendering the requested person or enquiry into the procedures of the 




5.1.2.1  Extraditability 
 
5.1.2.1.1 Extraditable person 
The requested person means a person which has been convicted of an offence or 
because he/she is being prosecuted.332  
 
5.1.2.1.2 Extraditable country 
Surrender of the requested person under the EAW applies only to Member States 
of the EU of which there are currently 28.333 
 
                                                          
324 Per Ole Traskman, above n 322, at 130.  
325 At 130.  
326 EU Framework Decision.  
327 Klimek, above n 323. 
328 EU Framework Decision; and Klimek, above n 323. 
329 Per Ole Traskman, above n 322, at 128. 
330 Per Ole Traskman, above n 322.  
331 Per Ole Traskman, above n 322. 
332 Klimek, above n 323, at 53. 
333 Article 1.1 of the EU Framework Decision. 
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5.1.2.1.3 Extradition offence 
 
5.1.2.1.3.1 Double criminality 
More liberal than Part 4 of the 1991 Act, a distinctive feature of the EAW is partial 
derogation of the double-criminality requirement by reason of Article 2(2).  It 
reflects an agreed upon list of thirty-two of the most serious offences for which 
double criminality is not required.334  
 
5.1.2.1.3.2 Penalty threshold 
The agreed list of offences requires at least three years’ imprisonment in the 
requesting state. For other criminal acts, the double criminality requirement remains 
intact provided the acts are punishable in a requesting State by at least 12 months’ 
imprisonment, or in the case of convicted defendants, they were serving a sentence 
of at least four months imprisonment.335  
 
5.1.2.2  Speciality 
In addition, the EAW provides no impediment to extradition based upon the 
principle of speciality. Instead, the EAW introduced special provisions on the rule 
of speciality under Article 2(2) of the EU Framework Decision, which includes 
exceptions and the application of the rule of speciality in case of subsequent 
surrender to another EU Member State and to third States.336  
 
5.1.2.3  Standard of evidence 
In common with other simplified systems in the Commonwealth, there is no 
requirement for the requesting state to establish a prima facie case.  
 
5.1.3  Procedure 
Procedurally, the EAW is more ‘judicialised’ with stricter time limits than Part 4 of 
the 1991 Act.337  A major distinction is that under the EAW there is no provision 
allowing the executive to determine whether there are grounds to refuse surrender.  
                                                          
334 Baker Report, above n 41, at 345. 
335 Article 2(4) of the EU Framework Decision. 
336 Klimek, above n 323, at 84-85. 
337 Article 1(1) defines the EAW.  
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Instead, the role of the executive is confined to deciding between competing 
requests for extradition, although it may prevent extradition on grounds of national 
security.338  
 
Another distinction from Part 4 under the 1991 Act, is the provision under the EAW 
for a central authority, (namely the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs or the General Prosecutor’s Office) whose role is confined to administrative 
matters, such as giving assistance to judicial authorities in coordinating the process, 
handling the receipt and transmission of requests for extradition.339 The question of 
who can act as a judicial authority under the EAW is uncertain however. In practise, 
across the contracting States, it is usually the courts or the public prosecutor.340  
 
5.1.4  Restrictions 
A major distinction from the New Zealand backed-warrant procedure under Part 4 
of the 1991 Act, is that based on the rationale of mutual recognition, there are fewer 
restrictions and conditions to be met, with few grounds for refusing surrender under 
the EAW.341 Importantly, the principle of mutual recognition,342 the underlying 
rationale for removing traditional exceptions to surrender, does not completely 
preclude exceptions to surrender.343 Restrictions to extradition under the EAW are 
divided into four groups: mandatory, optional, decisions in absentia; and special 
situations.  
 
5.1.4.1  Mandatory 
There are three mandatory restrictions on surrendering the requested person (under 
Article 3). These involve an amnesty for the offence for which extradition is 
requested, the acts for which extradition is requested offend the principle of ne bis 
in idem (double jeopardy) and by reason of the person’s age for criminal 
responsibility.344   
                                                          
338 Klimek, above n 323. 
339 Article 7(1)(2) of the EU Framework Decision. 
340 See Klimek, above n 323. 
341 Klimek, above n 323, at 57. Based upon the EAW embracing the principle of citizenship of the 
EU the EAW provides no impediment to extradition based on whether the offence is fiscal, 
political and whether the person sought is a national. 
342 See Article 1(2) of the EU Framework Decision. 
343 Klimek, above n 323. 
344 Klimek, above n 323, at 151-159. 
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5.1.4.2        Optional  
There are optional restrictions, “in the sense that Member States may choose 
whether to include them in their national legislation”.345  These include: absence of 
double-criminality (outside of those offences falling within the list of framework 
offences to which double criminality does not apply); the acts for which extradition 
is requested offends the second, third or fourth principle of ne bis in idem (double 
jeopardy);346 the criminal prosecution or punishment is statute-barred; the requested 
State undertakes to execute the sentence or detention order; and the lack of 
jurisdiction. 347 There is nothing preventing Member States creating discretionary 
grounds on which surrender may be refused additional to those set out in the 
Framework Decision however.  
Part I, s 11(1) of the Extradition Act 2003 (UK) illustrates the EAW’s  
implementation in practice.  It includes eight grounds which the judge must 
consider in determining the requested person’s eligibility for surrender.  The 
majority of these correspond with the Framework Decision. Section 14 of Part 1 of 
the 2003 Act is roughly equivalent to s 8(1)(c) of Part 4 in respect of passage of 
time: 
14. Passage of time. A person’s extradition to a category 1 territory is 
barred by reason of the passage of time if (and only if) it appears that it 
would be unjust or oppressive to extradite him by reason of the passage of 
time since he is alleged to have committed the extradition offence or since 
he is alleged to have become unlawfully at large (as the case may be).  
The test is simpler than in Part 4 of New Zealand’s 1999 Act.  No nexus is required 
to be established by reason of there being no words to the effect of “circumstances 
of the case” or “circumstances of the person”. Instead, the passage of time only 
needs to be determined unjust or oppressive.  Another difference is the narrower 
scope of these optional provisions on the grounds of injustice or oppression. It is no 
                                                          
345 J R Spencer “European Arrest Warrant” in Bell J, Kilpatrick C (eds) The Cambridge Year Book 
of European Legal Studies (Hart, Oxford, 2005) at 201-207. 
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347 Klimek, above n 323, at 159-160. 
74 
 
longer possible as it was under the Extradition Act 1989 (UK) to refuse surrender 
on the basis that the offence is trivial, or that the accusation was not made in good 
faith or more generally that it would be “unjust or oppressive” to order surrender.348 
Another important difference, is that, if the judge decides that any of the grounds 
for refusing surrender are established, the judge must order the person’s 
discharge.349  
 
5.1.5  Human Rights 
In addition to these mandatory and optional restrictions there are two other 
restrictions to surrender which relate to the right to be present during the hearings 
of the trial (decisions in absentia)350 and special situations that risk infringement of 
human rights.  
 
Article 1(3) and Recital 12 and 13 of the Preamble to the Framework Decision refers 
to human rights. Recital 12 of the Preamble requires Member States to implement 
the Framework Decision in accordance with respect for the fundamental rights and 
observance of the principles recognised by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union (“the EU Charter”).  In particular, Article 6 of the EU Charter 
guarantees some procedural rights, such as the right to a fair trial.351 Recital 12 
allows for refusal to surrender to a State where there is a risk that the issuing of the 
EAW is for discriminatory reasons or that the person’s position may be prejudiced 
for any of these reasons.352  
 
Like the EAW, adopted by the EU, the Part 4 backed-warrant procedure in New 
Zealand is designed to fast-track the surrender process.  As reflected in Radhi, New 
Zealand nevertheless lags behind the EAW in lacking the same judicial recognition 
                                                          
348 See New Zealand v Moloney [2006] FCAFC 143 [Moloney – Full Court] at [44]. 
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of the need to give due weight to the human rights of the requested person.353 In 
this regard, the EAW covers more safeguards for the rights of the person facing 
surrender than are provided in New Zealand under s 7 of the 1999 Act.  In particular, 
there is no provision under the Part 4, backed-warrant procedure that accommodates 
claims that surrender would lead to a serious risk of the requested person being 
subject to torture or cruel and inhumane treatment.354  Nor is there any provision 
for the rights of the child or respect for private and family life.355  That is not to say 
that these rights are inapplicable, they are just not made visible.356  Concerns for 
the need to guard against the risk of the requested person being subject to torture or 
cruel and inhumane treatment are validated by the way human rights in detention 
facilities in Australia have become a focus.357  The difficulty is that, comity and its 
presumption of similarity and trust obstructs the New Zealand courts from inquiring 
into whether Australia will comply with such fundamental human rights.  In this 
way, comity restricts the court’s inquiry into the fundamental rights of the person 
to the early stages of the backed-warrant procedure rather than further down-stream 
at the trial and punishment stage.  
 
5.2 Nordic Arrest Warrant Scheme 
5.2.1 Background to intra-Nordic extradition 
Reputedly more efficacious than the EAW, intra-Nordic extradition (Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) was developed during the second half of the 
20th century.358 During the late 1950’s and early 1960’s these Scandinavian 
countries entered into a cooperative informal approach towards extradition, without 
treaty obligations or duty to extradite under national law. Early practice of intra-
Nordic extradition was characterised by the way requested persons were handled at 
                                                          
353 See further Holly Cullen and Bethia Burgess, above n 276, at 211. Referring to the challenges 
of interpretation faced by the judiciary in Minister for Home Affairs of the Commonwealth v Zentai 
[2012] HCA 28; and Assange v the Swedish Prosecution Authority [2012] UKSC 22. 
354 Recital 13 of the Preamble of the EU Framework Decision allows for refusal to surrender to a 
State where there is a serious risk of being subject to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. 
355 CRC, art 3.1; and ECHR, art 8.  
356 United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment 1465 UNTS 85 (opened for signature 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 
June 1987) available at <www.unhcr.org>. 
357 UN News Centre “Australia’s Aboriginal children ‘essentially being punished for being poor’ – 
UN rights expert” UN News Centre (online ed, UN, 4 April 2017) <www.un.org>. 
358 Gjermund Mathisen “Nordic Cooperation and the European Arrest Warrant: Intra-Nordic 
Extradition, the Nordic Arrest Warrant and Beyond” (2010) 79 Nordic Journal of International 
Law at 1–33.  
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the police’s discretion without any judicial supervision. On 29 May 1958, the 
Norwegian Council on Criminal law commented:359 
. . . the situation may now be said to be that, practically speaking, one does not go 
through extradition in relations between the Nordic countries but that, instead, one 
has put to use an informal procedure for return of such persons where the police 
alone handles the case.  
The regime simply operated on the basis of mutual trust, respect for certain national 
differences360 and cooperation with reportedly very effective results.361 These 
Nordic countries adopted reciprocal domestic legislation on extradition, in force in 
the 1960’s.362  For example, extradition between Sweden and other Nordic countries 
was contained in ‘The Nordic Extradition Law’ 1959:254.363 The function of the 
legislation was to specify requirements to be met for extradition to be 
permissible.364  Similar to the minimal formalities of backing of arrest warrants in 
other Commonwealth countries, the legislation regulating intra-Nordic extradition 
had less restrictive conditions and more simplified procedures than what is provided 
in normal extradition law.365  
 
5.2.2 Nature of the Nordic Arrest Warrant Scheme (NAW) 
Shortly following adoption of the Framework Decision on the EAW, the Nordic 
states replaced this regime with the NAW adopted in 2005 at The Nordic 
Convention on a Nordic Arrest Warrant.366 Compared to the earlier intra-Nordic 
surrender system and the EAW, the NAW is slightly more developed, attributable 
to what is regarded by some as the higher degree of cooperation and similarity in 
criminal systems that exists between Nordic states than Members States of the 
EU.367 One major difference is that unlike the earlier Nordic system, satisfying a 
                                                          
359 Cited in Mathiesen, above n 358, at 6.  
360 Per Ole Traskman, above n 322, at 138. 
361 Mathiesen, above n 358, at 10. 
362 For example, the Swedish Act was adopted on 5 June 1959 (1959:254).   
363 Abolished by the implementation of the NAW into Swedish law under Law (2011:1165) on 
surrender from Sweden according to a Nordic Arrest Warrant. 
364 Mathiesen above n 358, at 5-6. 
365 Jorn Vestergaard “The European Arrest Warrant (EAW) and its Implementation in the Member 
States of the European Union” (paper presented to the International Conference, Country Report, 
Kraków, Denmark, 2006) at 1. 
366 Convention on a Nordic Arrest Warrant 2005 [Convention] (signed 15 December 2005, entered 
into force 16 November 2012) See Per Ole Traskman, above n 322, at 130. 
367 Traskman, above n 322, at 139; and Karri Tolttila “The Nordic Arrest Warrant: What Makes for 
Even Higher Mutual Trust?” (2011) 3 New J Eur Crim L 368.  
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surrender request is now no longer optional,368 except where there are grounds for 
refusing surrender applicable under the Convention. Equivalent changes have been 
made to the terminology of the NAW. For example, the traditional term 
‘extradition’ has been replaced with the expression ‘surrender’ and by nature is 
more judicial than political.369 
 
5.2.3 Conditions 
Reflecting the strength of the principle of mutual recognition and the degree of 
mutual trust operating in the intra-Nordic context, few conditions and restrictions 
are imposed.  
 
5.2.3.1  Extraditability 
 
5.2.3.1.1 Extraditable person 
Article 1.1. of the Convention refers to the meaning of a person eligible for 
surrender under a definition of the NAW:  
 
. . . a judicial decision issued by a Nordic State with the aim that another Nordic 
state shall apprehend and surrender a wanted person for a criminal procedure or for 
the execution of a sentence of imprisonment or another sanction consisting of the 
deprivation of liberty. 
 
5.2.3.1.2 Extraditable country 
Surrender under the NAW applies to Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and 
Sweden. 
 




                                                          
368 See Sweden’s implementation of the NAW in LAW (2011:1165) s 2.2; and Convention, art 4 
and 5. 
369 Article 1.1.  See Per Ole Traskman, above n 322, at 130. 
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5.2.3.1.3.1 Double criminality 
Compared to the EAW there is complete abolition of the double-criminality 
requirement.  
 
5.2.3.1.3.2 Penalty threshold 
There is no minimum penalty threshold for an offence to be considered eligible for 
surrender. There is simply the requirement that the crime for which surrender is 
sought, carry a sentence of imprisonment or other form of detention.370  
  
5.2.3.2  Speciality 
The principle of speciality does not apply in general, instead it is tightly 
circumscribed.371 In addition, the NAW has borrowed from the previous system of 
intra-Nordic extradition, by introducing “accessory extradition” (Article 2(2) 
defined by Mathieson:372 
 
... in cases of extradition for several criminal acts it is sufficient for the 
penalty threshold to be met by one of them. The other acts may be 
punishable with no more than for example a fine and still give rise to 
extradition, known as “accessory extradition”, together with the one act 
that does meet the penalty threshold. 
 
5.2.3.3  Standard of evidence 
Similar to other simplified schemes there is no requirement that a prima facie case 
be established by the requested State.   
 
5.2.4 Procedure  
Procedurally, the NAW is similar to the EAW, except there are shorter time limits, 
attributable to the closer cooperation between Nordic states than member states of 
the EU.373 Assuming the requested person does not consent to being surrendered, 
the normal time limit is 30 days after arrest instead of the EAW’s 60 days (Article 
                                                          
370 Article 2.1 of the Convention, above n 366. 
371 Tolttila, above n 367, at 376 and article 23 of the Convention, above n 366. 
372 Mathiesen, above n 358, at [19]. 
373 Tolttila, above n 367. 
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14(1)). If the requested person consents to surrender, the time limit is three days 
(Article 14(2)).374 
 
5.2.5 Restrictions  
Less strict than its predecessor, extradition for political and military offences are 
provided for under the NAW.   Nor is there any impediment to a State extraditing 
its own nationals. 
 
5.2.5.1  Mandatory 
Equivalent to the EAW, there are three compulsory grounds for refusing to 
surrender: amnesty; a prohibition on ne bis in idem; and age of criminal 
responsibility.375 
 
5.2.5.2  Optional  
Deviating from the traditional regime of intra-Nordic extradition and somewhat 
looser than the EAW, there are fewer optional grounds for refusing surrender under 
the Nordic Convention.  For example, unlike the EAW, neither double criminality 
nor limitation due to lapse of time serve as optional grounds for refusing 
surrender.376  
 
5.2.6 Human Rights 
Similar to the Framework Decision on the EAW, the Nordic Convention contains 
provisions referring to the European Convention on Human Rights. This functions 
as a safeguard against surrender if surrender is considered to be a breach of a 
provision under the Convention.  
 
5.3 Summary of mutual recognition schemes operating in Europe 
The EAW and NAW are somewhat different from that of the Part 4, backed-warrant 
procedure in that both are based upon mutual recognition rather than reciprocal 
legislation. The degree of simplification and efficacy of these mutual recognition 
schemes appears to vary as a function of the degree to which there is cooperation 
                                                          
374 At 376. 
375 The EU Framework Decision, art 3(1)-(3); and the art 4(1)-(3) of the Convention, above n 366. 




and similarities between and within states, historically, culturally, legally and 
linguistically.377 In this regard, the NAW has been described as more successful 
than the EAW resulting from a higher degree of mutual trust underlying the 
principle of mutual recognition.378   
 
The EAW appears more liberal than Part 4 of the 1991 New Zealand Extradition 
Act because conditions are less strict and there are fewer restrictions. These 
restrictions and other procedural matters canvassed, (role of the Central Authority) 
are relevant to a critique of the Commission’s proposals impacting on the backed-
warrant procedure in the succeeding section.  
 
The NAW is a step more liberal than the EAW, bare of any conditions or 
restrictions, save for those applicable to the ECHR. Another fundamental difference 
between the EAW and the NAW lies in the scope of application – the EAW is 
applicable in all EU Member States, whereas the application of the Nordic System 
is confined to Nordic countries.  The more liberal approach of the NAW has been 
viewed as tangible proof of the NAW showing close adherence to the principle of 
mutual recognition and the underpinning degree of mutual trust for which it relies. 
  
The key features that most distinguishes the EAW and NAW from surrender in New 
Zealand under Part 4, relates to a softening if not removal of the double-criminality 
and speciality requirement and to a lesser degree the seriousness threshold. In 
addition, the grounds for refusing surrender are considerably fewer and narrower, 
coupled with much less executive involvement than exists under Part 4.  
 
Of particular importance, is the observation that the 1991 Act lags behind the EAW 
and NAW, in not expressly applying equivalent fundamental human rights and 
procedural rights contained in the NZBORA.  Express provision for the Charter 
makes the EAW and NAW, at least in principle, more developed in recognising the 
importance of human rights than is provided for under Part 4. Although the 
narrower scope of the “unjust or oppressive” provision under the Extradition Act 
2003 (UK) suggests less protection is provided to the requested person, in practice 
                                                          
377 Mathiesen, above n 358, at 6.  
378 Tolttila, above n 367, at 368. 
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the role of national legislation, namely the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) in 
subjecting UK courts to the ECHR is said to obviate this risk.379 Further, s 21 of the 
2003 Act requires a judge to determine whether the surrender of a person would be 
compatible with ECHR rights. For example, article 6 of the ECHR enshrines the 
fundamental principle that everyone is entitled to a fair trial.380  
 
Notably, there are no provisions in either the EAW or NAW which allude to 
comity.381 Speaking in context of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
(“AFSJ”), Koen Lenaerts opined:382  
 
In the AFSJ, the successful operation of the principle of mutual recognition 
implies that Member States must trust each other when it comes to 
complying with fundamental rights. This means that the principle of 
mutual recognition presupposes mutual trust and comity among the 
national judiciaries. 
 
The type of comity referred to by Lenaerts is qualitatively different from comity as 
it relates to the Part 4 backed-warrant procedure, however. This is because in the 
context of the EU, comity does not entail a reciprocal arrangement with stark 
political interest involved.  Nonetheless, the explicit mention of human rights 
provisions in the NAW and EAW scheme aligns with the view of this thesis that 
comity ought to have a human rights component. To this end, comity requires a 
functional definition and legislative change designed to enhance trust in the 
presumption of similarity when it comes to complying with fundamental human 
rights.  
 
                                                          
379 Moloney – Full Court, above n 186, at [45]. 
380 For example  Soering v United Kingdom [1989] ECHR 14 at [113]. 
381 See Klimek, above n 323, at 91. 
382 Koen Lenaerts, above n 320, at 4. Koen Lenaerts is Vice-President of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, and Professor of European Union Law, University of Leuven.   
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5.4   British territories 
 
5.4.1 Nature  
Simplified systems of extradition are used between the UK and British territories 
(non-EU members), namely the Channel Islands (Jersey, Guernsey, Alderney and 
Sark) and the Isle of Man.383  Backing of arrest warrants between the UK, Channel 
Islands and the Isle of Man is a long-standing arrangement, for which the legal basis 
is found in the Indictable Offences Act 1848 (UK).384  In this situation, the UK Act 
has extraterritorial effect for offences committed in the UK and in the Islands.385  
 
These schemes are based upon the principle of reciprocity, as opposed to the 
principle of mutual recognition underlying the EAW and NAW. Section 13 reflects 
the principle of reciprocity in that the first half provides for the arrest of persons 
accused of crimes in England and Wales, who resort to the British Territories. The 
second half of s 13 provides for the arrest of persons accused of crimes in the British 
Territories, who resort to England and Wales.386  
 
5.4.2 Conditions 
5.4.2.1  Extraditability 
5.4.2.1.1 Extraditable person 
The backed-warrant procedure under s 13 of the 1848 Act is applicable to any 
person for whom there is a warrant issued for any indictable offence and who “shall 
escape, go into, reside, or be, or be supposed or suspected to be, in the requested 
country. 
 
                                                          
383 The Extradition Act 1989 continues to apply to these Islands for the purposes of extradition. 
Baker Report, above n 41 at 3.96.  See also HM Attorney-General Arrest and transfer to UK of 
Isle of Man resident – Use of UK law in Island (17 November 2009) 127 Tynwald Hansard at 248-
250, available at <www.tynwald.org.im>; The Police Procedures and Criminal Evidence (Jersey) 
Law 2003, Part 4, s 28(13) represents the statutory authority in Jersey law for the backing of 
warrants and s 81 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1989 represents the statutory authority in Manx 
law for the backing of warrants in the Isle of Man.  Evidence that a legal basis for Backing of 
Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act 1965 continues to apply in the Isle of Man, (set to change 
under the draft Extradition Bill 2011) is found the Island’s International Criminal Court Act 2003.   
384 Nicholls, above n 12, at 43. See s 13 of the Indictable Offences Act 1848. 
385 HM Attorney-General, above n 383, at 248, line 765-770. 
386 Richards v Attorney General of Jersey and another [2003] EWHC 3365 (Admin), 
CO/6231/2003 at [59].  
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5.4.2.1.2 Extraditable country 
The backed-warrant procedure under s 13 of the 1848 Act is applicable to the British 
Territories and the UK.  
5.4.2.1.3 Extraditable  offence 
Under the 1848 Act an extradition offence includes any indictable offences. 
5.4.2.1.3.1 Double criminality 
Under the 1848 Act there is no double-criminality requirement. 
5.4.2.1.3.2 Penalty threshold 
Under the 1848 Act there is no minimum penalty threshold. 
5.4.2.2  Speciality 
Under the 1848 Act there is no speciality requirement. 
5.4.2.3  Standard of evidence 
There is no prima facie requirement under the 1848 Act. 
5.4.3 Procedure 
Procedurally, the original warrant for arrest of the requested person is brought by 
police or other law enforcement officer with a power to arrest, accompanied by an 
affidavit or other supporting documentation used to obtain the original warrant 
issued by any court, justice of the peace, or magistrate in the UK or Islands.387 The 
original warrant is received by the UK or Islands’ police and/or the Attorney-
General388 for endorsement or backing by the judicial authorities in the UK or 
Islands. Endorsement of the warrant only requires that the judicial authority is 
satisfied that it is authenticated as sworn by the police officer producing it, for its 
execution by any constable.389  In the Isle of Man, a Justice of the Peace will endorse 
                                                          
387 For example Summary Jurisdiction Act 1989, s 81(1)).  See ‘Summary Jurisdiction Bill – 
Consideration of Clauses Concluded’ (9 May 1989) House of Keys, Hansard at K887 
<www.org.im>.  See also an unreported judgment from the Samedi Division of the Royal Court in 
Jersey, 1998/4 AG v Young and Cantrade [1998] UR 4 (12 January 1998) at 18.  Sir Godfray Le 
Quesne QC, Commissioner, refers to a lengthy excerpt of an affidavit sworn by a Detective from 
the Jersey Police before the Deputy Baliff in the UK seeking endorsement of the warrant for the 
purpose of arrest and return of the accused to the Island to face trial.  See also Richards v Attorney 
General of Jersey and another, above n 386.  
388 Mutual Legal Assistance Guidelines <www.govt.je>. 
389 See for example, the backing-of-warrants provisions in the Isle of Man under The Summary 
Jurisdiction Act 1989, ss 81(3). 
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the original warrant390 and in Jersey, the Baliff (Senior Judge), has the power to 
endorse the warrant.  Endorsement of the warrant is followed by arrangements for 
a police or other law enforcement officer who has a power to arrest, to travel to the 
island with the original warrant and supporting documentation. The backing of 
arrest warrant procedure pursuant to s 13 of the Indictable Offences Act 1848, is 
however subject to the availability of a writ of habeas corpus and the European 
Court of Human Rights.391  
5.4.4 Restrictions 
There are no restrictions to surrender under the 1848 Act in contrast to the s 19 
provisions of the 1881 Act. 
5.4.5 The role of comity 
There is no explicit mention of comity in the 1848 Act or to the knowledge of the 
author, in any case law.  
 
5.4.6 Human Rights  
An abuse of process, such as unlawful arrest, falls to be considered under the ECHR 
to which the 1848 Act are also subject.  For example, a warrant for a person’s arrest 
issued from the UK on the basis of an EAW issued from another EU member state 
(Category 1), cannot be backed in the Islands’ courts.392 
                                                          
390 Summary Jurisdiction Act 1989, s 81(2).  See ‘Summary Jurisdiction Bill – Consideration of 
Clauses Concluded’, above n 387, at K887. See also (23 February 2010) 127 Legislative Council 
Hansard 247.   
391 Bryce-Richards v Att Gen of Jersey & States of Jersey Police [2003] EWHC 3365 at 65 cited in 
Nicholas Le Quesne Haebus Corpus in Jersey (2013) Jersey & Guernsey Law Review; and 
Richards v Attorney General of Jersey, above n 386.  See also R (on the application of Hammond) 
v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1965] AC 810, [1964] 2 All ER 772. In that case that 
applicant succeeded in grant of writ of habeas corpus through a technical defect in the ways s 13 of 
the 1848 Act was performed. Both cases were grounded in the argument that the arrest warrants 
issued infringed human rights, namely the European Convention on Human Rights, for which s 13 
of the 1848 is subject to. 
392 For example the case of Dr Dirk Hoehmann  examined by the Social Affairs Policy Review 
Committee in Standing Committee of Tynwald Public Accounts Medical Staff Investigaton (5 
December 2012) at 2 <www.tynwald.org.im>; Standing Committee of Tynwald on Public 
Accounts Report on the Handling by the Manx Authorities of the case of Dr Dirk Hoehmann PP 
0097/13 (2012-2013) PP 0097/13; and Council of Ministers Response to the Standing Committee 
of Tynwald on Public Accounts Report on the Handling by the Manx Authorities of the case of Dr 
Dirk Hoehmann in Tynwald Order Paper (15 October 2013) GD NO 0051/13 
<www.tynwald.org.im>.  The HM Attorney General, advised that the only way to achieve Dr 
Hochman’s return to Germany was by an extradition request from the Germany Authorities to the 
Home Office and a warrant for the defendant’s arrest being issued under the Extradition Act 1989 
(2012-2013) at 17.   
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5.5  Africa’s backed-warrant procedure 
5.5.1 Nature of the African Acts 
Simplified schemes in Africa also operate on a reciprocal basis.  For example, in 
Kenya, the backing of warrants is reflected in Part III of the Extradition (Contiguous 
and Foreign Countries) Act entitled “reciprocal backing of warrants” which means 




5.5.2.1  Extraditability 
 
5.5.2.1.1 Extraditable person 
Persons liable to be surrendered under the backed-warrant procedure are defined 
under most of Africa’s extradition law as any person accused or convicted of an 
offence.394 
 
5.5.2.1.2 Extraditable country 
A more simplified procedure applies to any contiguous country with reciprocal 
provisions for backing of warrants under the extradition law of Uganda,395 
Tanzania,396 and Kenya.397 South Africa has a similar arrangement by way of 
extradition agreement with any foreign state that has reciprocal provisions for 
backing of warrants.398 
                                                          
393 See s 2 of the Extradition (Contiguous and Foreign Countries) Act [“the Kenyan Act”] in 
relation to Kenya. See also s 12 of the Extradition Act 67 of 1962 [“the South African Act”] in 
relation to South Africa; Part II of the Uganda Extradition Act 1964 [“the Ugandan Act”]; and Part 
III of the Tanzania Extradition Act 1965 [“the Tanzanian Act”].   
394See s 3 of the South African Act; s 1 of the Ugandan Act; s 2 of the Kenyan Act; and s 12 of the 
Tanzanian Act. 
395 See Part II of the Ugandan Act. 
396 See Part III of the Tanzanian Act.  
397 See Part III of the Kenyan Act. Simplified procedures exist between the neighbouring territories 
of East Africa, formerly provided for under the 1881 Act passed in the East African territories 
(Tanzania, Uganda). Cited in Republic of Kenya, The National Assembly, House of 
Representatives Official Report, First Parliament inaugurated, vol VIII, 7 June 1963 
<www.parliament.go.ke> at 314. 
398 See s 6 of the South African Act. The term ‘associated State’ is used under s 1 of the South 
African Act to mean any foreign State for which section 6 applies. Section 6 reflects associated 
States which are neighbouring states in Africa, which have treaty arrangements with South Africa.  
For example Botswana is an associated State by virtue of The Extradition Treaty concluded with 
South Africa as contemplated by s 6. It is associated States for whom a more simplified procedure 
for surrender operates. See also Watney, above n 24, at 299. 
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5.5.2.1.3 Extraditable offence 
Surrender under the backed-warrant procedure is not confined to the serious 
offences listed under the Schedule applicable to standard extradition in the Uganda 
Extradition Act 1964 (“Ugandan Act”); Extradition (Contiguous and Foreign 
Countries) Act (“Kenyan Act”); Extradition Act 67 of 1962 (“South African Act”); 
or the Tanzania Extradition Act 1965 (“Tanzanian Act”).399   The term ‘extraditable 
offence’ is used under s 1 of the South African Act and explicitly excludes any 
offence under military law which is not also an offence under the ordinary criminal 
law of the Republic and of such foreign State.  
 
5.5.2.1.3.1 Double criminality 
It is only the South African Act that preserves the double requirement under its 
definition of an ‘extraditable offence’.400  
 
5.5.2.1.3.2 Penalty threshold 
The South African Act requires a minimum penalty threshold of at least six months 
imprisonment.401 The Ugandan Act, Kenyan Act and the Tanzanian Act contain no 
minimum penalty threshold or requirement that the offence is one that attracts a 
custodial sentence or some other form of deprivation of liberty.  
 
5.5.2.2  Speciality 
It is only the South African Act that contain a speciality requirement. 
 
5.5.2.3  Standard of evidence  
Consistent with the 1881 Act, none of the other simplified schemes contain a prima 





                                                          
399 For example “extradition crime” is defined under s 28 of the Ugandan Act and applies to the 
“fugitive criminal” under standard extradition.   
400 African Act, s 1. 
401 But see the Protocol on Extradition (signed 3 October 2002, entered into force 2006) 




Procedurally, the backing of arrest warrant schemes in Uganda and Kenya are by 
and large similar to the 1881 Act.402 In order to engage the simplified procedure 
under the South African Act, the magistrate has to determine in context of an 
extradition enquiry, as to whether the surrender request should be dealt with on the 
basis of an associated state or as a foreign state.403 If it is the former, the magistrate 
is authorised to order the requested person’s surrender as set out in s 12 of the South 
African Act, subject to restrictions pursuant to 12(2).404  If however, it is the latter, 
the magistrate only has the power to order the person’s imprisonment because 
his/her surrender is determined by the minister.  
 
The South African Act has considerably fewer procedural safeguards. For instance, 
there is no requirement for the magistrate to find reasonable cause to suspect the 
person is on his or her way or in the country.405 Less strict than Kenya and Uganda, 
there are no authentication requirements as to identity of the person sought for 
surrender or the original warrant issued.406   
 
5.5.4 Restrictions 
In most respects, the grounds for refusing surrender are identical to those under s 
19 of the 1881 Act.407  One exception is the South African Act which contains a 
broader provision for refusing surrender under s 12(1)(c)(i) by virtue of the words 
“for any other reason” as found in s 34(2) of the 1988 Act. It appears that the South 
African Act provides an even lower threshold for refusing surrender by reason of 
the word “unreasonable” instead of “oppressive’. In this respect, the judiciary is 
entitled to the same power to refuse surrender as the minister under s 11(b)(i)-(iv) 
of the South African Act. 
 
The extent of restrictions in place as it relates to political offences and on the 
grounds of discrimination varies across Africa’s simplified schemes. The South 
                                                          
402 See s 11 of the Kenyan Act; South African Act; and Ugandan Act.   
403 Section 10 of the South African Act. 
404 “Associated state” is defined as a foreign state that has entered a reciprocal extradition. 
agreement.  See Misozi Chanthunya v S [2013] ZANWHC 45 at [30]. 
405 South African Act, s 6. Contrast s 17 of the Ugandan Act. 
406 Compare s 14 of the Kenyan Act, and s 18(1) of the Ugandan Act. 




African Act contains a discretionary rather than mandatory ground for refusing 
surrender on the grounds that “the person concerned will be prosecuted or punished 
or prejudiced at his or her trial in the associated State by reason of his or her gender, 
race, religion, nationality or political opinion.”408 In addition, the South African Act 
entitles the Minister to order cancellation of warrants of arrest or discharge of 
detained persons, at any time, if the offence for which surrender is sought, is 
political in nature.409 The Ugandan Act; Kenyan Act and Tanzania Act are stricter 
but narrower in scope in regard to restrictions on surrender under the backed-
warrant procedure.  These Acts prohibit the surrender of political offenders410 but, 
there are no other applicable discrimination exceptions. 
 
5.5.5 The role of comity 
Exemplifying the variance by which comity is defined, the South African 
Constitutional Court has regarded comity as qualified by the importance of a state 
complying with its own domestic laws. This approach to comity accords with Hilton 
v Guyot where the American Supreme Court expressed the following opinion:411  
 
Comity is neither a matter of absolute obligation nor a mere courtesy and 
good will. It is a recognition which one nation allows within its territory to 
the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due 
regard both to international duty and convenience and to the rights of its 
own citizens or other persons who are under the protection of its laws. The 
comity thus extended to other nations is not impeachment of sovereignty. 
It is the voluntary act of the nation by which it is offered and is inadmissible 
when contrary to its policy or prejudicial to its interests. But it contributes 
so largely to promote justice between individuals and to produce a friendly 
intercourse between the sovereignty to which they belong, that courts of 
justice have continually acted upon, as a part of the voluntary law of 
nations. It is not the comity of the courts but the comity of the nation which 
is administered and ascertained in the same way and guided by the same 
                                                          
408 South African Act, s 12(2)(c)(ii). 
409 South African Act, s 15. 
410 Ugandan Act, s 22; Kenyan Act, s 16(1)(a); and Tanzanian Act, ss 16(1)(a) and 1. 
411 Hilton v Guyot, above n 16. See Momodu Kassim-Momodu “Extradition of fugitives by 
Nigeria” (1986) ICLQ 35(3) 512 at 512. See also Tsebe, above n 16, at [128]. In context of 
determining eligibility for surrender under a simplified scheme between South Africa and 
Boswana, of which the latter risks imposing the death penalty. 
This passage was considered in Tesbe, above n 16, at [127]. 
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reasoning by which all other principles of municipal law are ascertained 
and guided. [Emphasis added]  
 
This formulation of comity aptly describes the importance of safeguarding 
sovereignty, the rights of the requested person and the international expectation of 
the efficiency with which surrender of the requested person should take place. It 
shows a greater understanding for the differences between a traditional definition 
of comity of nations, as described by the Law Commission,412 and a modern 
definition that is of significance to the purpose of this thesis.  
  
5.5.6 Human Rights  
With exception to restrictions on the grounds of political offences and in one case, 
grounds of discrimination, there are no human rights provisions contained in the 
Acts examined. Instead, the impact of human rights on surrender is derived from 
the fact that most states, including South Africa, Uganda and Kenya are party to the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights international human rights 
conventions.413   
 
There are also human rights instruments within each state impacting upon 
surrender, such as the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of South Africa. A pertinent 
human rights issue impacting on simplified schemes based upon extradition 
agreements, is the issue of the death penalty in retentionist versus abolitionist states. 
For example, Botswana and Malawai retain the death penalty whereas South Africa, 
under its constitution is an abolitionist state.414 In contrast to backing-of-warrants 
between Australia and New Zealand, these simplified schemes, are confronted with 
gross forms of human rights violations impacting significantly on international 
cooperation.  
                                                          
412 Issues Paper, above n 1. 
413 Watney, above n 24, at 310. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 
1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) <www.achpr.org/instruments>. 
414 Boswana and Malawai are associated states by virtue of an Extradition Treaty concluded with 
South Africa, as contemplated by s 6 of the South African Act.  For example Mohamed and 
Another v President of the RSA and Others 2001 (3) SA 893 (CC). The Constitutional Court ruled  
that there is an absolute bar on extraditing or deporting a person from South Africa to any country 
that poses a risk of the death penalty being imposed. See S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC).  
See also Tsebe, above n 16, at 4; and Canada v Schmidt [1987] 1 SCR 500, 522 (per La Forest J).   
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Illustrating the procedural weaknesses in the South African Act, the Court in Misozi 
Chanthunya v The State Criminal Appeal determined that at the extradition enquiry 
stage of the process, the magistrate as opposed to the minister, has no power to 
consider any constitutional issues or sufficiency of assurances given as to the death 
penalty in the extradition agreement, namely assurances regarding the death 
penalty.415 This is because the magistrate’s role in s 10 is confined to the issue of 
there being sufficient evidence to prosecute in the foreign state and liability for 
surrender.416  In this way, there is more benefit in being imprisoned to await the 
minister’s decision in regard to surrender, especially if the associate State provides 
insufficient assurance against imposition of the death penalty.417  
 
5.6   Australia’s inter-state backing of arrest warrants scheme 
 
5.6.1 Services and Process Act 1992 (Cth)   
Part 5 of the Australian Services and Process Act 1992 (Cth) (“the SEPA 1992”) is 
another simplified scheme providing for the return of persons interstate.418 
Procedurally, a person may be arrested in one State on the basis of an arrest warrant 
issued in another State with the intention of taking the person before a magistrate 
in that State, upon which the arrest warrant of the “issuing State” is produced.419 
For example, in Mok v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) a warrant issued by 
a DCJ in New South Wales for the accused who failed to appear on fraud offences, 
but surfaced in Victoria, was given effect in Victoria, under s 82 of the SEPA 
1992.420    
 
Distinctly more liberal than its predecessor the Services and Execution of Process 
Act 1901 (Cth) (“the SEPA 1901”), under the SEPA 1992 the magistrate has no 
statutory discretion to refuse to surrender the requested person to the State that 
                                                          
415 Misozi Chanthunya v S [2013] 2 NANWHC 45.  The Constitution of South Africa Act 108 of 
1996 is applicable to South Africa’s extradition law. Relevant are ss 10,11 and 12(1)(e) which 
have been invoked in prohibiting extradition to a country where the death penalty might be 
imposed. 
416 Tsebe, above n 16, at [69]. 
417 Tsebe, above n 16.  
418 The Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 has been in force since 10 April 1993.  
419 Section 82(1)-(2) of the SEPA 1992. 
420 Mok v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) 2016 HCA 13 at [5]-[8]. 
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issued the arrest warrant.421  The magistrate has the power to consider the validity 
of the warrant and grant bail however.  Owing to what is regarded as its 
administrative character,422 the magistrate must simply make an order, to either 
remand the person on bail to appear in the issuing State at a specified time and 
place423or order that the person be taken in custody or otherwise as the magistrate 
specifies, to a specified place in the issuing State.424 
 
5.6.2 Services and Execution of Process Act 1901 (Cth)  
Of particular relevance to the backing of warrants between New Zealand and 
Australia is the Services and Execution of Process Act 1901(Cth) (“SEPA 
1901”).425   This is because of the general proposition espoused by the Australian 
judiciary that the unjust or oppressive bar to extradition  under s 18(6) the SEPA 
1901 is relevant and helpful when considering the grounds for refusing surrender 
of the requested person to New Zealand (discussed below).426 This is partly because 
of its longevity and the copious authorities dealing with its interpretation. Notably, 
this analogy forms the rationale for applying a prima facie exception to the backing 
of warrant regime between New Zealand and Australia – discussed below. For 
instance, the Full Court in Moloney - Full Court thought that “New Zealand has 
been long equated, for extradition purposes, with the Australian States and 
Territories.”427 Evidently, the single, albeit broad, statutory bar to surrendering 
persons to New Zealand under s 34(2) of the 1988 Act, was modelled upon s 27 of 
the Extradition (Commonwealth Countries) Act 1966 (Cth).  That language was 
modelled upon s 18(6) of the SEPA 1901, which itself was derived from s 10 of the 
Fugitive Offenders Act 1881 (UK).428   
 
                                                          
421 SEPA 1992, ss 83-86. See Moloney & Garchow v New Zealand [2006] FCA 438 [Moloney – 
Federal Court] at 62.  
422 Mok v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (2015) 320 ALR 584 [2015] NSWCA 98 (Mok 
(No 3)) at [25]. 
423 SEPA 1992, s 83(8)(a). 
424 Section 83(8)(b). For example, Mok v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2016] HCA 13 
[2016] 330 ALR 201 at [1] and [8]. See further Douglas Brown “Judicial Scrutiny of Inter-State 
Extradition” (1976-1976) UW Aust l Rev 298. 
425 The SEPA 1901 was amended under the Service and Execution of Process Amendment Act 
1991 (Cth), then replaced by the SEPA 1992 following a report of the Law Reform Commission 
on service and execution of process. 
426 Moloney - Full Court, above n 186, at [54]. 
427 At [36]. 
428 Moloney - Full Court, above n 186, at [20]; [52] and [103]. See also EP Aughertson, above n 
11, at 236. Considered by Moloney – Full Court, above n 348, at [20]. 
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In support of this proposition, the Full Court in Moloney referred to the 
Replacement Explanatory Memorandum to the Extradition Bill 1987: 
 
The procedures for extradition to New Zealand are more simple than the 
procedures under Part II and are based on the backing of warrant procedure used 
for extradition between the Australian States.429 
  
Further supporting the rationale that there is a legislative intention to assimilate the 
principles governing the backed-warrant procedure between New Zealand and 
Australia to those governing backing of warrants within Australia,  the Full Court 
in Moloney noted Wilcox and Jackson JJ in Narain v Director of Public 
Prosecutions referred to an extract from the Attorney-General’s second reading 
speech for the Extradition Bill 1987 (Cth):  
 
The Bill contains a special part which governs extradition relations with 
New Zealand. Our close ties with that country have made appropriate a 
reciprocal regime which bears a very close similarity to the extradition 
relations between the various Australian States and Territories contained 
in the Service and Execution of Process Act 1901.430 
 
5.7 Interim conclusion of reciprocal and imperial-based schemes 
The discussion above reveals how influential the models pioneered in the imperial-
based statutes continue to be in the operation of many simplified schemes. There 
could not be a more simplified arrangement for the surrender of persons in the 
commonwealth than what exists between the British territories and the UK. Despite 
there being no conditions, or restrictions on surrender and few procedural 
safeguards, expressly built into the 1848 Act, by all accounts there has not been any 
criticism of the regime.   
The African Acts contain similar language to imperial-based statutes (namely, the 
1881 Act). Differences are found between the African Acts in respect of the 
inclusion or not of conditions and restrictions on surrender as well as procedural 
safeguards. These schemes also tend to place more emphasis on the role of the 
                                                          
429 Cited in Moloney - Federal Court, above n 421, at [36]) per Madgwick J. 
430 Cited in Moloney -Full Court, above n 348, at [105]) referring to Sackville J at 163-164 in 
Narain v Director of Public Prosecutions (1987) 15 FCR 411 [Narain] at 419. 
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executive than most other simplified schemes. Importantly, there are differences in 
how the usage of the term comity is applied by the Constitutional Court in South 
Africa, compared to how comity in context of the Part 4, backed-warrant procedure 
is applied by the New Zealand courts. This reflects how the flexible nature of 
comity as a concept may lend itself to arbitrary usage.  
Despite there being no express provision for the applicability of the African Charter 
to the African Acts or the ECHR to the 1848 Act, there are authorities establishing 
this to be the case. In this respect, it is fair to say that Part 4 of the 1991 Act is less 
developed in leaving it open to question how far the NZBORA applies to Part 4.  
The influence of imperial-based statutes is especially relevant to the impact that the 
SEPCA 1901 appears to have on requests for surrender by New Zealand to 
Australia. The SEPA 1901 is therefore relevant to a critique of the Commission’s 
proposals and confidence in the degree of mutual trust/comity between New 














6. Critique of the Law Commission’s recommendations 
relevant to the backed-warrant procedure 
6.1 Establishing a central authority  
The primary focus of the Commission’s draft Bill is the establishment of a central 
authority (nominally, the Attorney-General) and modifications to the standard 
procedure.  It is envisaged that the Central Authority will decide whether to 
commence an extradition proceeding, based upon the likelihood of success and if 
the decision is in the affirmative, will oversee the entire extradition process, from 
the time a request arrives until the moment a person sought is either discharged or 
extradited from New Zealand.431  
  
6.1.1 Role of the Central Authority in the backed-warrant procedure 
In regard to the backed-warrant procedure, it is helpful to consider the 
Commission’s shift in position towards the role of the Central Authority. Initially, 
the Commission evaluated the surrender request process undertaken by the New 
Zealand Police in a positive light432 and saw the place of the Central Authority as 
limited to an administrative role; reporting numbers and outcome, rather than a 
procedural role.433   
 
This limited role of the executive branch is characteristic of the EAW but for 
different reasons.  In limiting the role of the Central Authority, which is usually the 
Ministry of Justice or Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to administrative assistance for 
the judicial authorities, the EAW is achieving its object of reducing the role of the 
executive.434 Similar to the Part 4, backed-warrant procedure, it relies upon direct 
cooperation between judicial authorities rather than a central authority for the 
purpose of eliminating the problems associated with the standard extradition 
procedure such as potential delay and the potential for political pressure to reign 
over the decision to surrender.435  A major difference from the Part 4 backed-
warrant procedure, is the involvement of the police in the initial stages of the 
                                                          
431 Report, above n 1, at 4. 
432 Issues Paper, above n 1, at [4.18]-[4.19].  
433 At [4.19]. 
434 Klimek, above n 323, at 79. Recital 9 of the Preamble of the EU Framework Decision, above n 
322. 
435 Neil Boister and Robert J Currie (eds) Routledge Handbook of Transnational Criminal Law 
(Routledge, New York, 2015) at 165.   
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procedure whereas under the EAW the judicial authorities have sole responsibility 
for the procedure.436 It would appear, that the Commission’s initial rationale for 
limiting the role of the Central Authority,437 was based on the view that the police 
liaison aspect to the backed-warrant procedure works effectively.  This was in turn 
because of the close working relationships between New Zealand and the 
designated countries.438 This rationale, was also consistent with the Commission’s 
emphasis on comity and trustworthiness with Australia warranting further 
simplification of the backed-warrant procedure.   
 
Comparatively, the emphasis placed on the police in the initial stages of the 
procedure is similar to the early practice of intra-Nordic arrest warrants.439 Such 
practise has been attributed to the result of a mutual feeling of affinity and trust 
between the Nordic states.440 A high level of trust resulting from these similarities 
has left the Nordic states well-prepared for the practise of direct communication 
between judicial authorities under the NAW,441 without the involvement of a central 
authority. In contrast, the EAW does not have the same degree of mutual trust 
because there are more differences in the criminal systems of the EU.442   
 
From the African perspective, the more prevalent role of the Executive is associated 
with more differences between African states, namely the death penalty, which 
helps to explain why Africa’s simplified procedures of extradition are not unified 
in terms of the role of the Executive.443    
 
Aside from the role of trustworthiness and similarity in determining the role of a 
central authority, simplified schemes of extradition appear to vary according what 
is perceived as convenient and the degree to which traditional practise is rigidly 
viewed as the better option. More fundamental is the role of principles long-
established which guide the involvement of a central authority.  The simplified 
procedure of surrender under the 1848 Act between the British Islands and the UK 
                                                          
436 Plachta above n 351, at 187. 
437 Issues Paper, above n 1, at [4.18]-[4.19]. 
438At [4.43]-[4.44].  
439 Tolttila, above n 367, at 363. 
440 At 375. 
441 Tolttila, above n 367. 
442 See Tolttila, above n 367. 
443 For example Tsebe, above n 16. 
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is one such example. Its reportedly long track-record of success,444 based upon a 
procedure akin to the 1881 Act, suggests it is less open to reform, let alone the 
notion of a central authority involved in the surrender procedure. A similar 
approach is found in context of the backing-of-arrest warrants under the SEPA 
1901, a predominantly judicialised process modelled off the 1848 Act and the 1881 
Act.445  In contrast, the EAW is more recent and should be viewed from a different 
historical context, with reference to the predominance of a central authority that has 
in part, been attributed to the unworkability of extradition within the EU.  
Given the emphasis placed on the similarity and trustworthiness of Australia as well 
as the importance placed on aligning New Zealand’s extradition law with overseas 
trends in reducing the role of the executive, it is not surprising that the 
Commissioner opted to confine the role of a central authority.  
 
However, the Commission appears to have changed its mind and currently it 
recommends that the Central Authority be responsible for both procedural and 
administrative matters,446 while maintaining a close working-relationship with the 
Police.447 This more cautious approach means, that under the new Act, 
responsibility is given to the Central Authority rather than the Police, for the receipt 
and vetting of requests and decision for initiating proceedings under Part 4.448  
 
The Commission gives a number of reasons given for this change of plan. For 
example, the rationale for having the Central Authority as the applicant, as opposed 
to the requesting country, is based upon the need for a more integrated approach 
and the importance of maintaining independence from the requesting country so 
that the interests of the New Zealand Government are upheld.449 More generally, 
the role of the Central Authority is thought to ensure that proceedings are conducted 
according to New Zealand values.450 Of particular significance is the proposition 
that human rights are better served by the dominant role of the Central Authority in 
the surrender process.451  
                                                          
444 See Hohemann, above n 392. 
445 Douglas Brown “Judicial Scrutiny of Inter-State Extradition” (1976-1976) UW Aust L Rev 
298. 
446 Report, above n 1, at [2.11]-[2.12]. 
447 At [2.13]-[2.15]. 
448 At [2.2]. 
449 At [2.16]-[2.17]. 
450 At [2.16]-[2.17]. 
451 At [2.12]- [5.5]. 
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It is difficult to reconcile this shift in position with the Commission’s earlier 
statement in regard to its positive assessment of the Police role in preserving the 
efficiency of the backed-warrant procedure.  Also problematic is how this position 
reconciles with the trust/comity doctrine that is emphasised by the Commission in 
warranting further simplification of the backing-of-arrest warrant procedure. It 
reflects on the difficulty experienced by the Commission in delineating the standard 
procedure from the backed-warrant procedure. For example, in recommending that 
the applicant be the Central Authority, would conflict with the more limited 
administrative role initially proposed by the Commission.  
 
Aside from these inconsistencies, it is my thesis, that there is in any case, a strong 
principled reason for making the Central Authority applicable to the backed- 
warrant procedure. Evidence in support of this proposition is examined below.     
 
The case of Bennett452 is a good illustration for why the role of the Police should be 
replaced with the Central Authority, particularly in the initial stages of the backed-
warrant procedure. Had there been a central authority responsible for overseeing 
the entire surrender process, the police in both New Zealand and Australia may have 
been less inclined to ignore the statutory procedure for the surrender of Bennett 
from Australia to New Zealand. 
 
An Australian example offering persuasive argument for why a central authority 
should replace the role of the police in the backed-warrant procedure is found in the 
Australian decision, Samson v McInnes and Another (Samson).453  In that case, 
Samson, a New Zealand citizen, was arrested, interviewed twice and remanded in 
custody by South Australian Police simply on the basis of the original arrest warrant 
issued by a DCJ in New Zealand. This was explained by what appears to be 
erroneous advice given to a South Australian Police Officer (Detective Kahl) 
“within the Police Department”.454  The original warrant related to charges for 
alleged armed robbery in New Zealand.  At the same time and on the basis of prior 
information shared between New Zealand Police and Australian Police, Samson 
was told that he was illegally in Australia.  
                                                          
452 Bennett, above n 80. 
453 Samson v McInnes and Another [1998] 159 ALR 367 [Samson]. 
454 At 53.  
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The day following Samson’s arrest, Samson was brought before a DCJ who 
determined that he had no jurisdiction to consider the matter and directed that 
Samson should be brought before a magistrate. Later on the same day, Samson was 
brought before a magistrate and remanded in custody until the following day.  
 
Late in the evening, an officer of the Commonwealth Director of Public 
Prosecutions recognised that the original warrant was defective at the time of its 
execution because it had not been endorsed by a magistrate.455 On the following 
day, the original warrant was accompanied by a supporting affidavit and the 
prescribed application form under s 28 of the 1988 Act. A magistrate (“Swain”) 
signed the form and returned it with the warrant to Klotz.  The warrant itself was 
not endorsed however. Eventually the warrant was endorsed by Swain and on that 
basis, Samson was brought before the Magistrate’s Court later that same day before 
a second magistrate (“McInnes”).  After being advised that the warrant, at the time 
of its execution, had been defective, McInnes ordered that Samson be released. 
Shortly after, Samson was arrested again on the basis of the endorsed warrant and 
brought once again before McInnes which resulted in Samson being held in custody 
until his appearance in the Adelaide Magistrates Court approximately three weeks 
from date of arrest.456 On that occasion, a stipendiary magistrate ordered that he be 
surrendered to New Zealand, pursuant to s 34(1)(a)(i) of the Extradition Act 1988 
(Cth) (the Act).  
 
Samson, then sought appeal of the magistrate’s order under s 35(1) of the Act, to 
the Supreme Court of South Australia. He was unsuccessful. On 28 August 1998, a 
judge of that court confirmed the order of the magistrate.457 Samson, then appealed 
to the South Australia District Registry (“the Court”) from the order of the Supreme 
Court.  
 
The issue before the Court was to determine whether the efforts of Klotz and the 
first magistrate (Swain) were sufficient to remedy the earlier omissions? The Court 
agreed unanimously to allow the appeal and declared the surrender warrant invalid 
because there was no endorsed New Zealand warrant within the meaning of s  
                                                          
455 Extradition Act 1988 (Cth), s 28. Samson, above n 453, at 53. 
456 At 54.  
457 At 54.  
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34(1)(a)(i) of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) before the second magistrate 
(McInnes), when she purported to issue it.458    
 
In allowing the appeal, the South Australia District Registry of the Federal Court 
took a literal interpretation of the language of s 28 (that is, “the magistrate shall 
make an indorsement of the warrant”) and considered that sound reasons exist for 
requiring that the Form 17 endorsement must be found on the back of the warrant 
and not as an accompanying document.459  The Court held that the arresting officer 
did not have a warrant that could be validly acted upon and accordingly the arrest 
was irretrievably flawed.460  The Court maintained:461  
 
 Without such an endorsement, the arrestee would be entitled to challenge 
 the right of a police officer to execute a warrant of a foreign country in 
 Australia. The production of a separate document containing the Form 17 
 endorsement may not self-evidently link it to the relevant warrant; but an 
 endorsement on the back of the warrant puts the issue beyond doubt.” 
 Further, it was recognised, that  “endorsement directs the arresting police 
 officer what is to happen with the arrested person, namely, that he or she 
 be brought before a magistrate as soon as practicable. In the present case 
 this did not occur as there was no direction to that effect on the New 
 Zealand warrant.  
 
Accordingly, the surrender warrant was quashed and Samson’s release was ordered 
immediately. 
 
It was emphasised by the Court that Samson was arrested despite s 28 of the 1988 
(Cth) Act clearly and expressly prohibiting an Australian police officer from 
executing a New Zealand warrant on its mere existence.462  
 
A similar case involving an abuse of process in context of a simplified procedure is 
found in the case of Dr Hoehmann (“the Hoehmann case”).  Dr Hoehmann, was an 
                                                          
458 At 55.  
459 R v Metropolitan Police Commissioner; Ex parte Melia [1957] 3 All ER 440, followed in 
Samson, above n 453, at 55-56. 
460 Re Bolton; Ex parte Beane (1987) 162 CLR 514 70 ALR 225, followed in Samson, above n 
453, at 55-56. 
461 At 57. 
462 At 53. 
100 
 
ENT consultant employed at Noble’s Hospital, in the Isle of Man.463 The case 
involved a complicated sequence of events surrounding the Manx Constabulary’s 
knowledge of Dr Hoehmann’s criminal record and the existence of an EAW issued 
by Germany to the Serious and Organised Crime Agency in the UK.  Similar to 
Samson the Heohmann case involved the wrongful arrest of the requested person, 
arising from the Isle of Mann constabulary confusing the procedure under the EAW 
with that under the 1848 Act.  As it transpired, the EAW cannot be lawfully 
executed in the Isle of Man.  In order to have the arrest warrant backed in the 
Islands’ courts, the person sought, needs to have committed an arrestable offence 
in the UK. Alternatively, if the person residing in the Islands, enters the UK or any 
EU Member State, their arrest can occur on the basis of the EAW. 
 
It is conceded that these latter two foreign examples do not directly reflect on the 
procedural competence of the New Zealand Police in the backing of warrant 
process.  It would be unwise to assume that the New Zealand Police do not have the 
potential to behave as ruthlessly or as haplessly as these foreign police forces. The 
case of Bennett removes any doubt as to there being any evidence lacking in that 
regard.   
 
A central authority utilising a team specialised in extradition matters with 
familiarity in the surrender process, would better protect the interests of the person 
subject to arrest.  This would create a positive spin-off for the efficacy of the 
backing-of-warrants. As Samson illustrates, police bungling in the initial stages of 
the simplified procedure has the potential to create costly and lengthy proceedings 
when the requested person resists surrender. It is of some concern that other than 
appeal there is no way of determining whether other unchallenged cases similar to 
Bennett and Samson exist.  
 
A more moderate view of the problem is reflected in the Hoehmann case. In the 
context of that case, a Report in 2013 by the Department of Home Affairs, offers 
some insight into how the efficacy of the backed-warrant procedure is viewed.464  
                                                          
463 Draft Extradition Bill 2011 <www.gov.im>. The case of Dr Hohemann was examined by the 
Social Affairs Policy Review Committee, above n 392.     
464 Hon Juan Watterson Report of the Department of Home Affairs on the legislation, regulation or 
procedures for extradition between the Island and the UK (Minister for Home Affairs, December 




. . . Clearly, over a long period of time there will be occasions when 
misunderstandings may occur, where standard procedures are not followed 
as they should be by one or more parties or where things do not work out 
as they should. Nevertheless, the Isle of Man Constabulary has advised 
that the system has worked effectively, by and large, for over a century. 
 
Confidence in the backed-warrant procedure is reinforced in the recent draft 
Extradition Bill 2011 which indicates no intention to alter the backed-warrant 
procedure between the UK and Isle of Man.465 Similar confidence in the backing of 
warrant procedure in shown in respect of Jersey. In the case of Richards v Attorney 
General of Jersey and another Justice Jackson said:466  
 
[60] The simple and expeditious procedure, which s 13 of the 1848 Act 
lays down, is a reflection of the confidence which the English courts have 
in the criminal justice systems of the Channel Islands and the confidence 
which the Channel Island courts have in the criminal justice system of 
England and Wales. Those reciprocal provisions have stood the test of 
time. Section 13 of the 1848 Act was enacted in the early years of the reign 
of Queen Victoria. Over the last one and a half centuries Parliament has 
not seen fit to abandon the simple, expeditious and reciprocal procedure 
there set out. 
 
But the efficiency of the process is in some degree countered by the fact that it is 
not that common and thus always not that well executed, suggesting the 




                                                          
465 Draft Extradition Bill Consultation – additional note <www.gov.im>. The only proposed 
change affecting the backed-warrant procedure is between the Isle of Man and the Republic of 
Ireland. It is proposed that surrender should be dealt with under standard extradition provisions as 
is the case between the UK and Ireland and between Ireland and Jersey.   
466 Richards v Attorney General of Jersey and another, above n 386.  For recent examples of trials 
held by the Royal Court arising from backed-warrant procedure: Attorney-General v McNally 
[2015] JRC171 (arrest warrant for defendant relating to offences in Jersey backed in Glasgow);  
and Attorney-General v Maria Ermelinda Abreu De Andrade [2016] JRC020 (arrest warrant for 
defendant relating to offences in Jersey for which she absconded from the Island, backed in 




In sum, without a central authority acting in a procedural role, at least in the initial 
stages of the backed-warrant procedure, it is difficult to see how except by appeal, 
the types of human rights violations featuring in the above authorities may be 
avoided.  Despite the inconsistency that stricter procedural measures such as 
executive involvement has with the comity/trustworthiness doctrine, these 
authorities offer persuasive support for the need to replace the dominant role of the 
police with a central authority.  
 
6.2 Further recommendations relevant to the backed-warrant procedure 
Another factor which limits the extent to which the role of the Central Authority 
may obviate risks to the arrested person’s liberty interests is the degree to which 
other modifications designed to improve efficiency of the extradition process are 
consistent with enhancing human rights. Innovations proposed by the Commission, 
designed to create more transparency and efficiency, namely the Notice of Intention 
to Proceed (NIP)467 and an Issues Conference468are relevant here.  It is envisaged, 
that the Issues Conference will be the forum at which likely issues regarding human 
rights concerns are to be raised, in the hope that doing so will avoid unnecessary 
delay through multiple appeal processes.469   
The following recommendations by the Commission are more closely related to the 
question of whether the Commission’s proposed modifications are consistent with  
strengthening human rights under Part 4: 
 
(1) increasing the role of the judiciary and the breadth of grounds by 
which the judiciary may consider grounds for refusing 
surrender;470 
(2) further simplification of the backed-warrant procedure, 
especially in relation to Australia;471and 
(3) implementing appropriate NZBORA rights into the new Act;472 
 
                                                          
467 Report, above n 1, at [8.14]-[8.21]. See Extradition Bill, cls 26 and 39. 
468 Report, above n 1, at [8.24]-[8.28]. See Extradition Bill, cls 31 and 42.  
469 At [8.24]-[8.28].  
470 At [13](b)(i)-(ii) and [5.11]-[5.17]. 
471 At [7.9]-[7.30]; and Issues Paper, above n 1, at [6.22] and [11.14]–[11.17]. 
472 Issues Paper, above n 1, at [1.28]–[1.29]; and Report, above n 1, at 6. 
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These three key recommendations are examined below with reference to how they 
will impact on the backed arrest warrant procedure in achieving the Commission’s 
objective to strike the right balance between protecting the liberty interests of the 
person and the efficiency of the backed-warrant procedure.  
 
6.3 Increasing the role of the judiciary 
In order to balance the liberty interests of the requested person with the importance 
of international cooperation and comity, one measure proposed by the Law 
Commission in the new Act is to give more emphasis to the role of the court and 
less to the Minister in deciding all of the grounds for refusing surrender.473 
 
The rationale for a shift away from the executive towards the judiciary in the 
extradition process, relates to decreasing the personal nature of the assessment that 
a Government Minister might face, obviating any political pressure attached to 
some decisions.474 This approach is consistent with other simplified schemes, 
namely the EAW and NAW that represent a departure from viewing extradition as 
an aspect of international relations in the hands of the executive.475 The 
Commission’s concern to obviate any political pressure attached to some decisions 
is exemplified in the simplified schemes of Africa. On the one hand the South 
African Act is more judicialised by providing the judiciary with the same power to 
refuse surrender as the minister. One important exception relates to the breadth of 
issues on which the magistrate may exercise his/her discretion, notably the death 
penalty or any constitutional issues.476  
 
 In favour of extradition being judicialised, Kemp makes the following points:477    
 
(i) human rights and due process are best protected when viewed as an 
                                                          
473 Report, above n 1, at 6. See also Issues Paper, above n 11, at [8.18]. It is also suggested by the 
Commission, that the minister’s decision to defer extradition for a period to resolve or treat 
personal concerns, under s 30 of the 1999 Act, should be given to the court and exist as a ground 
that should be combined with the proposed general injustice or oppression ground for the courts to 
consider under new extradition legislation. In relation to that ground, the Commission reinforces 
that a high threshold would be needed before that ground would apply.   
474 Report, above n 1. 
475 Watney, above n 24, at 297. 
476 Misozi Chathunya v S, above n 415. 
477 At 297. Citing Kemp, above n 24.  
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extension of the criminal justice system rather than as a matter of 
 international relations; and (ii) the aim of extradition should be effective 
 criminal justice (with the concomitant requirements of due process and 
 human rights protection) rather than interstate relations. 
 
It is important to highlight that the executive and judicial role in the standard and 
backed-warrant procedure are quite differentiated. In the standard procedure the 
decision to extradite a person is ultimately an executive one whereas in the backed- 
warrant procedure, the decision to refer the matter to the minister is a judicial one. 
In most respects, the backed-warrant procedure under Part 4 is comparatively more 
judicial in nature. This is exemplified in s 18 of the 1991 Act which requires 
requests for surrender to be transmitted to the Minister of Justice as opposed to Part 
4, which is in fact silent on this point.  For this reason, it is appropriate to confine 
the following examination to the question of whether the comparatively more 
judicialised  backed-warrant procedure provides support for the proposition that the 
New Zealand courts are better placed to protect human rights interests.  
 
It is questionable whether Kemp’s confidence in the judiciary to protect the liberty 
interests of the person, can be applied to the New Zealand judiciary. To some extent, 
what erodes confidence in the preparedness of the New Zealand judiciary to use its 
own inherent power to avoid trials or processes oppressive to the accused is 
Richmond P’s disavowal of Bennett when reflecting on it in Moevao v Department 
of Labour:478 
 
However, and as a result of reading what was said in Humphrys and the 
Canadian cases, I am now inclined to the view that Bennett's case could 
not have been properly disposed of on the basis that the prosecution was 
an abuse of process. That is because I now see difficulty in using the 
oppressive conduct of the police towards Bennett to support an argument 
that the process of the Supreme Court was itself being abused. However 
my purpose in mentioning the matter is merely to sound a warning. The 
question whether illegal or "unfair" conduct by the police in the course of 
investigating a crime can so taint a subsequent prosecution as to render it 
an abuse of process must remain for determination in a suitable case… 
 
                                                          
478 Moevao v Department of Labour [1980] 1 NZLR 464 at 470 per Richmond P. 
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According to the reasoning of Richmond P, had Samson been surrendered to New 
Zealand without a valid endorsed warrant, it is doubtful that he would escape 
prosecution on his return, leaving it open to question whether the person’s 
fundamental rights are better protected by the judiciary here in New Zealand.  This 
comment, however, occurred a decade prior to the implementation of the 
NZBORA.  More protection is likely to be afforded to the person if it can be 
established that there has been a breach of BORA rights.  This depends, however, 
on the preparedness of the judiciary to recognise the applicability of the NZBORA 
to the backed-warrant procedure (a matter discussed below).479  
 
The degree to which the person’s liberty interests are better protected by the New 
Zealand courts, also depends on the degree of importance placed on comity, it being 
a core assumption that a person will receive a fair trial in Australia.  Closely linked 
to this is the Commission’s confidence in the courts’ ability to give a more objective 
assessment of the risk and threshold standard.480 It is argued that the amorphous 
concept of comity lessens the strength of this proposition. Ultimately how comity 
is construed plays an important role in determining the importance of the person’s 
liberty interests.  
 
Notwithstanding these weaknesses, Bennett lends support to the rationale for 
shifting the emphasis away from the executive to that of the judiciary because of 
the important role it has in assessing whether the accused should be surrendered.481  
A principled case for the increased role of the judiciary in the backed-warrant 
procedure, may be strengthened if the Commission’s third recommendation to 
                                                          
479 Also applicable to the backed-warrant procedure are New Zealand’s international obligations as 
follows: United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT) 1465 UNTS 85 (opened for signature 10 December 1984, entered 
into force 26 June 1987) available at <www.unhcr.org>; Optional Protocol to the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT) 
A/Res/59/199 (2006); CRC GA Res 44/25 (opened for signature 29 November 1989, entered into 
force 2 September 1990) <www.ohchr.org>; ICCPR 999 UNTS 171 (opened for signature 16 
December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976); ICESCR GA Res 2200A, XXI (opened for 
signature 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) <www.unhcr.org.>; International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) GA Res 2106, XX 
(opened for signature 21 December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969) available at 
<www.unhcr.org> and the Second Optional Protocol to the International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty 1642 UNTS 414 (opened for signature 
15 December 1989, entered into force 11 July 1991). 
480 Issues Paper, above n 1, at [8.18]. 
481 M Cherif Bassiouni, above n 12, at 650-651. 
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implement NZBORA rights comes to fruition and there is focus on developing the 
concept of comity in a way that accommodates the importance of human rights.  
 
6.4 Increasing the breadth of judicial discretion   
The Commission recommends that the courts be granted a broader discretionary 
power of the Court under s 8(1) in order that the courts rather than the Minister be 
given responsibility for deciding whether there exists to the requisite standard 
“extraordinary and compelling circumstances”. Another important change, is that 
the judiciary will no longer exercise a discretion in refusing surrender but will be 
compelled to refuse surrender if grounds are established.482  
 
 
6.4.1   Proposed new “unjust or oppressive” provision 
Initially, the Commission proposed removal of some or all of the grounds for 
refusing surrender, placing great emphasis on the importance of comity and 
reciprocity with Australia.483  Removal of the grounds for refusing surrender would 
place the backed-warrant procedure in a similar position to the British Islands and 
UK simplified scheme under the 1848 Act.  However, in its Report tabled February 
2016 by the Minister of Justice, the Commission abandoned this proposal because 
it was concerned to strike the correct balance between the importance of upholding 
New Zealand’s human rights values and the need to maintain the integrity of a 
simplified process.484  In practical terms, the Law Commission viewed that any 
delays would be circumvented by having those grounds considered at the 
extradition hearing after being raised by the respondent at the Issues Conference.485 
 
The human rights rationale for deciding against removal of some or all of the 
grounds for refusal in respect of Australia is problematic.  This suggests that the 
Commission either developed some doubts in respect of the degree of comity that 
is said to exist between New Zealand and Australia or has plainly contradicted itself. 
For instance, not only has the Commission recoiled from its bold proposal to 
remove grounds for surrender in the case of Australia (and by doing so suggests it 
considers that human rights protections are on par with New Zealand), the 
                                                          
482 Report, above n 1, at [5.1]. 
483 Issues Paper, above n 1, at [6.22]-[6.23].  
484 Report, above n 1, at 53. 
485 At 53. 
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Commission has then proposed stricter measures than currently exist under Part 4.  
This is exemplified by the Commission’s failure to consider risks of impediment to 
the backed-warrant procedure through the proposed new “unjust or oppressive” 
provision, in that it makes s 45(2)(d) subject to a broader discretionary power of the 
court to refuse surrender.  
 
Its breadth is found in its design to capture all circumstances where extradition 
would be unjust or oppressive.  Having considered various definitions recognised 
by a long line of authorities,486 the Commission proposed a measure designed to 
encapsulate the all-encompassing provision that the Minister enjoys in the 
discretionary grounds “compelling or extraordinary personal circumstances” and 
“any other reason” – discussed above. In the Issues Paper, the Commission 
recommended that a general ground be added: “any other sufficient cause”, wording 
that is found in the London Scheme, and the equivalent “for any other reason” under 
Part 3, s 34(2) of the 1988 (Cth) Act.487   
 
Described as the “corner-stone of our reform” the final result is reflected in clause 
20 of the Bill that reads:488 
 
(e) that the extradition of the respondent would be unjust or oppressive 
for reasons including (but not limited to) – 
(i) the likelihood of a flagrant denial of a fair trial in the requesting 
country; or 





                                                          
486 Issues Paper, above n 1, at [8.76]-[8.84]. 
487 At [8.78]. The words “for any other reason” were introduced in the Extradition 
(Commonwealth Countries) Amendment Act 1985 (Cth); see Narain, above n 430, at 479.  See 
Extradition Act 1999, s 8(1); the London Scheme for Extradition within the Commonwealth 
(incorporating the amendments agreed in Kingstown in November 2002), formerly known as 
Commonwealth Scheme on the Rendition of Fugitive Offenders, adopted in 1966, art 15(2)(b); 
Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) s 34(2); Extradition Act 2003 (UK), ss 14, 25, 82 and 91; and 
Extradition Act SC 1999 c 18, s 44(1)(a).   
488 Report, above n 1, at 196 
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For the purposes of clarity, the Bill illustrates the high threshold required with two 
examples: (e) (i) reflecting fair trial concerns, covering abuse of process and delay 
measured according to international minimum standards as opposed to the 
NZBORA;489 and (e) (ii) the “compelling or extraordinary personal circumstances” 
ground in s 30(3)(d) of the 1999 Act. In regard to the latter provision, the language 
has been imported from s 207 of the Immigration Act 2009, tailored to reflect a 
modernised concept of human rights issues.490 In this regard, the Commission has 
not considered the decisions that rightly or wrongly, distinguish deportation from 
extradition in considering grounds for refusing surrender.491 Furthermore, it is 
questionable whether reference to the language of the Immigration Act 2009, assists 
with the furtherance of human rights. Lord Mance in Norris identified a trap that 
the courts have fallen into by focussing on “…some quite exceptionally compelling 
feature …”492 they tend to:493 
 
 … divert attention from consideration of the potential impact of 
 extradition on the particular persons involved … towards a search for 
 factors  (particularly external factors) which can be regarded as out of the 
 run of the mill.  
 
In context of a case that dealt with the issue of the rights to the child in 
context of the EAW, Lady Hale in (H(H)) emphasised “some potentially 
grave consequences are not out of the run of the mill at all”494  and 
exceptionality is not a test but a prediction about whether the gravity of harm 
to the right at stake is justified by the public interest pursued.495 
 
What would make the New Zealand courts approach to an interpretation of 
the high threshold required more aligned to current jurisprudence, is to have  
the fundamental rights of the person more visible in New Zealand’s 
extradition law.  Unlike the simplified schemes of Africa, which is clearly 
                                                          
489 Report, above n 1, at 196. For example Soering v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439 
(ECHR) is cited as the source of wording “flagrant denial of a fair trial”.  
490 Report, above n 1, at 196. 
491 Radhi, above n 179; and Mercer – Court of Appeal, above n 185. 
492 Norris, above n 239, at 56 per Lord Mance. 
493 At 109, per Lord Mance. 
494 H(H), above n 228, at [32] per Lady Hale. 
495 At [32] per Lady Hale. 
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capable of diminishing the importance of human rights, the Part 4 backed-
warrant procedure is not governed by treaty arrangements.496  
 
It is notable, that the Commission’s interpretation of the “unjust or oppressive” 
limb, conflicts with that of two recent Court of Appeal decisions in Mercer and 
Mailley.  Instead of looking to English cases namely Kakis, as a guide to 
determining the boundaries of such a broad term, the Commission has chosen the 
Canadian threshold.   More puzzling is that the decision in Mercer – Court of 
Appeal, preferred the definition expressed in Kaki497 whereas in Mailley it was 
rejected by the same court in favour of its own earlier analysis in Wolf.   
Nevertheless, the analysis in Wolf accords better with the distinction between 
“circumstances of the person” and “circumstances of the case”.498  However, the 
new unjust or oppressive provision makes no such distinction, allowing for broader 
circumstances to fall under consideration and which in turn will enhance human 
rights.  
 
The Canadian threshold for standard extradition requires the circumstances to 
“shock the conscience”499 or be “fundamentally unacceptable to our notions of fair 
practice and justice.”500 The “unjust” limb is intended to allow “the Courts to refuse 
an extradition request if it has grave concerns about how the person will be treated 
by the foreign authorities upon return” whereas the “oppressive” limb addresses the 
impact of extradition in light of their personal circumstances.501  
 
In some measure, the new unjust and oppressive provision, conflicts with the 
Commission’s recommendation to further simplify the backed-warrant procedure, 
because it risks lengthy delays by placing emphasis on the liberty interests of the 
person.  Further, under the new Act, the judiciary will no longer exercise a 
discretion in refusing surrender but similar to the EAW, will be compelled to refuse 
surrender if grounds are established.502   
                                                          
496 See Tsebe, above n 16. 
497 Mercer – Court of Appeal, above n 185, at [33]-[34] and [53]-[55]. 
498 Mailley – HC review decision, above n 207; and Mailley – 2016 appeal, above n 210, at [39]. 
See Wolf v Federal Republic of Germany (2001) 19 CRNZ 245 (CA). 
499 Report, above 1, at 196; citing Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 
[2002] 1 SCR 3.   
500 At 196. 
501 At 196. 
502 At [5.1]. 
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What this suggests is that the Commission has revised its position in regard to 
unchallenged assumptions about comity with Australia and instead introduced a 
much stronger human rights provisions. It is argued that the Commission’s new 
scepticism is warranted and accords with Australia’s emphasis on protecting the 
liberty interests of the person in context of the backed-warrant procedure.  In 
support of this argument, the following paragraphs examine an historical tendency 
for the Australian courts to interpret the equivalent provision under the Australian 
Act, in a way that subordinates comity in favour of protecting the liberty interests 
of the person.  
 
6.4.2  Comity applied by Australia 
 
6.4.2.1  S 34(2) exception under the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth)  
Initially, the Commission considered that the case for removal of grounds for 
refusing surrender is strongest in relation to Australia whose extradition legislation 
already accommodates New Zealand in this way under the Extradition Act 1988 
(Cth) Act (“1988 (Cth) Act”). Section 34(2) of the 1988 (Cth) Act provides “that if 
a magistrate is satisfied by a person arrested on an endorsed New Zealand warrant 
that for one of the reasons specified, or “for any other reason” it would be “unjust, 
oppressive or too severe a punishment to surrender the person to New Zealand” the 
magistrate shall order that the person be released.”503 
 
The Commission correctly recognises that the only statutory bar to surrender is 
found in s 34(2) of the 1988 (Cth) Act:504 
 Further, instead of the usual “extradition objections” applying, the only bar 
 to extradition is for reasons of: triviality, bad faith, delay or any other 
 reason it would be “unjust, oppressive, or too severe a punishment to 
 surrender the person to New Zealand”.  
 
That being said, the Commission fails to recognise that by virtue of the words in s 
34(2), “for any other reason”, there is potential for the requested person to raise 
                                                          
503Moloney – Full Court, above n 186, at [143].  
504 Report, above n 1, at [7.21]. 
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broad grounds for refusal,505 equivalent to what might be considered by the Minister 
under s 48 of the Extradition Act 1999 Act (NZ) (“the 1999 Act”).506    
The historical background of s 34(2) is worthy of mention as it highlights the 
Commission’s misconception of there only being a single statutory bar to surrender 
in Australian law.  The historical origins of s 34(2) is linked to the intention of the 
Australian Parliament to bring the backed-warrant procedure with New Zealand 
into line with interstate extradition (the SEPCA 1901) by widening the scope for a 
refusal to surrender.507 This was achieved by amendment in 1985 to the Extradition 
(Commonwealth Countries) Act 1966 (“the 1966 Act”) which had been carried 
forward into the 1988 (Cth) Act.508  
In this way the Commission is misled in its appraisal of the reciprocal nature of the 
statutory scheme in Australia as far as surrender to New Zealand is concerned, or 
in the words of the Commission: “How Australia treats New Zealand”.509 Aside 
from an enduring rhetoric about the particular comity that is said to exist under Part 
4, there is an unchallenged assumption that recognition of comity, is a two-way 
street as far as Australia is concerned. 
To illustrate, the meaning given to the words “unjust” and “oppressive” in context 
of s 34(2) has relied on Binge v Bennett as the basis for refusing surrender.  It is 
significant that Binge v Bennett was decided under the SEPA 1901. In that decision 
Mahoney JA said:510 
 
 The words ‘unjust and oppressive’ given their ordinary meaning have a 
 broad connotation. I do not think that, so understood, they exclude matters 
 going to, for example, the nature and incidents of the justice system to 
 which the person in question is to be returned or to the circumstances or 
 mode of his treatment pending trial in that system.   
 
                                                          
505 EP Aughertson, above n 11, at 242. 
506 Radhi, above n 179, at 55.  
507  Kenneally v New Zealand (1999) 166 ALR 625 at [46]-[47]. For example Bannister v New 
Zealand [1999] [Bannister] FCA 362, (1999) 86 FCR 417.  
508 Extradition (Commonwealth Countries) Amendment Act 1985 (Cth). 
509 Report, above n 1, at [7.20]. 
510 Binge v Bennett (1988) 13 NSWLR 578 at 596 in Moloney – Full Court, above 186, at [68].  
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What this shows, is the influence of SEPA 1901 in providing a basis for the 
Australian courts to inquire into the human rights of the person further along 
the backed-warrant procedure. There is nothing comparable to the SEPA 
1901  in New Zealand.  Moreover, comity does not apply to the SEPA 1901, 
yet the SEPA 1901 has been influential in shaping an interpretation of s 
34(2) of the 1988 (Cth) Act.  One problem for the presumption of similarity 
underpinning comity is that under the SEPA 1901 matters considered by the 
courts include inter alia, the likelihood of conviction and prison conditions 
in the requesting state. These matters are downstream in the backed-warrant 
procedure and are simply not considered by New Zealand courts because of 
the unchallenged assumption of comity and its underpinning principle of 
similarity and trustworthiness. 
 
In practise, as we shall see, s 34(2) of the 1988 (Cth) Act has led the Australian 
courts to breach the comity doctrine, creating significant delays in processing 
extradition requests to New Zealand. This raises the important question of whether 
the backed-warrant procedure under the new Act and therefore, subject to the new 
unjust and oppressive provision, will follow the same trend as Australia. If it does, 
the new Act is likely to give less weight to the principle of comity in favour of the 
liberty interests of the person.  It is argued that this is a better approach in respect 
of protecting the liberty interests of the person sought for surrender.  Consequently, 
the importance of considering human rights grounds will be set at a level similar to 
that of its Australian counter-part under s 34(2).   
 
On the other hand, the Commission is unlikely to have intended such a broad 
provision to cover cases in which the ability of Australia’s legal system to guarantee 
a fair trial is called into question. Against the option of a narrower provision, the 
Commission viewed that the “broadly framed ground builds necessary flexibility 
into the Bill to ensure that the New Zealand authorities can refuse to extradite in 
appropriate cases.”511  
 
                                                          
511 Report, above n 1, at 194. 
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Procedurally, the Commission anticipates that the delays in having grounds for 
refusal unsuccessfully raised, will be circumvented by having these grounds 
considered by the Court at the extradition hearing, after having been raised by the 
respondent at the Issues Conference.512  In context of the backed-warrant procedure, 
the impact of the Issues Conference on the new unjust and oppressive provision, 
depends on the accuracy of the suggestion made by the Commission that it is 
“unlikely that grounds for refusal arguments would succeed in the case of an 
approved country, due to the nature and values of that country’s criminal justice 
system.”513 It is argued that viewed in this way, the proposed Issues Conference 
mechanism has degraded the Commission’s new scepticism by allowing comity to 
prevail.   
 
Illustrative of the tendency to place too much emphasis on comity is the Australian 
Federal Court decision Moloney & Garchow v New Zealand (Moloney – Federal 
Court)514 and the impact that decision had on the New Zealand High Court bail 
decision in R v PGD515 where the appellant had been surrendered from Australia to 
face historic sexual abuse charges in New Zealand.516  Similar to Moloney – Federal 
Court the two accused were subject to a request for surrender to New Zealand to 
face trial on an allegation of historic sex abuse. The accused succeeded on appeal 
against the magistrate’s finding that there were no grounds established that made it 
unjust or oppressive to surrender the accused.  
 
The quality of the trial that the accused might face, formed part of the Court’s 
assessment in determining pursuant to s 34(2) that ‘for any other reason’ it would 
be unjust or oppressive to surrender the accused to New Zealand.  In the view of 
Madgwick J, a fair trial was not possible because on account of delay, it would be 
unjust to surrender the accused. The nub of the decision, turned on what Madgwick 
J perceived was a disparity between New Zealand and Australia in the mandatory 
requirement of a Judge to warn a jury of the difficulties an accused faces in 
defending historic sexual assault allegations. The requirement Madgwick J was 
referring to, was based upon the approach in Longman v R, known as the “Longman 
                                                          
512 Report, above n 1, at [7.12]. 
513 Issues Paper, above n 1, at [8.137]–[8.138]; and Report, above n 1, at [7.30]. 
514 Moloney – Federal Court, above n 421. 
515 R v PGD HC Wellington CRI-2005-085-5692 24, 28 April 2006.   
516 At [14]-[15].   
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warning”.517  This mandatory requirement was said to contrast with the New 
Zealand position that does not accept the directions required by the Longman 
warning.518  
 
Madgwick J also considered differences in “cross-admissibility” between Australia 
and New Zealand, because unlike in New Zealand, in Australia, any trial for sexual 
offences involving multiple complainants would most likely be severed unless the 
evidence of each complainant was admissible as part of the case in relation to the 
other complainants.519   
 
After examining the decision of the primary judge in Moloney – Federal Court, 
Ronald Young J in R v PGD, accepted the submission that the chance of a second 
request for surrender succeeding was low, because of differences perceived by the 
Australian judiciary in the way New Zealand law governs warning juries in the 
context of historic sex abuse cases.520   
 
Although Ronald J challenged the soundness of that reasoning,521 it is important to 
note, for the purposes of questioning the trustworthiness assumed to exist between 
New Zealand and Australia, that the perceived lack of parity in the legal system 
between Australia and New Zealand significantly influenced the outcome of the 
bail decision for the applicant.522 
 
What Ronald J did not have, however, was the advantage of the decision in October 
2006 by the Full Bench of the Full Court (Moloney – Full Court).  The Full Bench 
of the Full Court held that it was not established that it would be unjust to return the 
respondents to New Zealand.523 Accordingly, the magistrate’s decision to order 
release of the accused was quashed and instead, their surrender to New Zealand was 
ordered and costs awarded against them.524   
 
                                                          
517 Longman v R (1989) 168 CLR 79. 
518 At [11]. See Moloney – Full Court, above n 186; and Moloney – Federal Court, above n 421. 
519 Moloney – Full Court, above n 186, at [11]. 
520 At [11]-[12]. 
521 R v PGD, above n 515, at [13]. 
522 At [11]. 
523 At [231], [233]-[235]. 
524 Subsequent to the Full Court decision the Federal Court in New Zealand v Moloney [2006] 
FCA 1363, dismissed the accused’s application to stay the orders of the Full Court.  
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In terms of the Longman warning, the Full Bench of the Full Court was not 
persuaded that disparity between its requirement in Australia and the flexible 
approach towards it in New Zealand was as significant as the accused (respondents) 
contended.525  Particular emphasis was given to the recognition that New Zealand 
courts share a mutual objective in ensuring a fair trial, which is supported by 
provisions of the NZBORA as laid down in R v M.526 The Court took the view that 
Madgwick J had erred in law by giving too much weight to the need for a Longman 
warning to be given in assessing whether the accused could receive a fair trial in 
New Zealand.527   
 
The assumption that any trial in New Zealand will be fair was reinforced in the 
following passages:528 
 
[36] As has been seen, New Zealand has long been equated, for extradition 
purposes, with the Australian States and Territories. The fact that the 
backing of warrants, without more, is regarded as sufficient, itself 
demonstrates confidence in the integrity of the New Zealand criminal 
justice system. 
[37] Even apart from the special arrangements that govern extradition from 
Australia to New Zealand, the close relationship between our two 
countries, and the respect and high regard with which New Zealand courts 
are held in Australia, would support an assumption of fairness. Section 
34(2) must be understood in the light of that assumption. 
 
However, the reality that in practise there are exceptions to the assumption of there 
being a fair trial in New Zealand limits the impact of the Full Court’s attempt to re-
settle the trustworthiness doctrine.  In Bannister v New Zealand (Bannister) the 
Court refused to surrender the accused to New Zealand based upon procedural 
disparity between New Zealand and Australia in relation to sexual offending 
charges.529 Because New Zealand sought the extradition of the accused to face trial 
                                                          
525 At [219]. 
526  R v M unreported, CA187/95, 13 November 1995, cited favourably. 
527 Moloney – Full Court, above n 186, at [222], [226]. 
528 Moloney – Full Court, above n 186. These passages have been cited favourably in subsequent 
decisions. For instance Newman v New Zealand [2011] QSC 257at [9]. See also M (M) v United 
States of America [2015] SCC 62, 2015 CSC 62 at [119]-[120]. 
529 Bannister, above n 507. 
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on representative charges, a situation the Australian High Court considered had 
previously given rise to a risk of miscarriage of justice, the Court concluded “that 
it would be unjust, within the meaning of s 34(2), to surrender the respondent to 
New Zealand to face trial on such charges.530 It should be noted that Bannister was 
influential in the Moloney litigation531 and although, the Full Court determined that 
Madgwick J failed to apply the ratio in Bannister correctly to the facts of the case,532 
the Full Court rejected New Zealand’s contention that Bannister should be 
overruled.533   
 
To the extent that it found the judge of first instance erred in applying Bannister 
and Longman, the Full Court at least in part, re-settled the trustworthiness doctrine.  
Four years later, the issue of comity was revisited in New Zealand v Johnston 
(Johnston – Federal Court).534 In that case the Full Court overruled the primary 
judge in refusing to surrender the accused to New Zealand on the basis that 
surrender would be unjust. What this indicates is a tendency for the lower-courts of 
Australia to adopt a less restrictive view of comity as a determining factor in 
surrender than is appropriate. The trustworthiness doctrine is not settled because 
such breaches of comity observed in the lower appellate courts of Australia only 
surface on appeal. 
 
6.4.2.2  Hidden evidential threshold under the “interests of justice” limb 
Another breach of comity by Australia relates to one qualification given to a 
prohibition against consideration of the strength of the case against the person 
sought for surrender to New Zealand.535 This exception is triggered under s 34(2) 
based upon the “unjust or oppressive” limb.  If for instance the requested person 
can show that there is no evidence to support the charge, or that there are other 
reasons why the prosecution cannot succeed, the court is likely to conclude that the 
accusation was not made in good faith or in the interests of justice, within the 
meaning of s 34(2)(b) and that the surrender of the person would be unjust or 
                                                          
530 At [13].  
531 At [129]. 
532 Moloney – Full Court, above n 186, at [202]-[204]. 
533 At [132], [139]. 
534 Johnston – Federal Court, above n 534. 
535  Extradition Act 1988 (Cth), s 34(4). This provision corresponds to s 45(5) of the 1991 Act 
(NZ). See Moloney – Full Court, above n 186, at [33]. 
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oppressive.536 This exception was discussed by the Full Court in Moloney as being 
“… the sole qualification to the rule that courts of the requested state are not 
concerned with the strength of the case against the accused…” .537 The origins of 
this exception have been traced to the SEPA 1901 as explained above.  In 
Kenneally, the Full Court said:538 
 
The introduction into the Act of the expression ‘for any other reason’ it 
would be unjust, oppressive or too severe a punishment’ avoids the 
necessity to construe s 34(2)(b) in such a way as to cover the situation 
where there is a hopeless case, but no evidence of any collateral purpose 
or lack of bona fides.  
 
The effect of this approach under Part III of the 1966 Act may be seen in numerous 
cases dealing with surrender of the requested person from Australia to New 
Zealand.539 These cases reflect the willingness of the Australian judiciary to address 
a submission of injustice or oppression based upon the proposition that there is little 
likelihood of the requesting State ultimately securing a conviction for the offence, 
or that the allegations against the accused were “wholly misconceived”, that they 
“could not be possibly right” and that it was “demonstrably clear that the 
proceedings could have no foundation at all”.540 These expressions were derived 
from Willoughby v Eland and Bates v McDonald.541 Moreover, the Australian 
judiciary consider that the expression “or for any other reason, it would be unjust, 
oppressive or too severe a punishment” under s 34(2) of the 1988 (Cth) Act should 
be construed in accordance with various cases determined under the SEPA 1901.542 
 
                                                          
536 At [28]. Referring to the Magistrate’s decision. See Bates v McDonald [1985] 2 NSWLR 89 at 
[102]; and Binge v Bennett (1988) 13 NSLWR 578 at 585. 
537 Moloney – Full Court, above n 186, at [52]-[59], [64]. The test for the prima facie exception 
was developed in cases that applied to extradition within Australia, under the SEPA 1901 and 
applied to extradition requests from New Zealand under s 27 of the Extradition (Commonwealth 
Countries) Act 1966 (Cth). See further Ex parte Klumper (1966) 86 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 142. 
538 Kenneally – Full Court, above n 507, at [46]-[47]. 
539 Bates, above n 536, at 95,100 and 102. 
540 At 95. Considered in Moloney – Full Court, above n 186, at [59]. 
541 Willoughby v Eland (1985) 79 FLR 130 at 134; and Bates, above n 536, at 95. 
542 For example Ex parte Klumper; Re Services and Execution of Process Act (1966) 86 WN (Pt 1) 
(NSW) 142; Rider v Champness [1971] VR 239; Re Alstergren & Nosworthy [1947] VLR 23; and 




Although a finding of injustice or oppression under this exception is not treated 
lightly,543 the preparedness of the judiciary to pay consideration to the standard of 
evidence against the requested person places Australia in direct conflict with the 
concept of comity as described by the Commission:544  
 
The interest in comity leads to extradition proceedings that show respect 
for the criminal proceedings of the requesting state. This can be achieved, 
for instance, through an approach that removes or reduces the requested 
country’s inquiry into the case against the person by making the extradition 
hearing more akin to a preliminary hearing than a full trial or by relaxing 
admissibility of evidence standards for foreign evidence in extradition 
hearings. 
 
Bates v McDonald was an appeal against a magistrate’s order for surrender from 
Australia to New Zealand under the 1966 Act, prior to the 1985 amendment to s 27 
of the 1966 Act took effect. In that case, the requested person had absconded to 
Australia from New Zealand while on bail in relation to trial proceedings for drug 
offences. The New South Wales Court of Appeal held that under s 27(b) of the 1966 
Act, the only issue was whether the accusation against the appellant was “wholly 
misconceived” or could not “possibly be right”.545 Contrary to there being no prima 
facie requirement, the Court held that it may examine the depositions of criminal 
proceedings in New Zealand, albeit, for the purpose of ensuring that a request for 
surrender was not made for an improper purpose, particularly in regard to s 27(b) 
and not for the purpose of adjudicating disputed questions of fact or law.546 After 
examining the depositions and evidence produced before the Court, the appellant 
failed to establish under s 27(b) of the 1966 Act that the accusation was not made 
in good faith of in the interests of justice.547 Kirby P narrowed the issue of injustice 
                                                          
543 Moloney - Full Court, above n 186, at [35]. See also Kenneally - Full Court above n 507, at 
[55].  
544 Report, above n 1, at [7.41]. 
545 Bates, above n 536.  See Kirby P at 95; and Samuels JA at 100 and McHugh JA at 104. Cited in 
Moloney – Full Court, above n 186, at [60]. 
546 Bates, above n 536, at 100. See Willoughby v Eland (1985) 79 FLR 130 at 151-152 followed. 
But see Daemar v Parker (1975) 45 FLR 405 [Daemar] at 409. Yelham J considered that unlike 
Part II of the Act there is no provision in Part III corresponding to s 17 of the Service and 
Execution of Process Act 1901, that allows the powers of the magistrate and of the court to 
examine whether there was any evidence sufficient to justify an order for committal.   
547 Bates, above n 536. 
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or oppression to where “there were no scintilla of evidence”.548 In this sense, there 
is a standard of evidence applicable to Australia’s backed-warrant procedure, albeit 
an extremely low one.  
 
Not all cases under the 1966 Act have shown uniformity of opinion as to whether 
an accusation would not be “in the interests of justice” if it was made to appear 
beyond argument that no case could be made out.549 Notwithstanding concern about 
the evidence relating to the charge against the accused sought for extradition to New 
Zealand, Yelham J in Daemar v Parker (Daemar) believed that the s 27(b) 
“interests of justice” exception precluded a magistrate to refuse surrender in a case 
in which it appeared that the prosecution must fail.550 In contrast, Hope JA in 
Willoughby v Eland expressed a contrary view.551   
 
The conclusion of Yelham J in Daemar, was largely based upon his examination of 
the SEPA 1901 (repealed) relating to interstate extradition, which is apparently 
regarded as analogous to the backed-warrant procedure under Part III in regard to 
New Zealand. In particular, s 18(6)(b) of the SEPA 1901 allowed for considerable 
flexibility (which contained a provision, “for any other reason, it would be 
oppressive to return the person” under s 18(6)(c)) and  extensive evaluation of the 
evidence in order to prove an abuse of process for the purpose of establishing 
whether the accusation was “not…made in good faith or in the interests of 
justice”.552 Finding that there was a corresponding provision under Part II but not 
Part III of the 1966 Act, Yelham J, expressed a need for legislative change to bring 
Part III into line with s 18(6)(b) of the SEPA 1901.553  
 
In Narain, Wilcox and Jackson JJ considered that the insertion in s 27, by the 1985 
amendments, of a reference to “or for any other reason” reconciled these two 
                                                          
548 Bates, above n 536. 
549 Bates, above n 536, at 102. 
550  Daemar, above n 546, at 409. See Narain, above n 430.  
551 Willoughby v Eland 79 FLR 130 at 134-135. Followed in Bates, above n 536. 
552 Daemar, above n 546, at 407. Referring to Aston v Irvine (1955) 92 CLR 353 at 366; [1955] 
ALR 890 at 894. The High Court in dealing with an application under s 18 subsection (6) of the 
Service and Execution of Process Act 1901 said: "It would be unjust or oppressive to return the 
accused to Adelaide if the facts as they are alleged or appear make it clear that there was no 
indictable conspiracy.”  See also Ex parte Klumper (1966) 86 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 142. Section 
18(6)(b) corresponds with s 19 of the Fugitive Offenders Act 1881 (UK). 
553 Daemar, above n 546, at 411.   
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sections.554 Consequently, the expression “or for any other reason” has been 
construed in accord with a long line of authority dealing with an application under 
the SEPA 1901.555 In Narain, a Full Court of the Federal Court reinstated a 
surrender order under the amended 1966 Act, which had been set aside by the 
primary judge. In that case, Wilcox and Jackson JJ noted that a court is justified in 
refusing extradition “where it positively finds that the offence was not 
committed”.556 In a statement of some significance to the exception of no evidential 
threshold, it was held:557  
 
…if the material before the magistrate had positively demonstrated, in 
relation to either charge, that the offence had not been committed, it would 
have been correct to hold that it would be unjust and oppressive to 
surrender the appellant on that charge. But this was not the case.  
 
The same evidential threshold approach has been employed successfully under the 
1988 (Cth) Act, in Kenneally v New Zealand (Kenneally) based on it being unjust 
to surrender the accused. In that case, the requested person was sought for surrender 
from Australia to New Zealand in relation to drug offences.  Kenneally then 
appealed to the Supreme Court of NSW against the decision of the magistrate to 
order his surrender. In the review proceedings, the primary judge allowed evidence 
from the respondent (New Zealand) to be adduced in support of its application for 
Kenneally’s surrender.  That being decided, the evidence adduced consisted of 
affidavit evidence from the New Zealand and Australian Police of which had 
annexed two versions of a transcript of intercepted conversations as well as audio 
discs.  
 
The primary grounds of appeal concerned the contention that the respondent’s (New 
Zealand) accusations against him were not made in the “interests of justice”.558 
Having considered the evidence before him, the primary judge dismissed the 
application for review on two bases. First, that it was not for an Australian 
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magistrate, or judge on review to decide which version of the transcript of the 
intercepted conversation was the more accurate.559Second, it could not be assumed 
that there was no other evidence available to support the charges. In regard to that 
point, the primary judge distinguished Bates where there had been committal 
proceedings.  
 
Kenneally then appealed to the Full Court of Federal Court of Australia560 against 
the decision of the primary judge. The Full Court held that the evidence upon which 
New Zealand authorities based its charges against the requested person, fell 
substantially below the prima facie standard. The Full Court said:561 
 
…where the Court is satisfied, upon all of the evidence before it, that the 
evidence taken as its highest for the prosecution fails to disclose a prima 
facie case, and it is clear that it has available to it no other evidence of any 
significance, the words of s 34(2) suggest that extradition should be 
refused. 
 
In finding that the primary judge had erred in not being prepared to assume that 
there was no other evidence, apart from the taped conversation, the Full Court 
reasoned that the standard of proof which must be met is the civil standard only. 
Although it has been described as an unusual case,562Kenneally remains current 
authority for there being an exception to the no evidence requirement.563  In accord 
with the test enunciated in Bates, a Full Court determined that it would be “unjust” 
for the appellant to be surrendered to New Zealand.564 
 
In contrast, the Full Court in New Zealand v Johnston (Johnston – Full Court) was 
led into making a comment about the no evidence approach when determining that 
the primary judge had erred in concluding that delay had rendered the accused’s 
trial unfair because his reasons were speculative as to how the delay might prejudice 
the accused’s trial.565 The Full Court noted that the approach taken by the primary 
                                                          
559 Kenneally, above n 507, at [38]. 
560 Kenneally v New Zealand [1991] FCA 1320.  
561 Kenneally- Full Court, above n 507, at [56]. 
562 At [79]. 
563 Kenneally, above n 507.  
564 In Moloney – Full Court, above n 186, at [79]. 
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judge elevated speculation into fact.566 It also noted the tendency for counsel for the 
first respondent to argue that the Full Court should assess the strength of the 
prosecution’s case, and, having done so, should conclude that it is hopeless or so 
weak that it would be unjust to surrender the first respondent to New Zealand in 
order to meet that case.567 In response, the Full Court said:568  
 
This Court is not permitted to make this kind of assessment of the 
prosecution case. It has not been put that the case has some fatal flaw or 
that it is clearly bound to fail. What was put by the first respondent's 
advocate was that, having regard to the matters referred to at [133] above, 
the case would not succeed. That conclusion is based upon an assessment 
of the facts which is an assessment for the New Zealand courts to make, 
not this Court. 
 
Despite what is emphasised by the Full Court in Moloney, that judicial intervention 
relating to evidence and strength of prosecution case in extradition of the requested 
person should only occur in the most exceptional of circumstances,569 the lower 
court decision in Johnston – Full Court, exemplifies that the concept of comity has 
not been properly understood and applied, let alone reflects an embodiment of 
reciprocity. 
 
In principle the evidential threshold exception could be invoked under the “unjust 
or oppressive” limb of s 8(1) of the 1999 Act in context of either a judicial discretion 
under s 45(4) or referral to the minister under s (48)(4)(a)(ii). Support for this 
proposition is found in the recent Court of Appeal decision in Mercer -2016 appeal 
where the Court considered Moloney – Full Court.570 In context of the backed- 
warrant procedure under the 1881 Act, Justice Salmond, in Re Murray Ross, 
conceded that it was conceivable to find cases in which: 
 
 . . . the innocence of the accused is so clearly demonstrated as to show that 
 his return is not being asked for in good faith and in the interests of justice; 
 in such a case the power of discharge under s 19 may be properly 
                                                          
566 Johnston – Full Court, above n 186, at [120], [122]. 
567 At [133]. 
568 At [134]. 
569 Moloney – Full Court, above n 186. 
570 Mercer – Court of Appeal, above n 185, at [50]. 
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 exercised in accordance with the terms of that section. But the present is 
 not a case of that description.571 
 
Some would argue that the evidential threshold approach would not succeed in the 
New Zealand courts because of comparatively stricter adherence to comity. Further, 
the tendency of the lower courts in Australia allowing comity to play a less 
restrictive approach in deciding whether or not to refuse surrender appears to be 
driven by the analogy drawn between backing of warrants under s 18 of the SEPA 
1901 and backing of warrants in relation to New Zealand under Part 3 of the 1988 
(Cth) Act.572 Judicial interpretation of one enactment that relies upon another in this 
way, undermines the whole procedure of backing of warrants.573 Notwithstanding 
this practise, the Australian cases do illustrate that there is a tendency to apply more 
substantive conditions to the backing-of-warrants in Australia when considering 
grounds for refusal than would be suggested by rigid adherence to comity. It is 
possible that under the Commission’s introduction of a broader unjust or oppressive 
provision, the judiciary may be willing to follow this practise, particularly on the 
basis of reciprocity in how warrants are treated.    
 
6.4.3  Summary 
The scope of s 34(2) under the 1988 (Cth) Act allows the Australian judiciary to 
engage in a wide-ranging consideration of the merits, or otherwise, of the New 
Zealand criminal justice system.574 On the one hand, there is merit in introducing 
broader grounds for refusing surrender from a human rights point of view. On the 
other, it is contestable whether the Issues Conference and NIP are adequate 
measures to obviate risking harm to the expediency of the backed-warrant 
procedure, if say the New Zealand judiciary showed a willingness to apply the 
exception to the no evidence requirement as recognised by Australian authorities.   
 
Unsurprisingly, the scope of s 34(2), has resulted in a significant number of 
impediments to surrender of persons from Australia to New Zealand in regard to 
allegations of serious offences.  That being said, the above authorities show that the 
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(Cth) Act. See Moloney – Full Court, above n 186; Narain, above n 430; and Johnston – Full 
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judicial approach in Australia towards s 34(2) has not been a unified one.  In 
general, the lower courts have allowed comity to play a less restrictive approach in 
determining grounds for surrender under s 34(2). It is concerning that this breach 
of comity has not been determined until it reaches the higher appellate courts.  
Consequently, these findings undermine the comity/trustworthiness doctrine upon 
which the Commission’s rationale relies.  
 
6.5 Further simplification of the backed-warrant procedure 
As part of the aim to further simplify the backed-warrant procedure, the 
Commission in its Issues Paper proposed treating Australia even more “favourably” 
by placing it in a category of its own under the new Act.575  In deciding whether 
differentiation from other categories of countries is necessary, the Law 
Commissioner considered: 576 
 
(a)  that most extradition traffic is with Australia; 
(b)  Australia is a country with a similar legal system to New  
  Zealand; 
(c)  a high degree of trust held by New Zealand in Australia’s 
legal system; and 
(d)  New Zealand is singled out as being a special category 
under the 1988 Act. 
 
For these reasons, the Commission entertained the possibility of removing the 
requirement of speciality, a step which acknowledges what are purportedly more 
relaxed provisions under Part 3 of the Australian Extradition Act 1988 (Cth)  in 
regard to New Zealand.577  
 
The possibility of Australia not having to meet the “extradition offence” test is more 
controversial.578 The Commission highlighted the observation that Australia is 
more relaxed towards extradition requests from New Zealand in not requiring there 
to be inter alia a seriousness threshold, double criminality or speciality.579  As to 
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the seriousness threshold, the Commission has not recommended any change to Part 
4, compared to the increase proposed under the standard procedure. The 
Commission has, however, recommended removing the requirement for Australia 
to establish double criminality and as mentioned earlier, removal of the requirement 
of Australia to comply with speciality.580  
  
The case of Radhi v New Zealand Police was highlighted by the Commission as an 
illustration of the difficulties encountered in trying to meet the double criminality 
requirement.581 That case involved an extradition request from Australia for Radhi 
who was sought in relation to an alleged people-smuggling offence. Radhi appealed 
to the High Court against the DCJ decision that he was eligible for surrender on the 
grounds that the offence for which extradition was based, was not an offence in 
New Zealand under s 142(fa) of the Immigration Act 1987, when in October 2001, 
the offence is alleged to have occurred.  Despite the broad approach relating to the 
conduct rule under s 5, the High Court determined that the relevant New Zealand 
offence at the time of the offending required the arrival in New Zealand of the 
persons being smuggled to flow from the accused’s conduct of wilfully assisting 
and aiding before the offence was complete.582 It is relevant that the offence under 
s 232A of the Migration Act for which Radhi was sought, did not require arrival 
into Australia of illegal immigrants, and that was not alleged by the AFP.583 
Accordingly, the High Court found in favour of Radhi, that at the relevant time, the 
conduct attributed to him did not constitute an offence in New Zealand and the 
requisite double criminality standard was not met. In 2014, the Court of Appeal, 
overturned the decision of the High Court on this point, finding instead, that Radhi’s 
conduct can be construed to fall within the relevant offence.584  
 
In anticipation of further cases like Radhi, which it viewed as creating unnecessary 
impediment to extradition through the difficulties identified with an interpretation 
                                                          
580 Report, above n 12, at [7.17]. See draft Bill cl 123(3). 
581 Radhi v New Zealand Police [2013] NZHC 163; and Issues Paper, above n 1, at [5.19]. 
582 Police v Radhi [2014] NZCA 327 at [15].  
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of s 5, the Commission has contemplated further widening the conduct rule.585 
Section 4 and 5 of the 1999 Act, reflect a modern approach in requiring that the 
conduct in question to be either in total or in part punishable under the laws of both 
the requesting and requested state (“the conduct rule”).586 This contrasts with the 
traditional, restrictive approach that required substantial correspondence between 
the offences in each country.587 The broader view accords with the London Scheme 
and the United Nations Model Treaty on Extradition.588  
 
It is contestable, whether there is a sound basis for removing the requirement for 
Australia to establish double criminality.589  For example, the criminalisation of 
cartels in Australia is problematic because currently and somewhat controversially, 
it remains for New Zealand in the civil jurisdiction.590  The fact that Australia 
operates a dual civil and criminal system to regulate cartel conduct, weakens the 
principled basis for the removal of the double criminality requirement in regard to 
Australia. In this case, the new unjust or oppressive provision invoked on the 
grounds of being a trivial matter, is of no assistance to the person, because criminal 
sanction for cartel conduct includes up to 10-years imprisonment for individuals 
found to have committed a cartel offence.591  
 
My principal criticism of the Commission’s rationale for relaxing these restrictions, 
however, relates to Australia’s purported trustworthiness.592   In the view of the 
Commission, a country’s trustworthiness is measured according to there being: 
reciprocity; a human rights record; membership of international schemes such as 
the London Scheme; assurances as to there being safeguards in place to guard 
against breaches of fundamental restrictions on extradition; and whether the wider 
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criminal investigation and prosecution systems include adequate checks and 
balances.593 These factors are said to assist in establishing the criteria by which 
countries may fall into a more simplified backed-warrant category.  Another 
proposition is that trustworthiness is reflected in what the Commission regards as 
New Zealand’s secure Trans-Tasman relationship, evidenced in the Trans-Tasman 
Proceedings Act 2010.  Specifically, the Commission cited the formal 
acknowledgement given of “each Party’s confidence in the judicial and regulatory 
institutions of the other Party.”594 However that statement is given in the context of 
private international law and different considerations arguably apply in that legal 
context which has a civil rather than criminal underpinning.595  
 
Further, the trustworthiness doctrine as one of the factors underpinning the 
argument for further simplifying the backed-warrant procedure was substantially 
undermined in the Samson and Bennett litigation when in the latter case, the Court 
of Appeal recognised that proceedings against Bennett would amount to an abuse 
of process, given the circumstances in which his surrender had been achieved.596  
As to human rights, Australia has shown a poor track record and has no enforced 
bill of rights legislation.597  
 
There are loose criteria for surrender in some areas of the Australian backed- 
warrant procedure, giving the appearance of strong adherence to the principle of 
comity. However, as the above analysis of case law dealing with s 34(2) under the 
1988 (Cth) Act reveals, there are even tighter safeguards in place to protect the 
liberty interests of the person than would seem proportionate to the importance of 
comity.  In other words, the Commission’s representation of the comparatively 
more ‘matey’ extradition process to New Zealand is a fiction, because it is based 
upon unchallenged assumptions about Australia’s adherence to comity.  It is further 
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argued, that the aim to improve efficiency in the backed-warrant procedure, relies 
on the assumption that the backed-warrant procedure suffers the same complex and 
convoluted issues identified in the standard procedure.598  
 
6.6 Implementation of extradition-appropriate NZBORA provisions 
Since its passing, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (“the NZBORA”) and 
its relationship to extradition proceedings has attracted considerable judicial 
attention. The applicability of the NZBORA to extradition proceedings has been 
discussed under three main headings: (a) extraterritorial application; (b) criminal 
process rights (namely ss 24-25); and (c) classification of extradition proceedings. 
The primary issue for extradition proceedings, is the way some provisions of the 
NZBORA are aimed at protecting persons charged with an offence while others are 
aimed at more general rights. 
In relation to the backed-warrant procedure, it is helpful to refer to relevant case 
law, particularly, the Supreme Court ruling in Dotcom v The United States of 
America (Dotcom), the position of the Law Commission and comparative review 
with overseas jurisprudence.599   What is evident from this analysis, is that there has 
been little, if any, focus on how the issues identified with the NZBORA might differ 
in respect to the backed-warrant procedure, particularly in regard to Australia. 
Instead, the Commission’s review appears to be overshadowed by the issues raised 
in the Dotcom litigation.   It is important to note that the Dotcom litigation addressed 
the issue of the NZBORA specifically in regard to the standard procedure. I will 
show that there are compelling reasons why some of the issues raised in Dotcom 
may be decided differently in context of the backed-warrant procedure.  
 
6.6.1 Natural justice (s 27 of the NZBORA) 
Section 27 of the NZBORA concerns the right to fundamental principles of justice, 
including the person’s liberty and freedom. Having considered these key values 
underpinning s 27, the Supreme Court in Dotcom held that s 27 of the NZBORA is 
applicable to extradition proceedings.600 It emphasised the importance of ensuring 
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that the content of natural justice be properly contextualised in the extradition 
setting.601 Consequently, absence of a prima facie requirement under the Part 4 
backed-warrant procedure, limits the extent to which s 27 is applicable, precluding 
the requested person from adducing evidence otherwise permissible under the 
standard procedure. Instead, its application underpins the concept of unjust and 
oppressive as it appears in s 19 of the 1881 Act (corresponding to s 8(1) of the 1991 
Act).602  Thus, notwithstanding the narrow scope of the discretionary power under 
s 8(1), it is likely that s 27 affords some protection to the accused under the Part 4, 
of the backed-warrant procedure.  
 
To the extent that s 27 of the NZBORA may apply to the requested person in 
extradition proceedings, the courts approach in the backed-warrant procedure has 
been fairly consistent with Dotcom.603  These cases are considered below.  
 
6.6.1.1  Natural justice in context of the backed-warrant procedure 
Addressing natural justice, the Court in Johnstone v Commonwealth of Australia, 
viewed the applicability of NZBORA as helpful in assisting whether “it would be 
"unjust" or "oppressive" in terms of s 19 of the 1881 Act, to return the prisoner or 
whether an order should be denied because the Court's process has been abused”.604  
Subsequently, the decision in Franic v Wilson clarified that the only bearing the 
NZBORA was found to have on the nature of submissions for the appellant, was s 
27, in relation to a hearing under Part II of the 1881 Act with reference to section 
19.605  Doogue J, sitting at the High Court, held that the DCJ was wrong in refusing 
the accused an application for adjournment of the proceedings in order to prepare a 
proper defence.  Having considered Australian and New Zealand authorities,606 
Doogue J made an interpretation of s 19, consistent with the applicability of s 27 
and the right to obtain adequate particulars in being able to lead evidence.  Doogue 
J was careful to differentiate an interpretation of s 19 from an interpretation of the 
Part II procedure, which like s 45 of Part 4 under the 1999 Act, precludes the 
                                                          
601 At [118], [120] per McGrath J and Blanchard J. 
602 Franic v Wilson, above n 69. 
603 Dotcom v United States of America, above n 599, at [184].   
604 Johnstone v Commonwealth of Australia HC Christchurch A 266-98, 9 March 1999 
[Johnstone].   
605 Franic v Wilson, above n 69, at 320. 
606 Franic v Wilson, above n 69. For example, Callahan v Superintendent of Mt Eden Prison 
[1992] 1 NZLR 541; and Narain, above n 427. 
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accused from adducing evidence and would be inconsistent with the applicability 
of s 27.607  
 
This conclusion is consistent with the ruling in Dotcom, that the content of the right 
to natural justice is contextual.608 The relationship statutory context and subject 
matter have to s 27 was also highlighted in McGrath when the Court accepted that 
s 27 is applicable to the minister’s consideration of the grounds for surrender, under 
s 30 of the 1999 Act.609 Strangely, the interpretation of s 27 in the Dotcom decision, 
was not considered by Mander J in McGrath.  In a step that was telling of the 
judicial gap in determining how extradition cases should be classified (discussed 
below), Mander J looked to authorities solely in the civil jurisdiction.610  
 
6.6.2  Criminal process rights 
Compared to more general rights, there are other NZBORA rights with dubious 
application to extradition, particularly those relating to the charging of an offence, 
namely ss 24-25.611  Based on the rationale that the NZBORA contemplates that 
these due process rights apply only to criminal trials in New Zealand, the defendants 
in extradition proceedings accused of an overseas offence, do not enjoy these 
protections. This is the current position in New Zealand arising from the majority 
ruling of the Supreme Court in Dotcom and one that is consistent with an earlier 
case decided by the High Court in Callahan v Superintendent of Mt Eden Prison.612  
 
6.6.3  Extraterritorial application of the NZBORA 
Another difficulty is the limited scope of the NZBORA to New Zealand officials 
pursuant to s 3. Section 3 provides: 
 
This Bill of Rights applies only to acts done— 
(a) by the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of the 
Government of New Zealand; or 
                                                          
607 Franic v Wilson, above n 69, at 322, line 23; and 323, line 32.  
608 Dotcom v United States of America, above n 599, at [50], [87], [120], [212], [281]. 
609 McGrath v Ministry of Justice [2015] NZAR 122 [Referral appeal decision] at [23]-[26]. 
610 McGrath, above n 609. For instance Webster v Auckland Harbour Board [1987] 2 NZLR 129 
(CA) at 132; Furnell v Whangarei High Schools Board [1973] 2 NZLR 705 (PC) at 718; and 
Daganayasi v Minister of Immigration [1980] 2 NZLR 130. 
611 Report, above n 1; Dotcom v The United States of America, above n 599. See also, with 
reference to s 18(1) of the NZBORA, Franic v Wilson, above n 69, at 321. 
612 Callahan, above n 585.  
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(b) by any person or body in the performance of any public function, 
power, or duty conferred or imposed on that person or body by or 
pursuant to law. 
 
 
This means that the provisions in the NZBORA have not extended their 
applicability outside of New Zealand, such as to Australia Police conduct in New 
Zealand.613  Nor has it extended the scope of s 3 to New Zealand Police conduct in 
Australia.614 In advance of the proposition that there needs to be a liberal 
interpretation of s 3, the Court of Appeal in Flickinger v Crown Colony of Hong 
Kong adopted observations of the Privy Council in Minister of Home Affairs v 
Fisher that the provisions of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (in that case s 
23(1)(c)) were to be construed generously so as to give individuals the full measure 
of the fundamental rights and freedoms referred to.615 In accord with that reasoning, 
it is argued that the NZBORA ought to apply to New Zealand Police conduct 
overseas. 
 
6.6.3.1 Generality of the Dotcom determination to the backed-warrant 
procedure 
In relation to cases dealing with the backed-warrant procedure with Australia, the 
situation regarding the extraterritorial effect of the NZBORA and criminal process 
rights is not as clear cut. It should be noted that Dotcom was considered in the 
context of standard extradition pursuant to Part 3 of the 1999 Act, which I suggest, 
limits its application. The authorities examined in reaching that decision were also 
subject to the standard extradition process, such as Callahan616 and Poon.617  
Absent of any comprehensive or clear direction of the ruling as it applies to the 
backed-warrant procedure, the issue remains open to question, whether decided in 
the context of the surrender process under Part 4, the Court may have approached 
                                                          
613 Johnstone, above n 65, at 11. 
614 R v Matthews (1994) 11 CRNZ 564. 
615 Cited in Plakas v Police, above n 152, at [9]. See Flickinger v Crown Colony of Hong Kong 
[1991] 1 NZLR 439. The Court adopted observations of the Privy Council in Minister of Home 
Affairs v Fisher [1980] AC 19, at 328-329. 
616 Callahan, above n 606. 
617 Poon v Commissioner of Police [2000] NZAR 70 (HC).  See also consideration of Canada v 
Schmidt [1987] 1 SCR 500. 
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the matter of extraterritorial application and criminal process rights of the 
NZBORA differently.   
This is primarily based on the rationale that human rights are at risk because there 
is no judicial supervision in the initial stages of the backing-of-warrant procedure, 
it being a police-to-police cooperation process.618  While it is indisputable that 
appropriate weight must be given to comity and its role in loosening the criteria for 
surrender to Australia, this, in my view, should not be interpreted to deny the 
requested person the protections of the NZBORA for Australian Police conduct on 
New Zealand soil.  
 
First, the inherent nature of surrendering a person to another country, let alone 
without establishing a prima facie case, is a serious matter because it interferes with 
the person’s liberty interests.619  Bennett and Samson are cases in point. These 
decisions illustrate the propensity for the Australian Police to abuse their authority 
in requiring New Zealand citizens to be removed to New Zealand.  There are no 
protections against similar conduct of Australian Police in New Zealand, leaving it 
open for Australian Police to act in a way that is dissonant with key values held by 
New Zealand, as reflected in the NZBORA. Two decisions of relevance decided 
under the 1881 Act, are given in support of this argument and illustrate another 
distinction with Dotcom in the sense of there being persuasive authority from the 
High Court for the extraterritoriality application and criminal process rights of the 
NZBORA, at least as far as Australia is concerned. Strictly speaking, the following 
authorities deal with BORA rights in the context of mutual legal assistance as 
opposed to extradition/backed-warrants. However the overlap between these 
procedures maintains its relevance.   
 
6.6.3.2  New Zealand Police Conduct in Australia 
In R v Matthews (Matthews), a New Zealand Detective was an observer in a party 
of Australian Police that attended the address of the accused for the purposes of 
executing a provisional warrant and search of Matthews’ house.  Matthews was 
later interviewed by the same detective for a charge of alleged sexual offending.620 
The accused was sought for extradition in relation to sexual offending alleged to 
                                                          
618 Bennett, above n 80; and Samson, above n 453.  
619 Plakas v Police, above n 152, at [10]. In reference to submission by counsel for Plakas. 
620 Matthews, above n 614.  
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have occurred in New Zealand. The New Zealand High Court determined that 
Australian Federal officers executing a provisional arrest warrant and search 
warrant on Australian soil were not subject to the NZBORA, even though the 
purpose of the exercise related to a New Zealand crime. Nor was the New Zealand 
detective under any statutory power in Australia that might make him subject to the 
NZBORA.621  Although s 23 was not held to be an applicable right if the interview 
is taking place outside New Zealand, Tipping J viewed that “as a matter of fairness 
that a New Zealand police officer wishing to interview a suspect overseas, in 
circumstances de facto covered by s 23, should give the suspect Bill of Rights 
advice as if the interview were taking place in New Zealand.”622 This raises the 
issue of whether the Court has given s 23 of the NZBORA extraterritorial effect.  
 
It is, however, a less persuasive argument for its relevance to the backing-of-warrant 
procedure. In considering s 23(1)(b) (the right to consult and instruct a lawyer 
without delay and be informed of that right), Tipping J was careful to characterise 
the applicability of BORA rights of Matthews arising from an interview with New 
Zealand police for the purpose of prosecuting Matthews, as opposed to any 
extradition-related purpose.623   
 
6.6.3.3  Australian Police conduct in New Zealand 
Matthews was considered in Johnstone in regard to the applicability of the 
NZBORA to Australian Police conduct in New Zealand. Similar to Matthews, there 
was an interview (“the interview”) with an Australian detective, characterised as 
being for the purpose of investigating an alleged sexual offending against an 11 
year old boy, rather than for any purpose related to his surrender. On appeal the 
interview was one aspect to the contention that there had been unreasonable delays.  
The delay between the interview and in making the application for surrender of 
Johnstone was approximately two years.624   
 
Judge Chisholm at the New Zealand High Court held that an Australian detective 
conducting an interview in a New Zealand with the a person later sought for 
surrender to Australia in relation to charges alleging sexual offending, was not 
                                                          
621 At 1. 
622 At 567. 
623 At 566. 
624 Johnstone, above n 604, at 2. 
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subject to the NZBORA.625  His Honour reasoned that protection of BORA rights 
in this context will likely depend upon satisfying the Court that the Australian 
authority is “performing a public function, power or duty conferred or imposed on 
him by or pursuant to law” under s 3(b) of the NZBORA.626  On the facts, Judge 
Chisholm inferred that the Australian detective was “probably not performing a 
public function,”627Judge Chisholm’s decision reflects an unwillingness by the 
judiciary to place too liberal an interpretation on s 3 of the NZBORA, whereupon a 
broader interpretation might concur with the proposition that an Australian police 
officer is acting “officially” under New Zealand law. 
 
After examining the evidence relating to the interview with the Australian detective, 
Chisholm J, determined that even if the NZBORA was applicable in the present 
case, there was no prejudice to the accused in the sense of s 24 (a) (“shall be 
informed promptly and in detail of the nature and cause of the charge”) and s 24(c) 
(“shall have the right to consult and instruct a lawyer;”).628   In regard to the latter, 
Justice Chisholm held that whilst it would have been a breach of the NZBORA, His 
Honour determined there had been no specific prejudice.  Instead, Justice Chisholm 
accepted the submission by counsel for the respondent, (Commonwealth of 
Australia) that there had been no admissions or confessions and at the most an 
inconsistency which could be elevated to a lie.629  
 
A different approach is found in Matthews however.  Justice Tipping held that the 
NZBORA is a good indication of what is to be regarded as fair conduct on the part 
of those investigating New Zealand crimes overseas, including BORA advice as if 
the interview were taking place in New Zealand.  Assimilating that reasoning with 
the circumstances in Johnstone, it is contested that the NZBORA should at the very 
least, be regarded as a good indication of what is to be regarded as fair conduct on 
the part of those involved in facilitating the investigation of Australian crimes 
including BORA advice when the interview is taking place in New Zealand.   
 
                                                          
625 At 11. 
626 At 11. 
627 At 11. 
628 At 14. 
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In particular, Justice Tipping held that “if the suspect does wish to have legal advice 
the obtaining of that advice from a “lawyer” should be facilitated to the extent 
reasonably possible according to the circumstances prevailing.”  In the case of 
Johnstone, the provision of the suspect’s BORA rights, namely the right to a lawyer, 
could have been facilitated under far less complicated circumstances than in 
Matthews.  Instead, Justice Chisholm chose to focus on fairness in terms of any 
specific prejudice at trial resulting from being denied a lawyer whereas in Matthews 
the focus was fairness in all the particular circumstances. 
 
The extraterritoriality issue signifies another illustration of the difficulties that the 
Commissioner has shown in delineating between the standard and simplified 
procedure. In reference to the new proposed unjust and oppressive ground, the 
Commission stressed that the example given relating to fair trial concerns (covering 
abuse of process and delay) – discussed above, must be assessed with reference to 
the international minimum standards for a fair trial, not by directly applying the 
relevant provisions in the NZBORA as if the trial were to be conducted in New 
Zealand. It was further suggested by the Commission:630  
 
If we required all foreign trials to be conducted in the same manner that 
they would be conducted in New Zealand, then very few extraditions 
would ever occur. Legitimate differences need to be accommodated in 
criminal justice systems. Judges may find the concept of a “flagrant denial 
of a fair trial” from the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence a 
useful point of departure in considering this ground.  
 
Aside from the inconsistency this creates in recommending at the same time, that 
certain rights, including fair trial rights (ss 24 and 25) in the NZBORA apply to the 
surrender context (discussed below), what this overlooks is that New Zealand’s 
backed-warrant procedure with Australia hinges upon there being 
comity/trustworthiness and the underpinning recognition of legal and procedural 
similarities including, it is argued, respect for the same human rights standards. It 
follows, that applicability of the NZBORA to fair trial concerns under the backed-
                                                          
630 Report, above n 1, at 196. 
136 
 
warrant procedure, particularly in relation to Australia, ought to be treated as an 
exception to the decision by the majority of the Supreme Court in Dotcom.631  
 
Reference to ‘international minimum standards’ may be fitting in context of the 
standard procedure under the 1991 Act, that deals with heterogeneous political and 
legal systems.  For instance, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union is designed to function in heterogeneous political and legal systems across 
Europe.632 These rights inter alia, include the right to a fair trial.633  However, the 
Commission has not distinguished the standard from the backed-warrant procedure, 
particularly in relation to Australia, where the legal and political system is 
characterised by similarities rather than differences.   
 
Consideration of the applicability of the NZBORA, rather than “reference to 
international minimum standards for a fair trial”, in Johnstone and Matthews 
(discussed above), also supports this proposition. Further support may be drawn 
from the Australian Full Court in Moloney  (discussed above), that gave particular 
emphasis to the recognition that New Zealand courts share a mutual objective with 
Australia in ensuring a fair trial, supported by provisions of the NZBORA, namely 
ss 25(1)(a) and (f).634  
 
For the above reasons, it is considered that there is persuasive argument for the 
extraterritorial application of the NZBORA to Australian Police conduct in New 
Zealand including what might be properly classified as mutual legal assistance in 
context of investigating a crime for the purposes of the backing-of-warrant 
procedure. It is argued that the case for extra-territorial application of the NZBORA 




                                                          
631 Arguably, if it were in issue, the Dotcom decision suggests that the majority in the Supreme 
Court are likely to favour the trustworthiness /comity doctrine with Australia and rule against its 
extraterritorial application, let alone recognise any applicable criminal process rights.   
632 For further discussion on the adequacy of human rights provisions relating to the EAW, see 
Baker report, above n 41.   
633 Klimek, above n 323, at 59-60. 




6.6.4 Classification of Extradition Proceedings 
Another issue for the court’s consideration of the NZBORA in extradition cases is 
the contentious matter of how extradition proceedings are classified.635  The Law 
Commission recognises that assigning extradition proceedings to discrete 
categories of law, civil, criminal, international or domestic is not straightforward, 
and any delineation of the correct protections for the rights of the requested persons 
needs to take account of values from quite different areas of law.636  
 
In contrast, the Supreme Court in Dotcom, viewed the classification of extradition 
proceedings as less murky.637 Emphasising the importance of classification, the 
majority of the Supreme Court held that sections 24 and 25 of the NZBORA are 
framed to protect the rights of persons who are to be the subject of the criminal trial 
process, not the extradition process, which has a different limited purpose.638  In 
reaching that decision, the Court considered a string of authorities in the UK, 
European Commission and Court of Human Rights and Canada.639  
 
In Kirkwood v United Kingdom, it was held that while an extradition hearing 
involves a limited examination of the issue to be decided at trial, it does not 
constitute or form part of the process for determination of guilt or innocence.640  
According to this reasoning, the backing-of-warrant procedure is even more remote 
from criminal process rights than standard extradition because it does not seek to 
establish a prima facie standard of guilt.641  
 
The Court was further persuaded by Canadian authorities, that emphasise the 
criminal process rights under s 11 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
as confined to trials conducted by the Canadian government as opposed to those 
conducted by a foreign government in a foreign territory for offences under its 
law.642  The Court also considered and overruled Poon v Commissioner of Police 
                                                          
635 Issues paper, above n 1, at [1.28]. 
636 At [1.28]. 
637 Dotcom v The United States of America, above n 599. 
638 At [115]. 
639 At [108]-[115]. For instance Maaouia v France (2000) 33 EHRR 1037 (ECHR); and 
Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 494. 
640 Issues Paper, above n 1, at [4.7]. Referring to Kirkwood v United Kingdom (1984) 37 DR 158; 
and Pomiechowski v District Court of Legnica, Poland [2012] UKSC 20, [2012] 1 WLR 1604. 
641 See Dotcom v The United States of America, above n 599, at [115]. 
642 At [111] per McGrath J. 
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and the judgment of Baragwanath J, whose view of the Canadian case, Canada v 
Schmidt643 was aligned to the dissenting view of Wilson J, that the fugitive had been 
“charged with an offence” for the purposes of the Charter, the offences being those 
he was charged with in the overseas jurisdiction. 644  From the perspective of 
Baragwanath J, the effect of the analogy in New Zealand was limited by there being 
some provisions of ss 24 and 25 inapplicable to extradition cases, however. Also 
Baragwanath J viewed differently the scope of the words “charged with an offence” 
in ss 24 and 25 of the NZBORA, in that he held that "to the extent that the language 
of the Bill of Rights can reasonably be applied to public sector conduct affecting a 
person in New Zealand it should be applied ...".645 In conclusion, the majority 
favoured the predominant view in overseas cases that save rights to natural justice 
(namely s 27), extradition proceedings did not trigger criminal process rights 
(namely ss 24-25).  
 
Alternatively, it could be argued that the classification of extradition proceedings 
by the Supreme Court is incorrect. Extradition proceedings have been wrongly 
viewed as an administrative proceeding, when in fact a defendant under either the 
standard or backed-warrant procedure can be arrested, provisionally arrested and 
held in custody.  Moreover, under a backing-of-warrant procedure, the requested 
person faces deprivation of liberty on the basis of a mere allegation without the 
entitlement to adduce evidence as to whether there is a case to answer.   For 
example, in the course of writing this thesis the author had direct experience with a 
Part 4 surrender process.  In the first instance, there was considerable delay in 
obtaining legal-aid resulting from the application being referred to a Specialist 
Advisor in the civil rather than criminal section of the Legal Services Agency. 
Indeed, case law has acknowledged, extradition proceedings are “criminal 
proceedings, albeit of a very special kind”.646 As pointed out by Pyle, extradition 
proceedings initiate criminal trials and foreign prosecutors initiate extradition.647  
 
                                                          
643 Canada v Schmidt [1987] 1 SCR 500. See also Argentina v Mellino [1987] 1 SCR 536. 
644 Poon, above n 617.  
645 Poon, above n 617, at 76 per Baragwanath J.  
646 R (Government of the United States of America) v Bow Street Magistrates’ Court [2006] 
EWHC 2256 (Admin), [2007] 1 WLR 1157, cited favourably in Dotcom v The United States of 
America, above n 599. 
647 Christopher H Pyle Extradition, Politics, and Human Rights (Temple University Press, 
Philadelphia, 2001) at 303. 
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Further, extradition proceedings are subject to the Bail Act 2000, granted in the 
most “special circumstances” and in the case of the backed-warrant procedure, the 
Criminal Procedure Act 2011 is invoked which means that the surrender hearing is 
conducted as a preliminary hearing comparable to the process that a person would 
face if charged with a Category 2 offence in this country. Referring to the wider 
legislation applicable to the standard process, namely the Summary Proceedings  
 
Act, Elias J held in dissent in Dotcom:648 
 
 Those facing committal hearings under Part 5 of the Summary Proceedings 
 Act for New Zealand offences were clearly entitled to observance of a 
 number of the rights contained in ss 24 and 25 in a hearing to the same 
 effect as the determination of eligibility for surrender. 
 
By analogy with the Criminal Procedure Act, the same point applies to Part 4 of the 
1999 Act. Yet, the disparity in how rights under the NZBORA are applied is 
exemplified in the passage from Dotcom where McGrath and Blanchard JJ noted:649   
 
We see no sound basis in human rights jurisprudence or otherwise for an 
interpretation of the criminal process rights protections in the BORA that 
would apply them to an extradition hearing. Their application would 
change the preliminary nature of the hearing and give it an altogether 
different character. 
 
Granted, the inherent nature of the extradition process, renders some NZBORA 
rights inapplicable to an extradition hearing,650  but McGrath J fails to elaborate on 
how the preliminary nature of the hearing would change if ss 24-25 rights 
protections in the NZBORA applied to an extradition hearing. A similar point is 
raised by the dissenting views of Elias J and Glazebrook J, who both agreed with 
Baragwanath J in Poon.651 Elias J commented:652  
 
                                                          
648 Dotcom v The United States of America, above n 599, at [51] per Elias J. 
649 At [115] per McGrath and Blanchard JJ. 
650 At [51] per Elias J. 
651 At [51] per Elias; and at [277]-[281] per Glazebrook J. See Poon, above n 617. 
652 Dotcom v The United States of America, above n 599, at [51] per Elias J. 
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As Baragwanath J pointed out in an extradition context, the policy for 
differentiating in the of fundamental values between those in custody for 
extradition purposes and those in custody because they faced charges in 
New Zealand is elusive. In both cases the underlying justification for the 
exercise of judicial authority is that the individual is charged with an 
offence. 
 
Exemplifying the strength of this observation, are extradition cases that are 
followed by the surrendered person making an application for a stay of proceedings 
(discussed above).653 In these cases, the Court has shown a willingness to venture 
into the heart of the extradition process as part of its assessment of whether or not 
there was a breach of s 25(b) of the NZBORA.  Justification for considering the 
extradition process is that section 25(b), which provides for the right to be tried 
without undue delay, arises from the accepted view that pre-charge delay might in 
certain circumstances have an influence on the overall determination as to whether 
post-charge delay is unreasonable.654 
 
For instance, in context of a stay of proceedings applied for after the accused was 
surrendered from Australia to New Zealand to face charges of sexual offending, the 
High Court in R v BJ, determined that there had been no breach of s 25(b) of the 
NZBORA. 655   Having consideration for the higher threshold required to justify a 
stay of proceedings in cases of sexual offending, the High Court considered that as 
a matter of resources, it was reasonable for Police to await the outcome of the 
Australian prosecution before taking extradition proceedings.656  The High Court 
also attributed some of the delay to the accused, arising from his decision to resist 
surrender.657   
 
The question of the applicability of s 25(b) to Part 4 was also considered in Plakas 
v Police.658 In that case the requested person, Plakas, was sought for surrender to 
Australia in relation to fraud offences. At the same time, Plakas faced New Zealand 
                                                          
653 Plakas v Police, above n 152; and R v BJ HC Auckland, CRI-2009-092-009763, 20 October 
2011. 
654 See Rust v R (1995) 13 CRNZ 621 (HC) at 627.  
655 R v BJ HC Auckland, CRI-2009-092-009763, 20 October 2011. 
656 At [95]. 
657 At [96]. 
658 Plakas v Police, above n 152, at [7]. 
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charges, which he was informed may subject him to extradition proceedings for 
similar offending. Randerson J at the High Court, granted Plakas a stay of 
proceedings in relation to the New Zealand charges based upon its inherent 
jurisdiction to prevent an abuse of process in relation to prosecutions in New 
Zealand. In his reasons, His Honour determined that it would be unjust to the 
accused and a breach of his rights under s 25(b) of the NZBORA to allow his 
surrender to the Australian authorities but require him to await the outcome of those 
proceedings before a decision is made about the future of the New Zealand 
charge.659  
 
What these authorities demonstrate, is that the Supreme Court in Dotcom has not 
considered that extradition proceedings may in fact trigger appropriate BORA 
rights, namely ss 24 and 25 in certain circumstances, particularly where matters 
relating to the criminal trial process and the extradition proceedings are inter-
connected. To the extent that the accused person’s s 25(b) BORA rights are 
concerned, it is clear that the High Court recognises their application in context of 
a request for surrender to and from Australia under the backed-warrant procedure. 
Thus, the impression that there is a difference in regard to the application of the 
NZBORA in extradition and criminal proceedings is not only arbitrary and elusive, 
but sometimes illusory, at least as far as backed-warrants are concerned.  
 
6.6.5 Law Commission’s position 
Another approach is that of the Commission and its de-emphasis on the need to 
classify extradition proceedings as criminal or civil altogether.660 To this end, the 
Commission has teased apart those NZBORA rights that are applicable to 
extradition proceedings from those that relate to persons charged with offences 
rendering them inapplicable. The rationale being that “the extradition process is not, 
and should not try to be, a criminal process designed to establish the guilt or 
innocence of the person sought.”661  At the same time, the Commission recognises 
that many of the rights under the NZBORA overlap with a range of intended 
restrictions and safeguards designed to balance the interests of the requested 
                                                          
659 At [32], [34]. 
660 Issues Paper, above n 1, at [1.29]. 
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person.662 Restrictions and safeguards designed to protect the defendant under the 
backed-warrant process have been considered above. I have also illustrated how 
extradition proceedings under Part 4 intersect with the NZBORA in context of an 
application for a stay of proceedings.  
 
In an attempt to remedy the low level of procedural rights currently afforded to the 
accused in extradition proceedings, the Commission analysed ss 21-27 of NZBORA 
and assigned them to three categories of varying applicability to each stage of the 
proposed procedures for extradition.663   Many of the rights under ss 21-27, which 
would otherwise be determined as inapplicable to the requested person, are 
proposed in the draft Bill to reflect the importance the NZBORA values has to 
extradition proceedings. For instance, general rights which do not offend against 
the view that the provisions of the NZBORA relating to a charged offence are 
inapplicable to extradition proceedings, includes s 21 (the right to be free from 
unreasonable search and seizure); and s 22 (the right not to be arbitrarily 
detained).664   
 
In this way, (although the Commission view their approach reflecting more the 
Supreme Court unanimous decision, that s 27 natural justice provisions apply to 
extradition proceedings),665the Commission’s recommendations actually align 
fairly well with the dissenting view of Elias CJ and Glazebrook J in Dotcom.666 
Accepting that some of the provisions under ss 24 and 25 have no relevance to 
extradition proceedings, Elias J thought some of them did and could see no reason 
to deny these rights on the basis that the underlying offence, although it must be 
equivalent to an offence in New Zealand, is not a New Zealand offence. The 
examples given by Elias J are largely reflected in the Commission’s proposed 
amending legislation, designed to ensure:  the right to be informed “in detail of the 
nature… of the charge”; “the right to adequate time and facilities to prepare a 
                                                          
662 For example, s 7 contains mandatory grounds for refusing extradition which are based on 
established anti-discrimination and human rights standards and s 8 contain discretionary grounds 
based upon fundamental rights to justice such as fair trial rights relating to delay and good faith, 
captured by the unjust and oppressive provision. For example, Mercer – Court of Appeal, above n 
185; and Mailley – Court of Appeal 2016, above n 210. 
663 Report, above n 1, at [4.16]. 
664 At [4.4]. 
665 See Issues Paper, above n 1, at [1.29]. 
666 See Dotcom v The United States of America, above n 599, at [51]-[52] per Elias J; and at [277] 
per Glazebrook J. 
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defence” and “rights to legal assistance and the assistance of an interpreter”.667  
These recommendations also align fairly well with case law considered above under 
the backed-warrant procedure668  and assist in reconciling the tension identified in 
relation to consideration of pre-charge delay under s 25(b). 
 
The Commission’s recommendations under this head align with well-established 
practise across the simplified schemes of other states using surrender.  For example, 
both the EAW and NAW are amenable to the Charter of the EU, adherence to which 
is considered a necessary prerequisite to their existence.  Even the most archaic and 
inchoate backed-arrest warrant scheme, namely, the British Islands and the UK 
under s 13 of the 1848 Act is subject to the ECHR.  Those in Africa, are subject to 
the African Charter669 and national bills of rights.  
 
Without such measures, the requested person is subject to significant consequences 
for their liberty, by virtue of the provisions for arrest and detention without the 
possibility of bail. Exacerbating that concern, is the absence of the restriction 
requiring the prosecution to establish a prima facie case under Part 4.   
 
6.6.6 Summary  
The above discussion reveals that as far as current authority is concerned, namely 
Dotcom, the applicability of the NZBORA to extradition proceedings is limited to 
the right to natural justice under s 27.  The applicability of the NZBORA is 
particularly contentious under three heads of argument relating to criminal process 
rights, extra-territoriality and classification of rights. The main point this thesis 
makes is that the Dotcom position, in this regard, is not necessarily generalizable to 
the backed-arrest warrant procedure, at least as far as Australia is concerned. The 
familiar theme of the Commission’s tendency to blur the standard procedure with 
the backed-warrant procedure in its proposals, reappears in reference to the 
NZBORA. Ultimately, however, the Commission’s proposal to implement 
extradition-appropriate NZBORA rights, aligns fairly well with the dissenting view 
                                                          
667 At [52] per Elias J. Compare to Report, above n 12, at [4.16]. 
668 For example, Matthews, above n 614; and Johnstone, above n 604. 
669 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted on 27 June 1981, entered into force on 
21 October 1986) <www.achpr.org/instruments>. 
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in Dotcom, and what is similarly the case under other simplified schemes operating 










Extradition is meant to be expeditious and efficient. At the same time, the process 
must provide adequate protection to the rights of the person sought for extradition. 
These principles underlie the Law Commission’s rationale for the proposals 
examined above.  It is, however, argued that in proposing a new Act, the 
Commission has shown limited consideration for the impact of its proposals on the 
Part 4, backed-warrant procedure and how by extension these two principles are 
affected. 
First, this thesis has sought to show how the Commission’s failure to delineate 
between the standard and backed-warrant procedure in proposing a new Act, 
impacts negatively on its proposals for the backed-warrant procedure.   At the root 
of the problem is a lack of consideration to any case law relevant to the backed-
warrant procedure, which might have otherwise compelled the Commission to 
reconsider its position in making blanket proposals, namely, a proposed new unjust 
or oppressive provision.  Instead, the Commission simply drew a parallel with 
Australia’s extradition legislation,670 without giving adequate consideration to the 
implications relevant case law concerning s 34(2) of Australia’s 1988 (Cth) Act, 
has for the Part 4, backed-warrant procedure.   Arguably, this proposed new unjust 
or oppressive provision will breach comity and impede rather than enhance the 
expediency of the Part 4, backed-warrant procedure.  Notwithstanding that the 
backed-warrant procedure relies heavily on comity, the Commission clearly has 
reservations about this practise, indicated by its inconsistent application of comity.  
This thesis has also shown that in being led by the Dotcom litigation, the 
Commission has narrowly focussed upon the NZBORA as it applies to the standard 
procedure. It is, however, apparent that there are appreciable differences in how the 
NZBORA is applied by the New Zealand courts between the standard procedure 
and backed-warrant procedure. Another more subtle example of the Commission’s 
failure to delineate between the standard and backed-warrant procedure, relates to 
how comity is understood and applied by the decision-maker, which may vary 
according to whether extradition involves a standard or simplified procedure.  How 
each country is categorised gives rise to further definitional differences.  Arguably, 
comity under Part 4 in relation to Australia is qualitatively different from comity in 
                                                          
670 Extradition Act 1988 (Cth), s 34(2). 
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relation to the UK, as a function of geographic proximity and economic importance 
for instance.671      
 
Secondly, this thesis has demonstrated how the Commission’s emphasis on comity, 
has been inconsistently applied. In the first instance, the Commission placed too 
much importance on comity by proposing removal of some or all grounds for 
refusing surrender in the case of Australia.  Then the comity rationale was 
abandoned altogether, when the Commission changed tack and recommended 
leaving the grounds for surrender under the Part 4, backed-warrant procedure intact. 
Similarly, the role envisioned for a central authority in the backed-warrant 
procedure, shifted from being a fairly confined, in a manner consistent with the 
need to preserve its perceived efficiency, to one that is more pervasive.  The 
Commission’s final position is consistent with a blanket approach, and one that 
limits rather than enhances the importance of comity. I argue, that such an approach, 
insofar as the Part 4, backed-warrant procedure is concerned, does not, in the words 
of the Commission, “strike the necessary and appropriate balance between 
protecting the rights of those whose extradition is sought and providing an efficient 
mechanism for extradition”. Consequently, there is a lack of coherency in the 
Commission’s proposals and underlying rationale.  These particular proposals are 
hard to reconcile with other proposals that are built upon the importance of 
trustworthiness and comity in regard to Australia, namely the proposal to further 
simplify the backed-warrant procedure. This leaves it open to question whether the 
Commission has as much faith in comity with Australia as they appear to profess.  
This thesis has shown that the concern is well-founded, however, and in the face of 
cases such as Bennett and Samson, strengthens the case for the proposed role of a 
central authority as opposed to the Police, at least in the initial stages of the backed-
warrant procedure.   
 
For this reason, this thesis is aligned to the Commission’s decisive position in 
favour of importing into the 1999 Act more provisions of the NZBORA than 
judicial authority has thus far determined apply. Thus the Commission has provided 
valuable contributions in attempt to resolve the problem in respect of ss 24-25 of 
                                                          
671 Issues Paper, above n 1, at [6.23]. 
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the NZBORA and the values they reflect, without compromising the objective of 
the extradition process. This would bring New Zealand in alignment with overseas 
trends (most other simplified schemes incorporate human rights instruments) and 
the weight that must be given to the liberty interests of the person.   
 
To bring these provisions within the backed-warrant procedure, I suggest will allow 
the Central Authority to consider matters of due process at the request phase and 
Issues Conference, respectively.  It is the combined effect of the proposal to 
establish a Central Authority, implement extradition-appropriate BORA rights, that 
will more likely accommodate the liberty interests of the person without 
compromising the efficacy of the backed-warrant procedure.  For instance, there is 
reason to doubt that the court is prepared to use its inherent power to guarantee 
protection against an abuse of process, in context of the backed-warrant procedure.  
Justice Randerson’s disavowal of Bennett, suggests that another layer of protection 
against an abuse of process is appropriate.   In these circumstances, it would be 
prudent to make explicit provision for the NZBORA as proposed by the 
Commission.  At all times, before and after arrest, the NZBORA should bind the 
New Zealand Police, even when it acts outside of New Zealand.  The case for extra-
territorial application of the NZBORA, to Australia requires a liberal interpretation 
of the existing jurisprudence, however.  
 
Thirdly, this thesis has demonstrated that the Commission has based its proposals 
on unchallenged assumptions about comity in regard to Australia.  The impact of 
this tendency is most relevant to the proposal to further simplify the backed-warrant 
procedure.   In particular, this thesis argues that based upon the above analysis of 
case law, the Australian judiciary has proven itself to be a flouter of comity as far 
as the required standard of evidence is concerned.  This approach by the Australian 
judiciary, particularly the lower courts, is not aligned with the majority of 
Commonwealth countries that operate simplified schemes.   There are appreciable 
differences in how comity and liberty interests are weighed in context of the 1988 
(Cth) Act compared to the 1991 Act.  It may be the result of a partitioning between 
the influence of a broad latitude given to the judiciary by virtue of s 34(2) “for any 
other reason” and what the Australian judiciary, regard as firmly established 
authority for considering an exception to the prima facie requirement and the role 
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of the SEPA 1901, in assessing the grounds for refusing to surrender a requested 
person to New Zealand. Thus it is difficult to reconcile these findings with the 
assumption of there being mutual trust and comity between New Zealand and 
Australia.   In my view, comity demands that Australia should not interpret one 
enactment with another (namely, SEPCA 1901 and Part 3 of the 1988 Act). 
It follows therefore, that the Commission’s proposal for further simplification of 
the backed-warrant procedure, under Part 4, in regard to Australia, places too much 
emphasis on comity and trustworthiness.  In critiquing the Commission’s 
suggestion to further simplify the backed-warrant procedure, this thesis has also 
emphasised the significance of protecting against an abuse of process, exemplified 
in the authorities considered, namely Bennett, Samson and Hohemann.   Further 
simplification of the backed-warrant procedure, is therefore unjustified and would 
be in principle, an unnecessary sacrifice of the person’s liberty interests in favour 
of comity and international cooperation. In any event, the need for further 
simplification of the backed-warrant procedure, is arguable and likely to be 
thwarted by the proposed new “unjust or oppressive” provision. 
 
As a result of all of the issues identified above, it is uncertain what policy the 
Commission has or should have towards the backed-warrant procedure.  It remains 
to be seen whether the effect of the new unjust and oppressive provision, if 
implemented by the government, will frustrate the backed-warrant procedure and 
suffer the same judicial fascination with fair trial issues as evidenced in Australian 
case law, or whether the problem can be avoided by the newly proposed Issues 
Conference. Perhaps a solution would be to amend these proposals in a way that 
delineates the standard from the backed-warrant procedure.  To that end, it would 
be helpful to consider how the judiciary is understanding comity and whether it 
needs to be re-conceptualised, and operationally defined in the new Act, so that it 
fits consistently with the Commission’s attempt to modernise our extradition 
legislation. Ultimately, it should be determined whether the current backed-warrant 
procedure, is discouraging surrender requests and suffering the same delays 
associated with the standard procedure,672 before tampering with the current 
balance.  
                                                          
672 Issues Paper, above n 1, at [9.63].  
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To sum up then, in recommending removal of some or all of the grounds for 
refusing surrender,673 it is contended that the emphasis placed on comity, is based 
upon unchallenged assumptions about New Zealand’s relationship with Australia. 
At the same time, it is argued that under the new proposed “unjust and oppressive” 
provision, akin to that of Australia, 674 the Commission’s change of heart, in leaving 
intact the grounds for refusing surrender, suggests that we follow the lead of the 




























                                                          
673 Issues Paper, above n 1, at [6.22]-[6.23]. 
674 Extradition Act 1988 (Cth), s 34(2). 
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